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Parenthood Divided:

A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations

By Jill Elaine Hasday
Abstract:
The American law of parent and child is conventionally understood to be extremely
deferential to parental prerogatives and highly reluctant to intervene. But this picture, endorsed by
legal authorities and popular commentators from the nineteenth century to the present day, reflects
only one tradition in the law’s regulation of parenthood. Since the last quarter of the nineteenth
century, there has also been massive legal intervention into the parental relation. This second legal
tradition, moreover, has been guided by norms wholly different from those conventionally associated
with family law, often evincing a radical suspicion of parental autonomy and an eager willingness to
reshape family relations. This Article explores how the divide in the laws and norms governing the
parental relation emerged and maintained itself, tracing an important chapter in the history of the
law’s regulation of family life. It then uses this history to examine why the divide has survived the
modern constitutional era.
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INTRODUCTION
The American law of parent and child is conventionally understood to be extremely
deferential to parental prerogatives and highly reluctant to intervene.1 But this picture, endorsed by
legal authorities and popular commentators from the nineteenth century to the present day, reflects
only one tradition in the law’s regulation of parenthood. Since the last quarter of the nineteenth
century, there has also been massive legal intervention into the parental relation. This second legal
tradition, moreover, has been guided by norms wholly different from those conventionally associated
with family law, often evincing a radical suspicion of parental autonomy and an eager willingness to
reshape family relations.
Consider, to take just one prominent modern example, the bifurcation between the norms
and procedures that the Social Security program employs in dealing with parental relations, and
those that shape Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or its recent successor,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). All of these programs are forms of family law,
determining who counts as a family member for their purposes and regulating the legal rights and
responsibilities that family members have because of this legal status.2 The Social Security program,
however, is highly respectful of familial autonomy and self-government, abiding by the presumptions
that the authoritative accounts of family law continue to endorse. Its laws and regulations distribute
financial benefits to the spouses and dependent minor children of qualified workers, but make no
attempt to determine whether recipients have properly fulfilled their familial responsibilities or to
restructure a family’s home life. Its benefits are entitlements that family members collect based solely
on their family status. When a parent entitled to Social Security benefits (usually a father) dies or
retires, his spouse and his dependent minor children are automatically entitled to collect Social
Security benefits.3 AFDC and TANF are also contemporary governmental programs that structure
the legal rights and obligations of family members and distribute financial benefits to families with an
absent or incapacitated parent, usually a father. But these programs, which overwhelmingly serve
poor single mothers and their dependent minor children, routinely scrutinize the familial relations of
their recipients, doubt parental judgment, and undercut familial autonomy.4
This Article explores how the divide in the laws and norms governing the parental relation
emerged and maintained itself, tracing an important chapter in the history of the law’s regulation of
1

See infra text accompanying notes 25-54, 195-200, 264-284.
There is a long tradition of federal family law that continues to thrive in the modern era. See Jill Elaine
Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1319-86 (1998). For a more extended
discussion of the definition of family law, see id. at 1311, 1370-73.
3
See infra text accompanying notes 270-279.
4
See infra text accompanying notes 225-263.
2
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family life.

It then uses this history to examine why the divide has survived the modern

constitutional era. The sharp contrast between Social Security and AFDC or TANF is neither
inevitable nor a one-time anomaly, simply the product of unique political commitments and
coalitions shaping individual statutory schemes along different lines. It is a recent episode in a
specific and lengthy history, part of a bifurcation in the law’s treatment of parenthood that has
flourished since the late nineteenth century.
It is also an example of the ways in which modern courts, in considering what equality means,
have reasoned from within the very same history and structure that produced the challenged practice
in the first place. Current constitutional doctrine easily holds that states can use the provision of aid
to subject recipients of AFDC or TANF to forms of intervention that would never be used against
recipients of Social Security. State AFDC programs, for example, were free to require home
inspections as a condition of eligibility for assistance.5 State TANF programs are permitted to create
strong disincentives against having children, by providing no additional aid for a child born while her
mother is receiving TANF.6 Courts have protected the bifurcation between Social Security and
AFDC or TANF as a matter of constitutional law. Indeed, they have made clear that they take this
type of bifurcation to be a matter of common sense, something that requires little, if any, justificatory
explanation. In the process, this contemporary constitutional framework has allowed the historical
divide in the law’s treatment of parenthood to persist, without ever rigorously questioning whether it
is consistent with basic principles of equality.
In order to uncover the principles and presumptions that have historically guided the law’s
bifurcated treatment of parenthood, this Article begins by considering how the bifurcation was
created and sustained. This history is, in part, a record of the origins of the modern welfare state.
But it is also, and more precisely, a particularly legal history about the development of new bodies of
law to manage the dependency of poor people in a wage labor economy. The common law, the
historical source of the noninterventionism generally ascribed to family law, was fiercely committed
to upholding the household governance of the husband and father. But by the last half of the
nineteenth century, many leading Americans had come to believe that this form of sovereignty was
inappropriate for vast numbers of family men. These husbands and fathers were found wanting in
several vital respects. Indeed, their failure was powerfully intersectional, simultaneously drawing
weight from divides of class, race, and gender. As an initial matter, these men had failed to earn
wages sufficient to keep their wives and children out of market labor, in an era that increasingly took
this often unattainable goal to be the measure of both sound moral character in general and
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See infra text accompanying notes 288-310.
See infra text accompanying notes 337-350.
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successful manhood more particularly. Moreover, and intensifying the consequences of this first set
of failures, men who failed to provide for their families’ entire support were disproportionately likely
to be part of an ethnically or racially marginalized group, which made it more difficult for them to
demand intrinsic respect as the patriarchs of their own homes.
The new legal regimes governing family relations that emerged starting in the nineteenth
century were directed at these families, subjecting all their members to intense regulatory scrutiny
because of the failed fatherhood of their assumed head. Like the common law, these new regimes
evaluated and classified women and children in terms of their relationships with adult men. The
legal treatment accorded to these presumed dependents turned on judgments about the men to
which they were or should have been attached. Family law, as it was officially described, was limited
to those principles and presumptions governing families with a recognized male patriarch. These new
bodies of law, for families with failed fathers, regulated the terms of parenthood. But they took their
logic precisely from standing outside of what was considered to be family law.
The result was a two-part regime, implicitly understood but never fully acknowledged, that
persists to the present day. After examining in Part I the legal, social, and economic forces driving
the split, this Article proceeds in Part II to consider two key moments in the bifurcation of the law’s
treatment of parental relations. The first revolves around the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Children, established in New York in 1874 and quickly spread across the nation. Focused on
families in which fathers were unable to earn income sufficient for their children’s support, these
societies were highly interventionist and very hostile to claims of parental right. Led by wealthy
private philanthropists, they amassed unprecedented legal authority to scrutinize parental behavior,
arrest parents, and remove thousands of children.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, this interventionist impulse had begun to take
what would become its more prominent modern form. The second turning point in the law’s
bifurcation that this Article considers involves the mothers’ pension laws that swept state legislatures
starting in 1911. Like the child cruelty societies, the mothers’ pension programs regulated families
without a viable male patriarch. Their jurisdiction was limited to families in which the father, if
alive, had failed to maintain his family on his own wages, and his wife and children needed economic
assistance. But the regulatory concern and reach of these programs extended beyond failed fathers
alone to equally encompass the wives and mothers associated with these unsuccessful family men.
When either parent in these families was at issue, the mothers’ pension programs were systematically
suspicious of parental judgment and eager to monitor, critique, and reshape parental behavior. The
underlying norms carried over strongly from the child cruelty societies and the laws that empowered
them. Only the form of the legal intervention was noticeably new. The mothers’ pension programs
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were fully state-run. More crucially, they relied on the provision and denial of desperately needed
financial aid, much more than the threat of familial separation, to accomplish their agenda.
Much of this historical record might appear vulnerable to normative scrutiny. But the divide
in the law’s treatment of parental relations has persisted nonetheless, and been accorded
constitutional protection besides. As Part III explains, the law still uses the transfer of funds through
government programs thought to signify dependency and failed fatherhood (like AFDC or TANF) as
grounds for subjecting men, and the women and children associated with them, to rules that are
interventionist, instrumental, and very much opposed to those that otherwise govern the legal
treatment of family relations. In part, this divide in the regulation of parenthood has avoided critical
attention because family law is still conventionally defined to include only those legal practices and
presumptions applied to families considered financially self-sufficient (like those receiving Social
Security). The bodies of law that operate to constrain or deny household autonomy are typically
understood as falling solely within the jurisdiction of welfare or poverty law, even though they
regulate the rights, responsibilities, and relationships of family members and thus importantly
function as forms of family law as well.
More fundamentally, however, the disutility of the current constitutional framework has
collapsed serious normative debate about whether particular transfers of money should be the
occasion for a complete switch in the norms that the law uses to govern parental relations. Modern
constitutional law is structured so that it is all but impossible to raise a successful legal challenge to
government programs that condition the provision of aid to poor families on the surrender of legal
and constitutional rights to privacy and autonomy that the recipient families would otherwise enjoy.
This jurisprudence has protected the bifurcation in the law’s treatment of parental relations with few
questions, upholding the divide by accepting and reasoning within its confines.
With little room in constitutional jurisprudence to discuss or redress this dual normative
regime, the issue has not been subject to sustained debate in political or popular discourse. But
serious deliberation on the question is long overdue as a matter of legislative policy. The question is
not what amount of welfare the government should supply, a much addressed topic. Rather, it
concerns whether and to what extent the provision of welfare should change the legal rules of
parenthood. Why should it be that a father’s failure to provide, combined with a mother and child’s
call on the state for support through certain stigmatized programs, is still sufficient to subject the
entire family to a completely different, and much more instrumental, set of laws and norms governing
their family life? Constitutional law and legislative decision makers have hardly begun to frame that
question, much less answer it. The divide in the law’s treatment of parenthood is generally taken to
be so commonsensical and so familiar as to obviate the need for serious explanation, even though

4

many of the reasons historically offered to create and maintain the bifurcation would not persuade
substantial numbers of contemporary Americans. History offers little defense for the divide in the
legal regulation of parenthood. The time for serious reflection about whether and why the
bifurcation should persist is long past due.
I.

THE BIFURCATION OF THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF PARENTHOOD
A.

A Stark Divide in the Legal Regulation of Parenthood Emerges in Late Nineteenth-Century
America

The founding of the first Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children marks a pivotal
moment in the bifurcation of the law’s treatment of parental relations. The New York Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children was established in New York City in 1874 by two elite reformers,
Henry Bergh and Elbridge Gerry, who used the occasion of a celebrated case of physical violence
against a child to create the first organization designed to combat “child cruelty” in the United
States.7 Common law courts of the period staunchly protected the rights that parents in general and
fathers in particular exercised over the custody and control of their children.8 But the New York
society accorded almost no weight to the prerogatives of the parents it was concerned about,
characterizing their connection to their children as little stronger than the ties of happenstance.
Gerry explained at an organizational meeting in December 1874, for instance, that the society would
“seek out and rescue from the dens and slums of the City the little unfortunates whose lives were
rendered miserable by the system of cruelty and abuse which was constantly practiced upon them by
the human brutes [their parents] who happened to possess the custody or control of them.”9 Describing
the homes of cruel parents as “dens and slums” offered a key clue, of course, to the limits the New
York society placed on its jurisdiction. From the start, it focused on families that had not been
7

See Fearful Cruelty to a Child, EVENING POST (New York), Apr. 9, 1874, at 4, 4; Mr. Bergh Enlarging His
Sphere of Usefulness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1874, at 8, 8; The Mission of Humanity, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1874, at 2, 2;
Mary Ellen Wilson, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1874, at 2, 2; The Cruel Step-Mother, EVENING POST (New York), Apr. 27,
1874, at 4, 4; Mary Ellen Wilson, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1874, at 8, 8; Protection for Children, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
1874, at 3, 3; Little Mary Ellen Finally Disposed Of, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1874, at 12, 12; Prevention of Cruelty to
Children, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1874, at 2, 2.
Even before the plight of this particular child came to light in 1874, Henry Bergh, the president of the Society
for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, had been lobbied to extend his reformist concern to children. One woman, for
instance, had written a public letter to Bergh in 1872 urging him to “prevent the cruelty used toward the little children in
our streets,” meaning specifically the cruelty of “the beggars in our streets” who used allegedly drugged children to aid in
their appeals to the sympathy of passersby. The letter writer advocated placing these children “in an asylum of some
kind” and imprisoning the adult beggars “where they will have to work.” Cruelty to Children, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1872,
at 3, 3 (Letter from “A LADY WHO IS DEEPLY INTERESTED” to Mr. Bergh (Jan. 24, 1872)); see also Mr. Bergh Enlarging
His Sphere of Usefulness, supra, at 8 (noting Bergh’s presidency of the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals).
8
See infra Part I.B.
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successful in the wage labor economy, operating on the principle that this economic failure had been
caused by some crucial moral or character flaw.10
The New York society was formally a private organization supported mainly by private
11

funds. Some of the wealthiest and most prominent men in the nation sat on its board of directors.12
Yet reform movements in the late nineteenth century often closely intermingled elite private
philanthropy and state power,13 and the New York society sought, and quickly won, tremendous
9

Protection for Children, supra note 7, at 3 (reporting remarks of Elbridge Gerry) (emphasis added).
See infra text accompanying notes 142-149.
11
Initially, the New York society received no money from either New York State or New York City. See, e.g.,
THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 7 (New York,
Styles & Cash 1882) [hereinafter THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, SEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT] (“[The New York society] does not derive one dollar of aid from either the State or city; but, on the
contrary, pays taxes to the latter on the building which it occupies, and in which it receives children at any hour of the day
or night.”). But in 1894, New York City began providing the society with an annual appropriation of $30,000. See, e.g.,
Law of Feb. 14, 1894, ch. 25, §§ 1-2, 1894 N.Y. Laws 60, 60 (“To the New York society for the prevention of cruelty to
children, the sum of thirty thousand dollars for the uses and purposes of said society. . . . The board of estimate and
apportionment of the city of New York is hereby authorized to make immediate provision for the payment hereby
authorized.”), amended by Law of Apr. 19, 1894, ch. 336, § 2, 1894 N.Y. Laws 613, 613 (authorizing the New York City
board of estimate and apportionment to provide for the payment to the New York society in 1894 “of such portion of the
sum of thirty thousand dollars as herein authorized and as may be necessary for the uses and purposes of said society in
said year by directing the comptroller to issue and sell revenue bonds of said city”); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 8 (New York, no publisher 1898) [hereinafter
THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT] (“For its
legal work . . . , it receives an appropriation from the City of New York, to be applied to its uses and purposes. It does
not receive anything from the City or State for the support, education, care or maintenance of the children.”); THE NEW
YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 11 (New York, no
publisher 1899) [hereinafter THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, TWENTY-FOURTH
ANNUAL REPORT] (“The expenses of this latter work [bringing ‘violations to the attention of the courts,’ asking ‘that the
violators be punished, and, if the case demands it, that children be taken’] have for some years been defrayed, in part
only, by a small appropriation received from the City of New York . . . .”).
12
John D. Wright, the New York society’s first president, was a wealthy businessman who had made his fortune
in the leather business. See John D. Wright Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1879, at 5, 5. Commodore Vanderbilt, one of
the richest men in America, was one of the New York society’s first vice presidents. Vanderbilt’s contribution was
mainly financial. He reportedly told Wright: “‘John, I haven’t got the time to go into this thing myself, but I’ll give you all
the money you want.’” Id. The list of vice presidents also included Peter Cooper, a wealthy businessman and the founder
of Cooper Union. See id.; MIRIAM GURKO, THE LIVES AND TIMES OF PETER COOPER 166-83 (1959); EDWARD C. MACK,
PETER COOPER 243-73 (1949).
Elbridge Gerry, the guiding force behind the New York society, served first as its counsel and, after Wright’s
death in 1879, as its president. He was a wealthy lawyer and investor, with an impeccable pedigree: His grandfather, of
the same name, had signed the Declaration of Independence. See SYDNEY H. COLEMAN, HUMANE SOCIETY LEADERS IN
AMERICA 66-67 (1924); Elbridge T. Gerry Dies in 90th Year, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1927, at 15, 15; Gerry’s Odd Actions,
CHI. TRIB., May 15, 1892, at 31, 31 (“[Gerry] is a man of unquestioned philanthropy, a capital yachtsman, [and] the
possessor of a fortune of about $10,000,000 . . . .”); see also Elbridge T. Gerry, The Relation of Societies for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children to Child-Saving Work, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH ANNUAL NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTIONS HELD AT MADISON, WIS., AUG. 7-12, 1882, at 127, 129 (A.O. Wright ed.,
Madison, Midland Publishing Co. 1883) (noting that the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children “are
composed of humane persons of social position, unquestioned integrity and undoubted zeal”) (emphasis added).
13
Anthony Comstock, for instance, was an agent for the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), serving
on its Committee for the Suppression of Vice. Established in 1872, this Committee was formed and financed by some of
the same wealthy and influential New York philanthropists who served on the New York cruelty society’s board. See
10

6

public authority. At the society’s urging, the New York legislature created new forms of positive law,
at sharp variance with common law principles, to regulate poor families deemed pathological.
These laws authorized the intense scrutiny of family life, the frequent arrest and incarceration
of parents found wanting, and the systematic institutionalization of their children. The New York
society’s work did not constitute the first occasion in American history in which public regulatory
efforts were directed at poor families. Most notably, the Elizabethan poor laws in England had their
equivalents in the early American colonies, states, and territories.14 But the New York society,
ANNA LOUISE BATES, WEEDER IN THE GARDEN OF THE LORD: ANTHONY COMSTOCK’S LIFE AND CAREER 62 (1995);
Robert Bremner, Introduction to ANTHONY COMSTOCK, TRAPS FOR THE YOUNG, at vii, xi (Robert Bremner ed., Harvard
Univ. Press 1967) (1883). The next year, Comstock won public authority to implement the agenda he had been pursuing
through privately organized philanthropy. Comstock was the key lobbyist behind the 1873 federal anti-obscenity law,
which was popularly known as the “Comstock Act.” See BATES, supra, at 80-91; HEYWOOD BROUN & MARGARET
LEECH, ANTHONY COMSTOCK: ROUNDSMAN OF THE LORD 128-44 (1927); An Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and
Circulation of, obscene Literature and Articles of immoral Use (Comstock Act), ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873).
Immediately after the law was enacted, Comstock was appointed special agent of the Post Office, empowered to enforce
the statute. See BATES, supra, at 90; BROUN & LEECH, supra, at 143; Bremner, supra, at xiii.
A number of the private reform groups that organized to combat prostitution in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries also wielded significant influence and power within the law enforcement process. Agents for the
“Committee of Fourteen for the Suppression of ‘Raines Law Hotels’ in New York City,” which was incorporated in 1907,
investigated “‘current vice conditions’” in order to pass along their findings to law enforcement officials. Committee
agents also provided police officers with personal introductions “‘to probable law-breakers,’” “‘continued with the police
during the securing of the evidence,’” and “‘later appeared in court as . . . witness[es].’” WILLOUGHBY CYRUS
WATERMAN, PROSTITUTION AND ITS REPRESSION IN NEW YORK CITY, 1900-1931, at 98, 109-10 (1932) (quoting
COMMITTEE OF FOURTEEN, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1922, at 4-5); see also id. at 81 (discussing the Society for the
Prevention of Crime, incorporated in New York in 1878 “‘to aid in the enforcement of the laws of th[e] state’” against
prostitution (quoting SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIME, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT (1878))); WALTER C.
RECKLESS, VICE IN CHICAGO 254-55 (Patterson Smith Publishing Corp. 1969) (1933) (discussing the Committee of
Fifteen, incorporated in Illinois in 1911 “‘to aid the public authorities in the enforcement of all laws against pandering and
to take measures calculated to suppress the white slave traffic’” (quoting Committee’s incorporating documents)).
14
On the Elizabethan poor laws, see generally LYNN HOLLEN LEES, THE SOLIDARITIES OF STRANGERS: THE
ENGLISH POOR LAWS AND THE PEOPLE, 1700-1948 (1998); E.M. LEONARD, THE EARLY HISTORY OF ENGLISH POOR
RELIEF (1900); PAUL SLACK, THE ENGLISH POOR LAW, 1531-1782 (1990). For a thorough account of the impact that the
Elizabethan poor laws had on the law of California, see Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its
Origin, Development, and Present Status (pts. 1-3), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257 (1964) [hereinafter tenBroek, Part 1], 16
STAN. L. REV. 900 (1964) [hereinafter tenBroek, Part 2], 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965) [hereinafter tenBroek, Part 3].
tenBroek’s landmark study of California argued that the family law of that state was split in two, and identified
the legal regime governing poor families in California as an almost direct modern descendant of the Elizabethan poor
laws. See, e.g., tenBroek, Part 1, supra, at 257-58; tenBroek, Part 2, supra, at 978 (“[California] adheres to a pattern cut
in Elizabethan England which was widely received in the American colonies and continued with little adaptation in the
states.”). On his account, however, the family law of California reflected a straightforward class divide, rather than a
division also infused with important considerations of gender and race. In this vision, “[t]he basic motive” of the family
law governing the poor in California was simply “fiscal and economic: to conserve public funds to the fullest extent
possible consistent with the original undertaking.” tenBroek, Part 3, supra, at 676. tenBroek did note that “racial and
ethnic minorities” were among “the principal victims of poverty” (women were not included on the list). tenBroek, Part
2, supra, at 978. But he did not consider the ways in which evolving norms of appropriate family life, driven by
intersecting divides of class, race, and gender, might have affected the development of family law. See infra Part I.C.
tenBroek also did not examine regulatory efforts like the child cruelty societies, which in their enthusiasm to arrest
parents and institutionalize children hardly operated on the premise that public funds needed to be carefully conserved
(although that impulse certainly does help explain the eventual unpopularity of the cruelty societies’ methods). See infra
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driven by a new vision of appropriate family life and domesticity that became dominant over the
course of nineteenth century,15 pursued its interventionist agenda with an unflagging energy for
enforcement, a tremendous reach, and an impulse to centralize legal power in itself that the nation
had never before seen in anywhere near the same dimensions.
The New York society’s statute of incorporation gave it the right to call on the police for
assistance, to bring complaints to court, and to provide the courts with factual information.16 It
steadily built on this base. Society agents literally roamed the streets looking for instances of child
cruelty,17 and they followed children back to their homes.18 By 1881, they had won the statutory
right to make arrests on their own authority.19 The society also developed a powerful role in the
courts, deploying its prosecutorial power enthusiastically and against thousands of parents. By the
end of 1900, the year of Gerry’s resignation, it had brought 52,860 criminal cases, resulting in 49,330
convictions (a 93.3% success rate).20 During the same period, the society removed 90,078 children
with judicial approval.21 It exercised enormous discretion over their placement,22 and put the
overwhelming majority in institutions.23 Once a child had been removed from her parents at the
note 192 and accompanying text.
15
See infra Parts I.C, II.B.
16
See An Act for the incorporation of societies for the prevention of cruelty to children, ch. 130, §§ 3-4, 1875
N.Y. Laws 114, 114.
17
See THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT
12 (New York, no publisher 1889) [hereinafter THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO
CHILDREN, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT] (“The work continues as in the years gone by, and the Society’s officers both
night and day search the slums and by-ways of this great city to save and rescue the ‘neglected child’ . . . .”); THE NEW
YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 7 (New York, no
publisher 1894) [hereinafter THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, NINETEENTH
ANNUAL REPORT] (“In the heat of the summer and in the storm of the winter, [the society’s] officers penetrate the haunts
of vice . . . .”).
18
See THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 6
(New York, Styles & Cash 1878) (“A number of degraded children have been removed from their parents. Great pains
have been taken to exercise this delicate power with justice and discrimination. The children are always followed to their
homes, and the exact condition of the family ascertained, whether professionals or unfortunate.”).
19
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 293 (1881).
20
See THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL
REPORT 12, 16 (New York, no publisher 1901).
21
See id. at 16.
22
See, e.g., THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, SEVENTH ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 11, at 6 (noting that the society’s “aid is invoked in placing the children it rescues with the proper
institutions or persons, to whom their permanent care is assigned”). Indeed, an 1886 New York statute provided that
courts could appoint the New York society to serve as a child’s guardian. See An Act to amend chapter one hundred and
thirty of the laws of eighteen hundred and seventy-five entitled “An act for the incorporation of societies for the
prevention of cruelty to children,” ch. 30, § 1, 1886 N.Y. Laws 38, 38.
23
The New York society’s first annual report recorded the “Disposition made of [72] Children at the instance of
the Society.” THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 45 (New
York, Styles & Cash 1876) [hereinafter THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT]. Eight (11.1%) children had been placed in homes or “situations” (presumably apprenticeships or
domestic service), 11 (15.3%) were lost or stolen children who were returned to their parents, and 53 (73.6%) were
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New York society’s instigation or with its help, the courts were extremely reluctant to allow visitation
or to release the child, unless the society agreed.24
The New York society’s work, examined in more detail in Part II, constitutes a crucial episode
in the creation of two sets of normative and legal systems for governing the parent-child relation.
The rest of this part places that bifurcation in historical context. First, to make clear the sharpness of
the divide that emerged in the nineteenth century’s legal treatment of parental relations, it reviews
the common law principles of parenthood that courts and authoritative legal writers continued to
promulgate throughout the century, principles grounded in deference to paternal autonomy. It then
analyzes the social and economic forces that helped convince many leading nineteenth-century
Americans that common law rules and norms could not govern vast numbers of families, that new
bodies of law had to be created outside the official jurisdiction of family law because many families
had no patriarch worthy of the public’s deference.

institutionalized. See id. The society followed that pattern consistently. Its third annual report, for instance, recorded the
disposition of 461 children removed from their parents during 1877. Twenty-six (5.6%) had been placed in homes or
situations, 58 (12.6%) were lost, stolen, or strayed children who were returned to their parents, and 377 (81.8%) were
institutionalized. See THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 18, at 66.
The New York society did promise from the start, however, that it had no intention of attempting to convert
Catholic children by placing them in Protestant institutions. The Catholic Church had accused the Children’s Aid Society
of this practice, and the New York cruelty society was eager to avoid that controversy. See, e.g., Prevention of Cruelty to
Children, supra note 7, at 2 (“It was unjustly intimated that the society was got up in favor of the Protestant sects, and
that it was to interfere with the religion of Roman Catholic children. . . . He, as counsel, would place all Roman Catholic
Children in Roman Catholic institutions.”) (reporting remarks of Elbridge Gerry); CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE
NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN 7 (New York, no publisher 1875) (“[This society]
proposes to labor in the interest of no one religious denomination . . . .”); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION
OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 27 (“[The society’s] officers have in every case endeavored
to ascertain the religious faith of the parents of the child, informed the Court thereof, and urged the commitment of the
child ‘to an institution governed or controlled by officers or persons of such religious faith as far as practicable.’” (quoting
ch. 173, § 2, 1875 N.Y. Laws)); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, TENTH
ANNUAL REPORT 13 (New York, no publisher 1885) [hereinafter THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF
CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT] (“[The society] labors, side by side, and harmoniously with the other
institutions, irrespective of creed; for all religious denominations are represented in its Board of Directors, and its work is
entirely unsectarian.”).
24
See, e.g., People v. Giles, 46 N.E. 326, 326-28 (N.Y. 1897) (finding for society in case where mother had lost
custody on charge that she was running a brothel and society refused to surrender children after mother was acquitted in
criminal trial); In re Diss Debar, 3 N.Y.S. 667, 669 (Sup. Ct. 1889) (“The president of the [New York society] stated . . .
that the effect upon the children of allowing Madam Diss Debar to visit them at the present time would be exceedingly
injurious. Under these circumstances, I am constrained to decline to make any order permitting her to see such
children.”); HOMER FOLKS, THE CARE OF DESTITUTE, NEGLECTED, AND DELINQUENT CHILDREN 175 (1907) (“This
society thus became, by 1890, the factor which actually controlled the reception, care, and disposition of destitute,
neglected, and wayward children in New York city, thus practically controlling the lives of an average number of about
fifteen thousand children . . . .”); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, TWENTYTHIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 8 (“[The society] defends the custody of children in institutions committed
through its instrumentality, when assailed upon habeas corpus, without expense to the [institution housing the child]; and
in the event of adverse decisions (which rarely occur), prosecutes appeals therefrom to the appellate tribunals of the
State.”).
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B.

The First Half of the Divide: Common Law Principles and Family Law As It Was Officially
Understood
Throughout the nineteenth century, the common law of parent and child remained devoted

to protecting the household governance of husbands and fathers. As Part II will discuss, growing
numbers of prominent citizens came to believe during this period that many husbands and fathers
were unworthy of this form of self-sovereignty. America, more and more dominated by the wage
labor economy, had increasingly come to define successful adult masculinity as the ability to support
an entire family on one’s own paycheck, keeping wife and children out of market labor and in a home
of some comfort. This standard was unattainable for large numbers of fathers in the nineteenth
century, and the failures were concentrated among the working class and the ethnically or racially
disfavored, whose claims to public respect as the heads of their own households were more tenuous to
begin with. In response, reformers and lawmakers developed new forms of law specifically and selfconsciously targeted at populations they believed were characterized by failed fatherhood and failed
domesticity. These laws placed far less value on familial autonomy, authorized much greater
intervention into parental relations, and enthusiastically contemplated the reshaping of family life.
Common law courts and commentators never acknowledged these legal developments of the
nineteenth century, however, much less considered them a threat to common law norms and rules.
The principles that the new bodies of law applied to family relations were diametrically opposed to
those that governed the common law. But all of this new activity took place outside of what was
officially considered family law. Indeed, the governing logic behind the new legal regimes revolved
precisely around the understanding that they regulated families who were outside the confines of
family law because of the failure at their head. Family law, as it was authoritatively defined, was
limited to the historical rules and norms that still applied to families with an acknowledged patriarch.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the divide between official family law and the new
legal rules governing the family relations of assumed social deviants became increasingly stark. This
section considers the first half of that divide, examining the fierceness and consistency with which
common law courts and commentators protected the prerogatives of successful fathers throughout
the nineteenth century. To help make that point, it takes the common law on a father’s rights of
custody and correction as illustrative examples.
The Anglo-American common law understood the connection between parent and child as a
relation of both reciprocal obligation and hierarchical obedience. At common law, a father enjoyed
an almost absolute right to the custody, labor, and earnings of his minor children,25 and was in turn

25

See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441; 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 25455 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 12th ed. 1873).
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expected to maintain, protect, and educate them.26 In order to secure his child’s obedience, a father
was entitled to “correct” his child using physical punishment. Middle-class Americans’ views on the
legitimacy of child labor reversed over the course of the nineteenth century, so that the once
accepted practice became a mark of unfit parenthood and failed home life.27 But the premise that a
father who protected, supported, and educated his children was entitled to very powerful rights of
custody and control persisted. Throughout the nineteenth century, common law courts and legal
treatises defended these paternal prerogatives in explicitly authoritarian terms, defined their scope
broadly, and enforced legal doctrines that radically diminished the possibility of legal intervention to
disrupt the exercise of paternal power.
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) set the tone of deference to
a father’s rule over his household. As Blackstone reported the common law’s reasoning, a father had
rights over his children “partly to enable [him] more effectually to perform his duty, and partly as a
recompence for his care and trouble in the faithful discharge of it.”28 Once a father was fulfilling his
obligations to his children, however, his prerogatives were tremendous. In Blackstone’s apt phrase,
children lived in “the empire of the father” until they reached twenty-one.29 A father enjoyed
virtually unlimited control over the custody of his minor legitimate children and was also free to
determine who would serve as his children’s guardian in the case of his death, unconstrained by any
obligation to select the children’s mother, for instance, or another relative.30 Blackstone’s description
of the right of correction, operating on similar principles, noted that a father had to act “in a
reasonable manner,” but left the exact location of this limit unclear. Blackstone endorsed correction
for the purpose of securing obedience; the only behavior he actually declared unreasonable was
intentionally killing a child for insubordination. As he explained:
The ancient Roman laws gave the father a power of life and death over his children;
upon this principle, that he who gave had also the power of taking away. . . .
The power of a parent by our English laws is much more moderate; but still
sufficient to keep the child in order and obedience. He may lawfully correct his child,
being under age, in a reasonable manner; for this is for the benefit of his education.31

26

See BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *434-40; KENT, supra note 25, at 225-52.
See infra text accompanying notes 62-69.
28
BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *440. As Blackstone noted, “a mother, as such, [was] entitled to no power,
but only to reverence and respect.” Id. at *441.
29
Id. at *441.
30
See id.
31
Id. at *440.
27
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Blackstone’s account, faithfully translated for an American audience in James Kent’s
Commentaries and other treatises, proved extremely influential.32 Over the entire course of the
nineteenth century, common law courts and legal writers in the United States remained highly
respectful of the control that parents, particularly fathers, exercised over their households and
children, and committed to doctrines that made legal intervention to counter parental excess or
abuse very unlikely.
The common law, for instance, remained determined to protect parental rights of custody.
The child cruelty societies that spread rapidly across the nation in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century may have enthusiastically deprived biological parents of custody over children that they had
raised from birth in their own households and treated biological parenthood as hardly more than a
mere accident. But all this legal intervention and lack of deference was directed at families without a
father able to support his wife and children and keep them out of market labor.33 In the same years
that saw the rise of the child cruelty societies, the nineteenth-century courts and treatise writers
describing and developing the common law shared and enforced Blackstone’s assumption that the
custodial prerogatives of biological parents almost always trumped the claims of anyone else
(although they did help steadily improve the position that mothers occupied in interspousal custody
battles).34
32

For instance, Kent’s description of a father’s right of correction, first published in 1826, followed Blackstone

closely:
the Romans, according to Justinian, exceeded all other people, and the liberty and lives of the children
were placed within the power of the father. . . . When the crime of exposing and killing infants was
made capital, under Valentinian and Valens, then the practice was finally exterminated, and the
paternal power reduced to the standard of reason and of our own municipal law, which admits only the
jus domesticoe emendationis, or right of inflicting moderate correction, under the exercise of a sound
discretion.
KENT, supra note 25, at 253-54; see also CHARLES E. CHADMAN, PERSONAL RIGHTS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 115
(Chicago, Henneberry Co. 1899) (“At the ancient Roman law the father had the power of life and death over his children
. . . . The English common law, while recognizing the power of the parent to correct the child, reduced the power to that
sufficient to keep the child in order and obedience.”).
33
See infra Part II.B.
34
Mothers seeking custody in interspousal disputes fared best when the children at issue were very young, or ill,
or female. See, e.g., Anonymous, 55 Ala. 428, 432-33 (1876) (“All must feel, that no greater calamity can befall an
infant daughter, than a deprivation of a mother’s care, vigilance, precept and example. . . . Therefore, courts are reluctant
now to deprive her of the custody of her infant daughters, and but seldom, if ever, do so, unless misconduct is imputable
to her.”); McKim v. McKim, 12 R.I. 462, 464 (1879) (“The welfare of the child, considering her tender age, her sex, and
the delicacy of her constitution, will, in our opinion, be best subserved by leaving her for the present with her mother
. . . .”); id. at 465 (“[I]f the child here, instead of being a girl, were a boy of somewhat riper age, in good health, we might
deem it our duty under the law to restore him to his father, even at the risk of tearing the mother’s heartstrings asunder.”);
JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 338 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1870)
(“The rule as to legal preference [with respect to child custody] is essentially that of the common law, with, however, an
increasing liberality in favor of the mother; strengthened, in no slight degree, by positive legislation.”); WALTER C.
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Nineteenth-century judges and legal writers conceded that common law courts could rule
against the custodial claims of parents “when the morals, or safety, or interests of the children
strongly require[d] it.”35 But they stressed that it was “not enough to consider the interests of the
child alone.”36 “[D]ue weight” had to “always be given to the legal rights of the father.”37 In virtually
every case, this meant that a father who was not “plainly” unable or unwilling to discharge his basic
parental duties had “a paramount right to the custody of his infant child, which no court [was] at
liberty to disregard.”38 As one state supreme court summarized the premise guiding nineteenthcentury custody decisions at common law, “it would not do” to deprive a biological parent of his
custodial authority simply because his children were, “in the ordinary estimation, . . . neglected, and
. . . the popular verdict would declare that they would be better off, and stand a better chance of
becoming useful members of society, if they were removed from the pernicious influence of their
parents.”39 A biological parent could only lose custody for behavior that was “sufficiently extravagant
and singular and wrong to meet the condemnation of all decent and law-abiding people.”40
Given this legal standard, common law custody disputes challenging the claims of a biological
parent in the nineteenth century clustered around a narrow set of circumstances. A biological parent
who was raising his child in his household faced little risk that a common law court would deprive
him of custody in favor of a third party. The typical custody battle that these courts adjudicated
between biological parents and third parties involved “third-parties” who had been raising the child
for some time and were biologically related to the child as well. Courts occasionally granted these
surrogate parents legal custody,41 but their chances were greatest where the biological parent had
TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 250-51 (St. Paul, West Publishing Co. 1896)
(“A child of very tender years needs the care and attention of a mother . . . . It can only be in such cases as this, where the
child, from its extreme youth or sickness, needs a mother’s care, that the court can deprive the father of the right to the
child’s custody . . . .”).
35
KENT, supra note 25, at 254-55.
36
Verser v. Ford, 37 Ark. 27, 30 (1881).
37
TIFFANY, supra note 34, at 248.
38
State v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272, 275 (1860); see also SCHOULER, supra note 34, at 339 (noting that “[t]he
father has then, in America, the paramount right of custody independently of all statutes to the contrary,” although “this
paramount right may be forfeited by his misconduct”).
39
Lovell v. House of the Good Shepard, 37 P. 660, 661 (Wash. 1894).
40
Id.
41
In almost all of the cases I found, three factors were present when a common law court awarded custody to a
third party instead of a biological parent: (1) the third party had been raising the child in his household for a substantial
period of time, either with the parent’s consent or because the parent had totally abandoned his responsibilities; (2) the
third party was biologically related to the child; and (3) the biological parent was claiming custody singly rather than
jointly with the other parent, usually because the other biological parent was dead. See, e.g., In re Vance, 28 P. 229, 23031 (Cal. 1891) (awarding custody to maternal grandmother who had raised children rather than widowed father who had
abandoned and ceased supporting them); Estate and Guardianship of Linden, 1 Myrick Prob. 215, 216-21 (Cal. Prob. Ct.
1878) (awarding custody to maternal aunt rather than widowed father who had given aunt the child to raise at nine
months); Smith v. Bragg, 68 Ga. 650, 651-53 (1882) (awarding custody to maternal uncle who had raised and supported
child rather than widowed father who had abandoned child); Bryan v. Lyon, 3 N.E. 880, 880-86 (Ind. 1885) (awarding
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waived his parental rights or had allowed his relationship with his child to lapse for a number of years
before attempting to reassert control.42
The bifurcation that emerged in the law’s treatment of parenthood is perhaps easiest to see in
the custody context, where common law courts diligently protected and reinforced a biological
parent’s right to custody at the same moment that the child cruelty societies were extremely willing,
even eager, to scrutinize familial relations, undercut parental autonomy, and deprive biological
parents of custody. But the common law right of correction also provides an illuminating
custody to maternal uncle and aunt who had raised and supported children rather than widowed father who had
abandoned them); Bonnett ex rel. Newmeyer v. Bonnett, 16 N.W. 91, 92-93 (Iowa 1883) (awarding custody to paternal
grandparents rather than widowed mother who had given grandparents the child to raise when child was two months old);
Drumb v. Keen, 47 Iowa 435, 435-38 (1877) (awarding custody to maternal grandparents rather than widowed father
who had given grandparents the child to raise when child was three); Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 654-58 (1881)
(awarding custody to maternal aunt rather than father (possibly widowed but definitely not living with wife) where
parents had given aunt the child to raise at birth); Sturtevant v. State ex rel. Havens, 19 N.W. 617, 617-19 (Neb. 1884)
(awarding custody to maternal grandparents rather than widowed father who had given grandparents the child to raise at
birth); In re Schroeder, 65 How. Pr. 194, 195-98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1883) (awarding custody to paternal aunts rather than
widowed mother who had agreed aunts would raise the children); Commonwealth ex rel. Goerlitz v. Barney, 4 Brew.
408, 409-13 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1872) (awarding custody to maternal grandmother who had been raising the child rather than
widowed mother); Sheers v. Stein, 43 N.W. 728, 729-31 (Wis. 1889) (awarding custody to paternal aunt who had been
raising child rather than widowed father who had never contributed to the child’s support, manifested aversion towards
the child, and expressed the belief that he was not the child’s biological father).
Less frequently, courts ruled in favor of the custodial claims of a third party who had been raising a child but
was not biologically related to the child. See, e.g., Washaw v. Gimble, 7 S.W. 389, 389-90 (Ark. 1888) (awarding
custody to member of widowed father’s church congregation who had raised child from birth at father’s request rather
than to father who now demanded custody); People ex rel. Curley v. Porter, 23 Ill. App. 196, 196-99 (1887) (awarding
custody to couple who had raised and supported child at widowed father’s request rather than to father who had agreed
that couple could keep child until adulthood but now demanded custody).
42
In State v. Richardson, for instance, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire awarded a widowed biological
father custody of his ten-year-old daughter, against the claims of a maternal uncle and his family who had raised the child
for most of her life. See 40 N.H. at 275-82. The court stressed that “there [was] no evidence of the unfitness of the father
for the proper discharge of his parental duties toward the child, or of the want of proper parental affection,” id. at 276,
finding that the father had never agreed to give the uncle custody and had never, “in any way, waived or abandoned his
parental rights or duties,” id. at 279. For other examples where a biological parent was awarded legal custody against the
claims of a third party who had raised the child for a significant period of time, see People ex rel. Trainer v. Cooper, 8
How. Pr. 288, 291-97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853) (awarding custody to widowed father, a free black man, who was claiming his
daughter from a woman who had been raising the girl, on ground that “the father has a title superior to any stranger”);
Armstrong v. Stone, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 102, 102-08 (1852) (awarding custody to widowed mother rather than paternal
grandfather who had been raising the child, on ground that “the mother was entitled to the custody as her legal right” and
had not “impair[ed] her right to the custody” by temporarily leaving her child with the child’s grandfather while she
worked to support herself); Lovell, 37 P. at 660-62 (holding that widowed mother had legal right to custody of child that
she had placed in charitable institution for raising but now wanted back); Rust v. Vanvacter, 9 W. Va. 600, 602, 612-15
(1866) (awarding custody to widowed father rather than maternal grandmother who had been raising child, on ground
that father had the preeminent right to his child and had never waived or abandoned his parental rights); see also Henson
v. Walts, 40 Ind. 170, 171-73 (1872) (awarding custody to widowed father who had placed child in care of unrelated
couple for a year and then had couple attempt to gain legal custody); Hutson v. Townsend, 27 S.C. Eq. (6 Rich. Eq.) 249,
249, 253-54 (Ct. App. 1854) (awarding custody pending the resolution of a lawsuit over permanent placement to
widowed father rather than maternal aunt who had been raising child, on ground that “the natural right of the father to the
custody of his child did not appear to be infringed by misconduct on his part, or by consequential injury to the interests of
the child”).
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juxtaposition to the norms of intervention and suspicion that governed the work of the child cruelty
societies and their successors, even if the divide in the law of parenthood is somewhat less obvious
here. As we will see, the cruelty societies and the programs that followed in their tradition never
focused on preventing the physical abuse of children, even where failed fathers and their families
were concerned.43 Yet the case law and legal scholarship on the common law right of correction
nevertheless help reveal the commitment that the common law retained in the nineteenth century to
protecting and upholding a father’s household government, simply because those common law norms
were never stated and defended more clearly than in this context.
Tapping Reeve, author of the first family law treatise published in the United States,
acknowledged some limit on a father’s right of correction. But Reeve, more explicitly than even
Blackstone, left determining “the bounds of moderation” almost entirely to a father’s own
discretion.44 His Law of Baron and Femme (1816) explained that a “parent”—and here Reeve
certainly was not envisioning a married woman stripped of her civil identity by common law
coverture—operated as a sovereign within his own realm, subject to state intervention only in clear
cases of malicious intent.45 “[T]he parent ought to be considered as acting in a judicial capacity,
when he corrects; and, of course, not liable for errors of opinion,” Reeve instructed. “[A]lthough the
punishment should appear to the triers to be unreasonably severe, and in no measure proportioned to
the offence; yet, if it should also appear, that the parent acted conscientiously, and from motives of
duty, no verdict ought to be found against him.”46
As intended, the legal protection accorded to a parent’s right of correction at common law
discouraged prosecution. In contrast to all the legal activity that the Societies for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children generated, the common law courts, addressing families with a recognized
patriarch, had cause to consider a parent’s right of correction in just a handful of cases in the
nineteenth century. These courts modified the common law only marginally, retaining the historical
commitment to supporting a father’s governance of his children. Indeed, a minority of jurisdictions,
hearing cases that arose largely in the 1870s and 1880s (the very years the child cruelty societies
emerged on the scene), adopted a stance virtually identical to the one that Reeve had articulated at
the beginning of the century. This position, most prominently advanced in a series of North Carolina
43

See infra text accompanying notes 128-134, 168.
TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME 288 (New Haven, Oliver Steele 1816).
45
At common law, a married woman had little or no right to own property, contract, file suit, keep her own
earnings, or claim custody of her children. See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND
PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 17, 51-55 (1982); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH:
LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 25 (1985); ELIZABETH BOWLES WARBASSE, THE CHANGING
LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN, 1800-1861, at 7-21 (1987); Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law:
1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1365-68 (1983).
46
REEVE, supra note 44, at 288.
44
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Supreme Court decisions, held “that so long as the parent acts in good faith and without malice,”
which was the legal presumption, “the criminal law will not interfere with him however severe or
unmerited the punishment, unless it produces permanent injury.”47
The North Carolina Supreme Court explained its noninterventionism (or, more accurately,
its decision to staunchly protect parents from prosecution) in a language of parental sovereignty
particularly adapted for the American context and particularly powerful in a Southern state after the
Civil War. The family, in this view, occupied a role analogous to that of a state in the federal system
of government. “‘[F]amily government [was] recognized by law as being as complete in itself as the
State government is in itself, and yet subordinate to it.’”48 Like the states, a family needed and
enjoyed vast discretion to govern its own affairs. Conflicts within the family were to be resolved
internally, with the explicit understanding that the parent’s (particularly the father’s) will would
control. As the court warned, allowing a jury to convict whenever it found that a parent had
inflicted “cruel and excessive” punishment “would tend, if not to subvert family government, greatly
to impair its efficiency, and remove restraints upon the conduct of children.”49
47

1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 531 (Chicago, T.H. Flood & Co. 8th
ed. 1892). For examples of decisions adopting this position, see Dean v. State, 8 So. 38, 39 (Ala. 1890) (“He must not
only inflict on the child immoderate chastisement, but he must do so malo animo,—with legal malice or wicked motives;
or else he must inflict on him some permanent injury. . . . [T]he parent, as to such matters of discipline, exercises pro hac
vice judicial functions . . . .”); Neal v. State, 54 Ga. 282, 283 (1875) (“[A] very large margin must be left to the judgment
of the parent . . . .”); State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 588 (1886) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 48-49); State v. Alford,
68 N.C. 300, 302 (1873) (“[A]s it appeared that the chastisement was for the misconduct of the boy, . . . and the injury
did not, nor was it in its nature, calculated to produce lasting injury to the boy, it did not exceed the limits of the power
granted to the defendant . . . .”).
For analogous reasoning in cases ruling on a teacher’s right to physically correct a student, see Boyd v. State, 7
So. 268, 269 (Ala. 1890) (“[A] teacher is often said pro hac vice to exercise judicial functions. . . . [But] [h]e cannot
lawfully disfigure [his student], or perpetuate on his person any other permanent injury. . . . [and a teacher cannot
lawfully correct when] induced by legal malice, or wickedness or motive . . . .”); State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. &
Bat.) 348, 350 (1837) (“His judgment must be presumed correct, because he is the judge . . . . [But] [i]f he use his
authority as a cover for malice, and under pretence of administering correction, gratify his own bad passions, the mask of
the judge shall be taken off . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Seed, 4 AM. L.J. 137, 138 (Ct. C.P. Phila. 1852) (“[T]he parent
ought to be considered as acting in a judicial capacity, when he corrects; and, of course, not liable for errors of
opinion. . . . [I]f it should . . . appear that the parent acted conscientiously, and from motives of duty, no verdict ought to
be found against him.”); Anderson v. State, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 455, 457 (1859) (“[T]he legal presumption is, that the
chastisement was proper . . . . To hold a parent bound to prove that he had good cause to whip his child, or be subject to a
conviction upon indictment, would be monstrous. The same rule applies to the relation under consideration.”).
48
Jones, 95 N.C. at 592 (quoting State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453, 456 (1868)).
49
Id. at 590. The North Carolina court also supplemented its authority-based rationale for upholding a father’s
household government with newer privacy considerations, predicting that forcing a father-defendant “to lift the curtain
from the scenes of home life, and exhibit a long series of acts of insubordination, disobedience and ill-doing . . . would
open the door to a flood of irreparable evils far transcending that to be remedied by a public prosecution.” Id. The most
interesting aspect of this appearance of privacy discourse, however, is how much of a rarity such discourse was. Some
scholars have assumed that nineteenth-century common law authorities deferred to parental prerogatives of correction out
of a “belief in the privacy of the family.” ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 75 (1987). Yet such presumptions are quite
ahistorical. Privacy arguments began to dominate the jurisprudence on wife beating in the late nineteenth century, as
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While a majority of common law courts in the nineteenth century formally adopted a legal
doctrine on correction that was slightly more liberal than the North Carolina rule, they too remained
firmly noninterventionist and committed to protecting a father’s sovereignty over his offspring.
These courts held that a father could only inflict moderate correction on his children; if his
chastisement was excessive (a question for the jury), no showing of malice or of permanent injury was
necessary to convict.50 In practice, though, the presumption that a father’s correction had been
feminist agitation and cultural celebrations of companionate marriage made authoritarian rationales for nonintervention
seem less and less persuasive in that context. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2150-74 (1996). The North Carolina Supreme Court played a leading role in this case law
on the marital relation, one reason it may have thought to insert an argument from privacy into a decision on a parent’s
prerogatives that generally focused on parental authority. See Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) at 459 (“[It] is not, that the
husband has the right to whip his wife . . . ; but that we will not interfere with family government in trifling cases. . . . We
will not inflict upon society the greater evil of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of
trifling violence.”). But to my knowledge, no other common law court in the nineteenth century reasoned about a parent’s
right of correction in the idiom of privacy. Instead, these courts still took authoritarian accounts of parenthood to be fully
convincing and grounded their explanations for nonintervention on explicit endorsements of the subordination of children
to their parents.
50
See Fletcher v. People, 52 Ill. 395, 397 (1869) (“It would be monstrous to hold that under the pretense of
sustaining parental authority, children must be left, without the protection of the law, at the mercy of depraved men or
women, with liberty to inflict any species of barbarity short of the actual taking of life.”); Hinkle v. State, 26 N.E. 777,
778 (Ind. 1891) (“The father has the right to administer proper and reasonable chastisement to his child without being
guilty of an assault and battery, but . . . if he does administer unreasonable chastisement, and treats the child cruelly and
inhumanly, his acts become unlawful, and, if they . . . constitute an assault and battery, he may be prosecuted . . . .”);
Hornbeck v. State, 45 N.E. 620, 620 (Ind. App. 1896) (“The law is well settled that a parent has the right to administer
proper and reasonable chastisement to his child without being guilty of an assault and battery; but he has no right to
administer unreasonable or cruel and inhuman punishment.”); State v. Bitman, 13 Iowa 485, 486 (1862) (“It is the right of
a parent to chastise his child, but when such chastisement amounts to cruelty or inhumanity, or where, as the court below
charged the jury, the parent or master goes beyond the line of reasonable correction, his conduct becomes more or less
criminal.”); State v. Washington, 29 So. 55, 55 (La. 1900) (“Whether a parent who inflicts corporal punishment on a
child is acting ‘in good faith, prompted by parental love, without passion,’ is a matter which may be determined [by the
jury] largely from the character of the injuries received by the child . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Blaker, 1 Brewster 311,
311-12 (Ct. Quarter Sessions Phila. 1867) (“[P]arent[s] must exercise reasonable judgment and discretion, and be
governed as to the mode and severity of the punishment by the nature of the offence, the age, size, and apparent powers
of endurance of the child, and it is for the jury to decide whether the punishment was excessive.”); Johnson v. State, 21
Tenn. (2 Hum.) 283, 283 (1840) (“In chastising a child, the parent must be careful that he does not exceed the bounds of
moderation, and inflict cruel and merciless punishment; if he do, he is a trespasser, and liable to be punished by
indictment.”); Stanfield v. State, 43 Tex. 167, 168 (1875) (“Whether it is moderate or excessive must necessarily depend
upon the age, sex, condition, and disposition of the child, with all the attending and surrounding circumstances, to be
judged of by the jury . . . .”); 17 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF LAW 362 (John Houston Merrill ed.,
Northport, Edward Thompson Co. 1892) (“In assertion of this right of control the law gives the parent the right of
moderate correction of his child in a reasonable manner; and the courts are reluctant to interfere in matters of family
discipline.”); IRVING BROWNE, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYED 73
(Boston, Charles C. Soule 1883) (“The father may correct the child in a reasonable manner, but for cruel punishment he
is liable to indictment, and may even be found guilty of manslaughter or murder where death ensues.”); WM. L. CLARK,
JR., HAND-BOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 212 (St. Paul, West Publishing Co. 1894) (“A parent or teacher, and possibly a
guardian, chastising his child, pupil, or ward, does not commit a criminal assault and battery if the punishment is
moderate, but it is otherwise if the punishment is immoderate . . . .”); MARSHALL D. EWELL & JAMES W. LA MURE, A
MANUAL OF THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 59 (Detroit, Collector Publishing Co. 1896) (“[T]he parent may
administer punishment upon his child, without incurring any guilt therefor. But the chastisement must be proper and
reasonable. If in degree it is unreasonably severe, or in manner inhuman and shocking to the senses, it becomes unlawful
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within the bounds of his authority remained extremely difficult to overcome. Successful prosecutions
were rare,51 and they focused on defendants who might have tested even North Carolina’s generous
deference (like the father who doused his blind son with kerosene and locked him in an unheated
cellar).52 As these courts explained, “[t]he right of parents to chastise their refractory and
disobedient children, is so necessary to the government of families and to the good order of society,”
that no one would think “of interfering with its existence, or of calling upon [parents] to account for
the manner of its exercise upon light or frivolous pretences.”53 “The authority to govern must rest in
some one, and the law has placed that power in the hands of the father as the head of the family. His
right to exercise such authority in moderation and justly will not be denied.”54
The next section considers the social and economic forces that helped convince leading
American reformers and lawmakers in the nineteenth century that many of the nation’s husbands
and fathers did not merit the protection and deference that the common law continued to so
copiously accord to the household government of family patriarchs. These failed men, and
accordingly the women and children in their families, needed to be subject to a new legal regime.
C.

Socioeconomics and the Ideal of Domesticity in the Nineteenth Century

. . . .”); G.W. FIELD, THE LEGAL RELATIONS OF INFANTS 66 (Rochester, Williamson & Higbie 1888) (“The parent may
lawfully correct or chastise his child, being under age, in a reasonable manner; but he cannot inflict a cruel and excessive
punishment; and the question of excess of punishment is one for a jury.”); 1 EMLIN MCCLAIN, A TREATISE ON THE
CRIMINAL LAW 206 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1897) (“There are various relations in life which make some degree of
violence or restraint under proper circumstances lawful. Thus, moderate restraint or correction may be employed by the
parent, or by one in loco parentis. But if such correction or restraint is unreasonable it constitutes an assault.”); IRA M.
MOORE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW 124-25 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1876) (“Every parent has a right
to correct his child . . . . [But] [t]he cause must be sufficient, the instrument suitable to the purpose, and the punishment
administered in moderation. And it will be for the jury to determine whether the punishment was excessive and
improper.”); W.C. RODGERS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 419 (Chicago, T.H. Flood & Co. 1899)
(“[A parent has] the right to inflict such bodily punishment or chastisement as is reasonably necessary to compel a dutiful
and proper respect for and obedience to the parental authority . . . . [S]o long as the parent exercises proper moderation,
there is no criminal liability for chastising his child.”).
51
For four examples, see Hinkle, 26 N.E. at 778 (affirming father’s conviction for assault and battery where
father “fasten[ed]” his 12 year-old daughter “to a sewing-machine by a chain attached to the girl’s ankle, and allow[ed]
her to remain chained during the day, except at meal-times, and . . . at bed-time”; the girl was found “thus chained in the
house, with her little brother, about two or three years old, there being no older person at the house”); Hornbeck, 45 N.E.
at 620 (affirming father’s conviction where “[t]he assault and battery was committed upon the person of the appellant’s
own son, a lad of 13 years, by striking him a number of times with a buggy whip”); Commonwealth v. Coffey, 121 Mass.
66, 66, 69 (1876) (holding that jury lawfully convicted father of assault and battery “upon the ground that [he and his codefendants] used force which was excessive and unjustifiable in the sick condition of the daughter” or upon the ground
that the defendants’ “acts were not done in the exercise or support of the rightful authority of the father, but in the
execution of a scheme of the [father’s lawyer], and under [the lawyer’s] direction and control only”); Blaker, 1 Brewster at
311-12 (reporting that jury convicted mother of assault and battery upon her child, but found defendant not guilty of
assault and battery with intent to kill).
52
See Fletcher, 52 Ill. at 396-97.
53
Johnson, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 283.
54
Smith v. Slocum, 62 Ill. 354, 358 (1872).
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Women’s historians have long stressed the importance that ideas about the home and family
assumed in the construction of gender relations in nineteenth-century America.55 But the American
ideology of domesticity, as it developed and became hegemonic over the course of the nineteenth
century, was always profoundly intersectional, and as much about socioeconomics as about gender.
The nineteenth century saw the rise of a powerful concept of domesticity that defined proper family
life to revolve around a particular ordering of family-market relations, in which the husband earned a
salary regular and ample enough to support his entire family, the wife and children performed no
market labor, and all family members resided within a comfortable home. This was an ideal in which
economic relations, increasingly dominated by wage labor in the nineteenth century, played a
remarkably large role. It was also a measure of successful family formation, and successful fatherhood
more specifically, by which large numbers of Americans were predestined to fall short.
There was a real irony and a real unfairness embedded in the dominant nineteenth-century
understanding of successful and failed fatherhood. The labor movement was agitating for a “family
wage” so energetically in this period precisely because such an income was not available to most
working men.56 Opposition to child labor, similarly, became such a highly charged issue among
middle-class reformers in the nineteenth century because so many families still depended upon their
children’s earnings stream for their survival.57 Family-market orderings that the ideology of
domesticity took to be a conclusive sign of a father’s personal failure, the result of his moral depravity,
weak character, and insufficient masculinity, actually had deeply structural roots. The standard of
paternal success, as it came to be conventionally defined in the nineteenth century, required an
arrangement of family and market life that was increasingly available to white middle-class
Americans, but far less realizable by less privileged populations.
55

Barbara Welter’s Cult of True Womanhood is the seminal examination of gender in the literature of
domesticity. See Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151 (1966). For other leading
accounts of the vision of women in antebellum American writing on domesticity, see MARY P. RYAN, THE EMPIRE OF THE
MOTHER: AMERICAN WRITING ABOUT DOMESTICITY, 1830-1860 (1982); KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, CATHARINE BEECHER:
A STUDY IN AMERICAN DOMESTICITY (1976). Nancy Cott has valuably added to this literature by examining women’s
diaries and letters between 1780 and 1835 in order to consider “how a certain congeries of social attitudes that has been
called the ‘cult of true womanhood’ and the ‘cult of domesticity,’ and first became conspicuous in the early nineteenth
century, related to women’s actual circumstances, experiences, and consciousness.” NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF
WOMANHOOD: “WOMAN’S SPHERE” IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835, at 1-3 (2d ed. 1997).
56
See 9 S. DOC. NO. 61-645, at 14 (1910); JEANNE BOYDSTON, HOME AND WORK: HOUSEWORK, WAGES, AND
THE IDEOLOGY OF LABOR IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 99, 155 (1990); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN’S WAGE:
HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 8-9 (1990); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT:
WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 165-66 (1998); Nancy Fraser & Linda
Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 309, 318-19 (1994);
Martha May, Bread Before Roses: American Workingmen, Labor Unions and the Family Wage, in WOMEN, WORK AND
PROTEST: A CENTURY OF US WOMEN’S LABOR HISTORY 1, 3-10 (Ruth Milkman ed., 1985); infra text accompanying
notes 76-79.
57
See infra text accompanying notes 62-69, 83-85.
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Nonetheless, the notion that successful fatherhood meant earning a wage sufficient to support
one’s entire family and keep it out of market labor gathered tremendous ideological potency
throughout the nineteenth century. That definition of success, in turn, meant that vast numbers of
family men were now culturally identified as failed fathers. This failure, moreover, combined with
what many elites could understand as another one. A disproportionate share of the fathers unable to
conform their market relations to the domestic ideal were not only poor, but also members of
ethnically or racially disfavored populations, which made it significantly more difficult for them to
claim the public’s intrinsic respect as the heads of their own households. The combination of these
two failures helped convince a growing population of reformers and lawmakers that the historical
norms protecting a patriarch’s government of his family should not apply to these fathers, whose
entire families were now definitively classified as socially deviant. New ideas about childhood led the
policy leaders and decision makers to focus in particular on the parent-child relationship in these
failed families.
1.

Domesticity, and Failed Home Life, Defined

To a striking extent, the nineteenth century’s understanding of domesticity was transformed
by the emergence of the wage labor economy. The vision of appropriate family life that came to
dominate the nation’s cultural consciousness as early as 1830 would have made little sense before the
rise of that type of market relation. This ideology posited a separation between work and home,
provider and provided for, of a sharpness not comprehensible in an agricultural economy before
widespread industrialization.58 It characterized work as the exclusive domain of adult men, and
celebrated the home as a complete and comfortable respite from labor that was populated by women
and children whose husbands and fathers had protected them from the cruel demands of the
market.59 As one author typically described family life, husbands and fathers spent their days in “the
busy and turbulent world,” leaving women and children free to dwell in the “sanctuary of rest” that

58

Tellingly, similar ideologies of domesticity emerged and came to prominence in other industrializing nations
in the early nineteenth century. See ANNA CLARK, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BREECHES: GENDER AND THE MAKING OF THE
BRITISH WORKING CLASS 197-271 (1995); DEBORAH SIMONTON, A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN WOMEN’S WORK, 1700 TO
THE PRESENT 87-96 (1998); JOHN TOSH, A MAN’S PLACE: MASCULINITY AND THE MIDDLE-CLASS HOME IN VICTORIAN
ENGLAND 4-5 (1999).
59
In contrast, for example, Mary Ryan’s study of Whitestown, New York found that “[b]etween 1790 and 1820
the household was the principal, almost solitary place of production within the township. . . . Parents conceived of their
children as their own flesh, blood, and labor supply.” MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN
ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW YORK, 1790-1865, at 25-26 (1981).
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men only returned to at night.60 Women and children, on this account, resided in “a refuge from the
vexations and embarrassments of business.”61
Indeed, children sheltered from the market became perhaps the preeminent sign of a father’s
successful family formation in the nineteenth century, although one always tied to the twin need for
a wife at home. Eighteenth-century Americans, still under the heavy influence of Calvinist
principles, had generally accepted that children were born corrupt and needed to be brought to
salvation through reason and deliberate choice when confronted with alternatives in the world.62
But over the course of the nineteenth century, that view was progressively replaced by the dominant
understanding that children were born innocent and highly vulnerable to worldly contamination.63
his faith in childhood innocence led many middle-class reformers to argue that corporal punishment
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MRS. A.J. GRAVES, WOMAN IN AMERICA; BEING AN EXAMINATION INTO THE MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL
CONDITION OF AMERICAN FEMALE SOCIETY 163-64 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1847).
61
CHARLES BURROUGHS, AN ADDRESS ON FEMALE EDUCATION, DELIVERED IN PORTSMOUTH, NEW-HAMPSHIRE,
OCTOBER 26, 1827, at 18 (Portsmouth, Childs & March 1827). E. Anthony Rotundo’s research into the private letters of
men and women in the nineteenth century has revealed many statements that echo the nineteenth-century prescriptive
literature’s account of appropriate domesticity, suggesting the pervasive power of this ideological vision. In one
characteristic letter from 1868, for instance, Mary Clarke reported to her suitor that she “‘often [thought] it is so different
for men from what it is with us women. Love is our life our reality, business yours.’” E. ANTHONY ROTUNDO, AMERICAN
MANHOOD: TRANSFORMATIONS IN MASCULINITY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE MODERN ERA 168 (1993) (quoting letter
from Mary Clarke to Willie Franklin (Sept. 10, 1868)). Alexander Rice would have agreed. He explained to his future
wife in 1844 that a family’s economic fate (and social status) rested on the efforts of the husband and father. He was the
person “‘upon whose arm you are to lean thro’ life, upon whose reputation your own will rest and upon whose effects your
happiness as well as his own will mainly depend.’” Id. at 169 (quoting letter from Alexander Hamilton Rice to Augusta
McKim (Mar. 2, 1844)).
62
For evidence of the eighteenth-century conception that children were born without innocence to lose, see
Nancy F. Cott, Eighteenth-Century Family and Social Life Revealed in Massachusetts Divorce Records, 10 J. SOC. HIST.
20, 29-30 (1976); Peter Gregg Slater, Views of Children and of Child Rearing During the Early National Period: A Study
in the New England Intellect 41-44 (1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Berkeley)) (on file
with author). Traces of this view remained in the early nineteenth century. See LEONARD WOODS, LETTERS TO
UNITARIANS OCCASIONED BY THE SERMON OF THE REVEREND WILLIAM E. CHANNING AT THE ORDINATION OF THE REV. J.
SPARKS 50-51 (Andover, Flagg & Gould 1820) (“[C]hildren are prone to evil, inclined to go astray. Any plan of
education, whether domestic or public, which should overlook this principle, and involve the opposite one of man’s
native purity, would be regarded by all men of sober experience and sober judgment, as romantic and dangerous.”).
Philippe Ariès has tracked this understanding of childhood before and during the eighteenth century in Europe.
He found, for instance, no assumption of childhood sexual innocence in early seventeenth-century France. See PHILIPPE
ARIÈS, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 100 (Robert Baldick trans., 1962) (“The modern
reader of [a] diary . . . of the young Louis XIII’s life is astonished by the liberties which people took with children, by the
coarseness of the jokes they made, and by the indecency of gestures made in public which shocked nobody and which
were regarded as perfectly natural.”).
63
For articulations of this new understanding of childhood, see CATHARINE E. BEECHER, RELIGIOUS TRAINING
OF CHILDREN IN THE SCHOOL, THE FAMILY, AND THE CHURCH 157 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1864) (“[T]his doctrine of
transmitted infant depravity. . . . has been the [cause of the] CONFLICT OF AGES, in which common sense has been
struggling against this theological dogma and the systems resulting from it.”); HORACE BUSHNELL, CHRISTIAN NURTURE
10 (New York, Charles Scribner 1861) (“[T]he aim, effort, and expectation should be, not, as is commonly assumed, that
the child is to grow up in sin, to be converted after he comes to a mature age; but that he is . . . to have loved what is good
from his earliest years.”); infra text accompanying notes 70-71.
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was only appropriate as a last resort,64 on the ground that obedience could be better secured through
appeals to a child’s inherent sense of love and goodness.65 It gave still greater power to the mounting
cultural and political opposition to child labor.
The legitimacy of child labor had been widely accepted in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, many middle-class
Americans had begun to fervently reject the proposition that children should contribute to their
family’s income stream.66 The shift was linked to the spread of industrialization; child labor on a
family farm aroused no opposition even in the nineteenth century, as Americans continued to believe
that agricultural labor was good training for adult life and independent citizenship.67 But the rising
opposition to child labor was also inextricably tied to ascendant ideas about the nature of childhood
and parental, particularly paternal, responsibility. For the growing number of opponents to child
labor, this mode of family-market organization came to represent the corruption of childhood
innocence and conclusive evidence of a father’s deliberate indifference and wilful exploitation.
Harper’s Magazine offered a standard characterization of the practice in 1873, reporting that children
performed market work simply because their fathers were “indifferent” to their “natural growth and
improvement” and lacked the “disinterestedness” needed “to be able to forego present profit for the
future benefit of the little one.”68 Fathers whose children labored in the market had, the New York
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Elizabeth Pleck has calculated that six out of the seven child rearing manuals published in England or
America in the last half of the nineteenth century advised parents to limit their use of corporal punishment. See PLECK,
supra note 49, at 34. For examples from the child rearing literature calling for a greater reliance on non-corporal
techniques of control, see MARY BLAKE, TWENTY-SIX HOURS A DAY 110-11 (Boston, D. Lothrop & Co. 1883) (“There
will be times, and I say it in all sadness, when nothing will answer but the rod. . . . It should always be the last resort, and
never, never, NEVER when the parent is angry. Stop and think about it, be sure you are right and just and calm.”); LYMAN
COBB, THE EVIL TENDENCIES OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AS A MEANS OF MORAL DISCIPLINE IN FAMILIES AND SCHOOLS,
EXAMINED AND DISCUSSED 9 (New York, Mark H. Newman & Co. 1847) (“As long as the conduct of the parent or
teacher is influenced solely by an affectionate and conscientious desire to benefit the child, he has the right to punish; but,
beyond that he has no right whatever . . . .”).
For a discussion of the rise of opposition to corporal punishment in other contexts, see MYRA C. GLENN,
CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: PRISONERS, SAILORS, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA
(1984); JAMES TURNER, RECKONING WITH THE BEAST: ANIMALS, PAIN, AND HUMANITY IN THE VICTORIAN MIND (1980).
65
As Humphrey explained, a child would respond to love-based appeals more strongly and more quickly than he
would respond to reason. A child might be “too young, indeed, to know why it yields,” but he would not be “too young to
feel the power by which its heart is so sweetly captivated.” H. HUMPHREY, DOMESTIC EDUCATION 184 (Amherst,
J.S.&C. Adams 1840); see also infra text accompanying notes 72-73.
66
For an excellent account of this transition, see VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE
CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 56-72 (1985).
67
See id. at 77; see also 41 CONG. REC. 1552 (1907) (statement of Sen. Beveridge) (“This bill does not strike at
the employment of children engaged in agriculture. I do not for a moment pretend that working children on the farm is
bad for them. I think it is the universal experience that where children are employed within their strength and in the open
air there can be no better training.”).
68
The Little Laborers of New York City, 279 HARPER’S NEW MONTHLY MAG. 321, 321 (1873).
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Times editorialized in more dramatic terms, “no civilization, no decency, no anything but
covetousness.”69
If a father’s success was beginning to turn sharply in the nineteenth century on whether his
children labored in the market, the growing opposition to child labor was also firmly linked to the
understanding that successful family life, and successful fatherhood, depended on keeping wives and
mothers at home and focused on domesticity. The child rearing literature of the nineteenth century
operated on the presumption that healthy child development required not only the banishment of
child labor, but also a mother’s constant presence and ceaseless vigilance against the appearance of
sin. Mrs. Child explained that “[t]he rule . . . for developing good affections in a child is, that he
never be allowed to see or feel the influence of bad passions, even in the most trifling things.”70
“While the character of the babe is forming,” Mrs. L.H. Sigourney similarly advised, mothers needed
to “let every action and indication of motive, be a subject of observation.”71
The turn from corporal punishment, moreover, only intensified the cultural requirement that
a mother’s time and energy be devoted exclusively to her home and children. The literature
advocating restraint in physical chastisement advised mothers to rely instead on far more timeintensive techniques of moral suasion and affective manipulation. These new strategies of securing
obedience depended on the development and indefatigable maintenance of intense, almost romantic
bonds between mother and child, such that a mother’s mere threat to withdraw some of her love and
attention would be sufficient to secure a child’s prompt and eager obedience.72 As Lyman Cobb
summarized the strategy in a tract also concerned with order in the classroom, “[t]he parent or
teacher should, first of all, secure the LOVE and AFFECTION of his children or pupils. He will then
have an unlimited control over their minds and conduct.”73
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Child Labor in Coal Mines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1902, at 8, 8. More rigorous compulsory schooling laws,
reflecting similar societal impulses, also appear to have helped the movement against child labor, although perhaps it was
the other way around. Paul Osterman argues, for instance, that compulsory schooling laws were enacted and enforced
precisely when the extent of child labor had already diminished. As he explains, “[s]ince firms no longer required the
labor of children and adolescents, those pressing for longer compulsory schooling were able to succeed.” PAUL
OSTERMAN, GETTING STARTED: THE YOUTH LABOR MARKET 60-61 (1980); see also FOREST CHESTER ENSIGN,
COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AND CHILD LABOR 236 (1921) (“That child labor and compulsory school attendance
represent but two aspects of a single problem is now generally recognized. . . . [T]he laws themselves are usually worked
out with such care as to insure reasonable harmony . . . .”); MIRIAM E. LOUGHRAN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
CHILD-LABOR LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1921) (“[I]t is recognized that the enforcement of the child-labor
law is practically impossible without the assistance of a school attendance law which keeps the child in school during the
time when he is not legally permitted to work.”).
70
MRS. CHILD, THE MOTHER’S BOOK 9 (Boston, Carter & Hendee 2d ed. 1831).
71
MRS. L.H. SIGOURNEY, LETTERS TO MOTHERS 81 (Hartford, Hudson & Skinner 1838).
72
Richard Brodhead has very aptly termed this approach to child rearing “discipline through love.” RICHARD H.
BRODHEAD, CULTURES OF LETTERS: SCENES OF READING AND WRITING IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 18 (1993).
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COBB, supra note 64, at 104.
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The nineteenth-century literature on appropriate family life recognized that its methods
placed significant demands on parents. But it reasoned that mothers who failed to constantly
supervise their children at home, and fathers who failed to make that possible, had to lack love and
concern for their children. As one commentator reported, these parents did “not consider the
welfare and happiness of their children in future life, and their own happiness in connection with
them as they advance towards their declining years, as of sufficient importance to call for the
bestowment of this time and attention.”74
2.

The Socioeconomics of Failed Fatherhood

This vision was deeply gendered. It prescribed starkly differentiated roles for men and
women, refused to count women’s household labor as a form of work,75 and evaluated women (and
children) according to judgments about the adult men who led or were supposed to lead their
families. But it also had a sharp class content. The dominant nineteenth-century account of
successful domesticity and successful fatherhood assumed, endorsed, and demanded an ordering of
family-market relations that was becoming more common among the white middle class, but
remained literally impossible for many Americans to achieve.
Most notably, large numbers of husbands and fathers were simply unable to earn enough to
support their families on their own, even in relatively good economic times.76 Indeed, wage
dependents in the nineteenth century were frequently paid at or below the subsistence level and
experienced chronic unemployment.77 In the relatively prosperous year of 1890, for instance, 19% of
the male labor force in Massachusetts found itself unemployed at some point, and these men
remained out of work for an average of 3.3 months.78 The outlook was even bleaker, moreover,
during one of the economic downturns that regularly cycled through the nineteenth-century
economy. No less than 29.6% of the male Massachusetts labor force was out of work at some point
during the depression year of 1885, and their unemployment lasted an average of 4.2 months.79
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For this reason, many families were vitally dependent on the economic contributions of wives
and children. While the overall number of married women who worked outside the home in the
nineteenth century was small,80 many wives needed to add to their household’s income stream.
Outside work was most frequent among wives who were African-American, or foreign-born, or in the
native white working class.81 In addition, the same groups of wives more typically earned money
while in their homes, most often by taking in piecework, laundry, or boarders.82
Many poor and working-class families in the nineteenth century, immigrant and native-born,
also found that their children’s earnings were absolutely indispensable to their economic survival, no
matter what middle-class reformers thought about the practice of child labor and imagined about the
motivations behind it. One study of white families in Philadelphia in 1880, for example, discovered
The 1890 census, for instance, found that only 4.6% of all married women were “engaged in gainful
occupations.” BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP’T OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, STATISTICS OF WOMEN AT WORK BASED ON
UNPUBLISHED INFORMATION DERIVED FROM THE SCHEDULES OF THE TWELFTH CENSUS: 1900, at 9, 22 tbl.16 (1907).
This statistic included a mere 2.2% of native-born white wives with two native-born parents who were gainfully
employed. See id. at 22 tbl.16. The figure was 2.7% for native-born white wives with at least one foreign-born parent,
3.0% for foreign-born white wives, 22.7% for African-American wives, and 8.6% for “Indian and Mongolian” wives. Id.
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women participated in the labor force on average three times more than did white women, and married black women
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that the children of Irish-born men earned between thirty-eight and forty-six percent of their
households’ total income, while their peers with German-born fathers earned between thirty-three
and thirty-five percent, and the children of native-born fathers earned between twenty-eight and
thirty-two percent.83 As a consequence of this sort of dependency, market labor was probably even
more common among children than among wives in the nineteenth century. The 1870 census,
employing a definition that excluded many child workers, still counted 765,000 children between the
ages of ten and fifteen who were gainfully employed, representing almost six percent of the total
workforce.84 Thirty years later, the 1900 census recorded 1,750,000 child workers, almost one
million more than reported in 1870 and now slightly over six percent of the working population.85
In representing both work and home life, the nineteenth-century ideology of domesticity
frequently claimed to be just depicting the world as it was. But it was not doing that. The ideology
of domesticity was normatively invested in a specific mode of family-market relations. Its vision of
work and home was an idealized, prescriptive account, in which cultural norms about sex and
economics infused the way in which the world was being portrayed. By purporting to simply describe
the world as it was, however, this body of thought was able to characterize families without the
preferred family-market ordering as deviant, abnormal, and personally at fault. Its definition of
successful fatherhood—of normal fatherhood, really—immediately created a large population of
failed fathers, blamed for the fact that they did not earn enough to support an entire family, and of
failed families, whose status was inextricably tied to their unsatisfactory patriarch.
83
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To make matters worse, the concept of failed fatherhood drew power from racial divides, as
well as those of class and gender. These failed fathers disproportionately carried an ethnic or racial
identification that made it much more difficult for them to command the state’s intrinsic respect for
their household governance. The almost five million immigrants who arrived in the United States
between 1830 and 1860,86 and the over ten million who came during the next thirty years,87 quickly
suffered more than their share of low-wage employment, chronic unemployment, and poverty.88
Native-born Americans frequently understood these immigrants, who were overwhelmingly from
Europe,89 to be fundamentally different and unchangeably inferior, not just culturally, but ethnically
and even racially as well. America’s racial taxonomies were in flux during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, especially in the North where the African-American population was much
smaller.90 Throughout this period, Southern states focused intently on the white-black dichotomy
that came to dominate modern American thought.91 Northerners, however, were much more likely
to see racial divisions between people now understood to be white and to locate racial inferiority in
these groups. When the United States Immigration Commission compiled a Dictionary of Races or
Peoples in 1911, for instance, it officially identified forty-five different races among the immigrants to
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the United States.92 Thirty-six of these races were indigenous to Europe,93 including such races as
Germans, Hebrews, Irish, Italians, and Poles.94
In the standard nineteenth-century view, the racial inferiority of these immigrants was
particularly likely to manifest itself as a profound and permanent unfitness for self-government, in
both its public and private forms.95 Some native-born critics focused on the immigrant’s supposedly
inborn incapacity for self-government in the political arena. James Russell Lowell, for instance,
offered typical warnings in 1884, predicting that American democracy was threatened because “the
most ignorant and vicious of a population . . . has come to us from abroad, wholly unpracticed in selfgovernment and incapable of assimilation by American habits and methods.”96 Other commentators
and policymakers described immigrants’ failures within their own households in parallel terms.
Francis Walker, for example, explained in 1896 that the immigrants who crowded nineteenthcentury America’s cities were “beaten men from beaten races,” who had “none of the ideas and
aptitudes which fit men to take up readily and easily the problem of self-care and self-government.”97
The Massachusetts Board of State Charities elaborated on this latter theme, reporting that racial
inferiority, “inherited organic imperfection,—vitiated constitution,—or poor stock,” primarily
explained the inability of poor men to adequately support their families.98 The widespread incidence
of failed fatherhood was troubling enough, but the fact that many of these men were (understood to
be) racially predisposed to such failure could only be considered a stronger sign that the
preconditions for recognition as a patriarch were not being met. The combined situation helped
convince leading reformers and lawmakers that the common law’s fierce deference to patriarchal
household government should not apply to these husbands and fathers. These men—and it was
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thought to naturally follow, the women and children in their families—required a new and different
governing scheme.
II.

DOMESTIC INTERVENTION

Part II examines the legal regimes that were created beginning in the nineteenth century to
regulate failed fathers and the women and children whose status turned on this evaluation of the
men who headed or were supposed to head their households. These regimes were highly suspicious
of parental judgment, committed to the intense scrutiny of family life, and eager to remake familial
relations. Drawing on the growing elite consensus described in Part I, they operated on the premise
that common law rules and norms, which continued to govern economically successful families, were
wholly inappropriate in the absence of a viable patriarch. The record of the rise of these new legal
structures is, in part, a story about the emergence of the modern welfare state. But it is also, and
more specifically, a uniquely legal history about the development of new bodies of law that regulated
family life, yet took their logic from standing outside of what was conventionally and authoritatively
known as family law. To analyze the emergence of this two-part regime for governing the legal
treatment of parenthood, this part focuses in particular on two crucial moments in the law’s
bifurcation.
In nineteenth-century reform movements, elite private philanthropy and state power
frequently associated on intimate terms. As early as the 1850s and 1860s, leading American
reformers had become very interested in limiting the control that both fathers and mothers exercised
over their children, in circumstances where those children did not have a father able to provide for
his family’s entire maintenance. With the founding of the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children, the first pivotal moment that this part considers, that elite philanthropic impulse began to
acquire tremendous legal support. The cruelty societies, like their more fully private predecessors,
were disrespectful of both paternal and maternal autonomy and extremely anxious to intervene when
families without an acknowledged patriarch were at issue. But the cruelty societies, established in
New York City in 1874 and then rapidly spread throughout the nation, quickly amassed and
enthusiastically exercised unprecedented legal authority to investigate these families, arrest these
parents, and remove these children.
By the early twentieth century, this bifurcation of the law’s regulation of parenthood had
begun to take what would become its more modern form. The second key moment that this part
examines concerns the mothers’ pension laws that swept through state legislatures beginning in 1911.
The mothers’ pension programs had some new structural features that would also come to
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characterize successor regimes later in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. They were entirely
state-run. More importantly, they relied primarily on the provision and denial of crucial financial
support, rather than the threat of separating families, to achieve their aims. But the underlying
norms survived intact from the nineteenth century. Like the cruelty societies, the mothers’ pension
programs operated on the guiding presumption—always viscerally understood if never completely
acknowledged—that parent-child relations in families without a viable patriarch needed to be
scrutinized, regulated, and constantly reshaped, even though wholly different, and much less
interventionist and instrumental, rules and norms continued to be appropriate for more economically
successful families. Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a two-part
regime for governing parental relations had emerged and institutionalized itself, in a manner that is
still with us today.
A.

Philanthropic Intervention Between the Poor and Their Children

By the mid-nineteenth century, a number of elite reform efforts had been founded on the
principle that it was misguided, and even dangerous, to defer to the judgment and decision making of
either parent in families without a father able to provide for his wife and children’s entire support.
The premise was starkly at odds with the basic norms that drove the common law’s treatment of the
family. But these reformers were increasingly sure that the deference to patriarchal household
government that the common law so strongly endorsed was inappropriate for failed fathers and the
women and children associated with them, although still well-suited to the households of more
economically successful family men. While the reformers were not initially imbued with any
particular legal powers, they energetically worked within the confines of existing law to limit parental
authority in their targeted families. By the 1870s, the similar reform commitments advanced by the
Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children would lead to the creation of new bodies of law.
The first signs of this reform agenda were visible at least as early as the 1830s, in the Sunday
school movement directed at poor urban children. By later standards, the Sunday schools’
intervention into families was extremely mild: The schools simply offered religious instruction to
children. But the schools explicitly sought to displace parents (especially mothers) as the primary
moral instructors of their children, in an era that generally revered a mother’s personalized,
privatized, and individualized instruction.99 The movement’s leaders grounded their deviation from
the traditional celebration of parental guidance on the conviction that the instruction their students
received at home had no value and in fact needed to be energetically counteracted. As the Reverend
John Todd enthusiastically phrased the notion, the schools believed they were the antidote to “the
99
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poison of wrong example and wrong teaching at home.”100 The only real evidence that the Sunday school
leaders had to support this evaluation of their students’ parents, which applied at least as much to
their mothers as to their fathers, was the simple fact that these children came from families without a
father able to support his dependents. In the vision of the Sunday school leaders, poor children who
lived in “squalor”101 were necessarily being raised in “abodes of moral death”102 or “moral
orphanage,”103 where they had no parents worthy of public respect or deference.
The energy and commitment that elite private reformers devoted to constraining parental
authority and remaking parent-child relations in families without a recognized patriarch blossomed in
the 1850s and 1860s. The Children’s Aid Society of New York, founded in 1853 by Charles Loring
Brace,104 represented the most striking manifestation.
The Children’s Aid Society dedicated itself to removing poor children from New York City
and placing them with farm families in the West.105 Between 1853 and 1890, the year of Brace’s
death, it succeeded in relocating over ninety-two thousand people, almost all of them children.106
Although many of these children were orphans, approximately as large a group had at least one
parent living. Four hundred (51.5%) of the children placed out between February 1859 and
February 1860, for example, fell into this latter category, as compared to 328 full orphans and 48
unknowns.107 All of the removed children were “destitute,”108 and a substantial minority was also
foreign-born. In the 1859-1860 year, for instance, 296 (36.4%) of the 814 transported people were
foreign-born (mainly Irish and German),109 as compared to 456 (56.0%) listed as “American,” 3
(.37%) classified as “Colored,” and 59 (7.2%) unknown.110
100
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The Children’s Aid Society had no special authority to separate parents from their children,
but it seems to have taken advantage of every opportunity that the law did (at least arguably) make
available. The society formally required permission from parents before it placed out their children,
because it could not have legally removed these children without such authorization.111 But the
society was, in practice, apparently somewhat casual about parental notification and consent. The
society felt comfortable referring to children with living parents as “orphans,” and it hoped for their
adoption by the families they lived with in the West.112 Parents routinely came forward to report that
the society had not made clear the permanence of the separation intended.113 If a child apprised of
the possibilities of Western adventure responded by presenting himself as a (real) orphan, moreover,
the evidence suggests that the society would frequently take the child with no questions asked or
investigation made.114
The entire operation ran on the premise that virtually any level of intrusion, control, and
manipulation was appropriate to counteract the authority that these parents exercised over their
children. The Children’s Aid Society explained its overriding conviction in terms that were
accompanying note 107.
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been inconsistent with his truthfulness.” Id. at 191. As the court explained, “[t]he poor and unprotected, not noticeable
for improper or criminal conduct, are generally little known, and if known, are soon forgotten.” Id.
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becoming quite typical. As an initial matter, the society stressed that “an immense proportion”115 of
the parents involved were foreign-born—“miserable creatures of Europe, the scum and refuse of illformed civilizations”116—and racially predisposed to failed household government.117 As it turned
out, the families the society separated actually included more native-born Americans than the society
generally liked to acknowledge.118 But it was definitely the case that none of these families contained
a father able to adequately support his wife and children, and it was this fact that the society
emphasized most of all. When the society reported that its removal program was desperately needed
to save children from their “vile parents,”119 its evidence of vileness was precisely that these children
were not protected from the demands of the market and instead frequently labored within it. On the
society’s account, this deviation from ideal domesticity was unquestionably deliberate. It reflected
the same deep-seated moral and character flaws, the same “vices and crimes,” that explained the
persistence of the family’s poverty in the first place.120 Only woefully inadequate parents—uncaring,
immoral, and indolent—kept their children “in the street to earn something for their support.”121
This standard of parental fitness contained more than the usual ironies where the Children’s
Aid Society was concerned. Not only was it was blind to the structural constraints of poverty, it also
ignored the society’s own promotion of child labor. The most important way that the society induced
western families to receive the children that the society removed was by promising them that the
children would work for their keep. Their new homes were not much of a refuge from labor after
all.122 But the Children’s Aid Society applied its standards of parental success and failed fatherhood
without qualm, nonetheless, convinced that the parents it dealt with did not meet the preconditions
115

BRACE, supra note 104, at 35.
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY 4 (New York, M.B. Wynkoop 1856).
117
See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
118
See supra text accompanying notes 109-110.
119
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY 5 (New York, M.B. Wynkoop 1855).
120
TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY, supra note 112, at 42 (“Observe one of these
poor boys, taken from his birthright of squalid want and haggard misery—from parents whose vices and crimes breed a
corruption absolutely contagious. . . . [In the West,] [h]e finds a pure air, bountiful meals, comfortable clothing, and, for
the first time in his life, a home.”); see also SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY, supra note 119,
at 5 (noting “that no relief can be of permanent value to society, or to the poor themselves, without influence in some
form, on character”); THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY, supra note 116, at 27 (“In nine cases of
ten, it is probable, some cursed vice has thus reduced her [an impoverished woman whose children a society agent found
gathering coal in the street], and that, if her children be not separated from her, she will drag them down, too.”).
121
BRACE, supra note 104, at 42.
122
See id. at 231-32 (“[T]here was usually a dense crowd of people at the station, awaiting the arrival of the
youthful travelers. . . . [M]any who really wanted the children’s labor pressed forward to obtain it.”); To Farmers and
Mechanics and Manufacturers in the Country from the Children’s Aid Society (Mar. 1853), reprinted in HENRY W.
THURSTON, THE DEPENDENT CHILD: A STORY OF CHANGING AIMS AND METHODS IN THE CARE OF DEPENDENT CHILDREN
101 (1930) (“There would be no loss in the charity. These boys are, many of them, handy and active, and would learn
soon any common trade or labor. They could be employed on farms, in trades, in manufacturing . . . . The girls could be
used for the common kinds of housework.”) (emphasis omitted).
116
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for deference or respect. By the mid-1870s, this sort of elite philanthropic conviction began to have a
major legal impact, spurring the creation of new bodies of law governed by norms opposed to those
conventionally associated with the legal treatment of parenthood.
B.

The Law of Child Cruelty
1.

The New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children

The New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children was formally a private
organization, founded, led, and largely funded by some of the most prominent and wealthy
philanthropists of its day.123 Yet it immediately sought, quickly won, and eagerly exercised
unprecedented legal authority to scrutinize its targeted families, remove their children, and arrest
their parents.124 The society and its empowering legislation regulated the rights, responsibilities, and
relationships of family members, but its work was not understood to fall within the jurisdiction of
family law and it operated on principles at odds with family law as it was authoritatively defined.125
The New York society’s standard for determining which parents merited the deference
traditionally accorded at common law, and which did not, had familiar outlines, now codified into
positive law. The society did not seek to overturn parental prerogatives in every arena; it only saw
child cruelty in certain social forms and not others. In particular, the society operated on the
overriding principle that both children and the nation at large would be endangered if the law
respected the judgment and household autonomy of either parent in families without a father able to
adequately support his wife and children and keep them out of market labor. In this vision, cruelty
was defined as a deviation from ideal domesticity, but not necessarily the use of violence. This
standard of parental failure turned on practices strongly associated with people of little means, and
the society’s caseload, like that of its more fully private predecessors in elite philanthropy,126 was
exclusively poor.127
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See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 16-24.
125
See supra Part I.B.
126
See supra Part II.A.
127
On rare occasion, the society happened to cross paths with a wealthy child. It encountered, for instance, two
wealthy orphans in its early years. See THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 33-34 (“[V]ery respectable citizens testified . . . that he was possessed of considerable
property in real estate and money; that both parents were dead, his mother dying in March last; . . . and that evil-minded
persons, both men and women, were assisting to ruin him, and squander his property.”); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR
THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 18, at 10 (“Charles F. Barrett, found among the street gamins in
San Francisco, Cal., by the Society there, and upon investigation it was ascertained that he had run away from Boston,
Mass., some time previous; that parents had died during his absence, leaving considerable property.”). But the society
dealt with these children outside of its usual procedures, by arranging guardians for them. See THE NEW YORK SOCIETY
FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 34 (“Judge Loew appointed
Henry Kugeler, a wealthy gentleman, residing near the boy’s property, guardian. Mr. Kugeler has filed bonds in the sum
124
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Although the child whose plight initially sparked the formation of the New York society had
been the victim of physical abuse,128 the society always viewed the question of physical violence
ambiguously. From the start, it enthusiastically supported a parent’s right to corporally punish his
child. Henry Bergh, soon to become a vice president of the New York society,129 explained at an
organizational meeting in December 1874 that he was “anxious to protect children from undue
severity,” but still “in favor of good wholesome flogging, which he often found most efficacious.”130
Over time, the New York society appears to have become less certain that even excessive
physical violence was central to the problem of child cruelty. In the 1890s, Elbridge Gerry, the
president and guiding force behind the society, campaigned (unsuccessfully) in New York for laws
subjecting “child cruellists” to the whipping post.131 The effort revealed, very dramatically, Gerry’s
suppositions about the sort of parents who committed child cruelty. Gerry supported “the infliction
of physical pain,” on the ground that the rod was “an argument” that parents could “appreciate, no
matter how illiterate they are, or how debased by crime, or how besotted by indulgence in liquor.”132
of $30,000 dollars for the faithful performance of his trust.”); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF
CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 18, at 10 (“A proper guardian was appointed, and boy forwarded per steamer to New
York, and received by this Society and forwarded to Boston, where he is now attending school, having given up his
roaming propensities, as we are informed.”).
128
See supra text accompanying note 7.
129
See John D. Wright Dead, supra note 12, at 5.
130
Prevention of Cruelty to Children, supra note 7, at 2 (reporting remarks of Henry Bergh).
131
See Elbridge T. Gerry, Must We Have the Cat-O’-Nine Tails?, 160 N. AM. REV. 318, 323 (1895) (advocating
“[t]he present proposed legislation, which has the sanction of all the humane societies in the State of New York, and was
prepared by their Committee on Legislation pursuant to their instructions”); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 7 (New York, no publisher 1896) (“Corporal
punishment has been suggested as a very practical method of dealing with the evil, on account of its deterrent effect. Last
year the Legislature of this State failed by a few votes to pass such a measure.”).
John G. Shortall, the president of the Illinois Humane Society, also supported the whipping of child cruellists.
See THIRTIETH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS HUMANE SOCIETY 5, 56 (Chicago, Illinois Humane Society 1899)
(“Shortall . . . drew up a bill which was presented to the Legislature . . . , asking for the enactment of a law making
whipping a penalty under the criminal statutes, for certain offenses. The bill was introduced, but failed of present
adoption. It was not expected that it would be adopted at once . . . .”). The Illinois Humane Society was the local
equivalent of a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. See infra text accompanying notes 175, 182.
For similar advocacy, see Flogging for Wife-Beaters, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 8, 1899, at 8, 8 (“There is a
growing sentiment that for the brute who beats his wife [or] who ill-uses children . . . a short term of imprisonment is an
inadequate and ineffective penalty, and the opinion is gaining ground that for such offenses the whipping post . . .
constitutes the only appropriate and deterrent punishment.”); The Whipping-post, WASH. POST, May 22, 1899, at 6, 6 (“A
drunken brute capable of beating his helpless wife and maiming his innocent children recognizes no terrors in the modern
prison . . . . The one thing he fears, and, therefore, the one deterrent he is capable of appreciating, is physical suffering.”).
132
Gerry, supra note 131, at 320-21; see also THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO
CHILDREN, supra note 131, at 6-7 (“[M]ore stringent measures [are] necessary to lessen successfully [‘the record of
crimes committed against the helpless children of the poor’] . . . . The human brute who seeks his victim in helpless
childhood dreads imprisonment but little, if at all. Pain is the one thing to which he is not insensible.”); John G. Shortall,
To the Honorable the Members of the Forty-First Legislature of Illinois, Assembled at Springfield, reprinted in
THIRTIETH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS HUMANE SOCIETY, supra note 131, at 56, 57 (“We demand . . . punishment
which has a deterrent quality. No punishment has that quality for the person to whose fine nature you cannot appeal,
except physical pain.”).
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More broadly, this campaign endorsed serious physical violence as a means of securing obedience to
legitimate hierarchy, whether between the state and these particular citizens or between parent and
child. In the course of his campaign for the whipping of child cruellists, Gerry made the case for the
corporal punishment of children in similarly authoritarian terms, explaining that “corporal
punishment is recognized in every household in the land, as a speedy and effective method of
reducing an unruly child to submission; and while in very many cases it should be the last argument
resorted to, it certainly has the advantage of producing an immediate compliance.”133
The society’s practice accorded closely with Gerry’s views on the issue of physical violence.
By 1893, Superintendent E. Fellows Jenkins, the man assigned to tabulate and summarize the work of
the society’s agents, was reporting that “fewer cases of actual physical cruelty are found,” leaving the
society free to focus on “neglect and moral cruelty . . . , as well as many other wrongs to children.”134
Jenkins had no independent means of tracking the incidence of physical violence against children in
New York City; what he was really reporting was that the society’s agents were arresting fewer
parents and removing fewer children on grounds of physical abuse. The New York society’s
campaign against child cruelty was not necessarily a campaign against violence. Indeed, the society
understood much violence against children to be perfectly legitimate, and cruelty to be mostly
something other than violence.
Rather than concentrate on physical abuse (or on other features of the interaction between
parent and child), the society devoted its most intense energy to another problem, that of children in
the commercial public, earning money by begging,135 peddling,136 or performing.137 The society
133

Gerry, supra note 131, at 322; see also Shortall, supra note 132, at 57 (“From the days of Solomon it has
been well known that when the rod is spared the child is spoiled. We believe it to be true to-day.”).
134
THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 18
(New York, no publisher 1893).
135
See, e.g., THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 23, at 36 (“Sept. 22. Sarah Quinn, arrested with child about three years old, for begging. . . . Maggie
Solferino arrested for begging. . . . Michael Brennan, aged nine years, arrested twelve o’clock at night for begging. . . .
Malachia Brennan, six years old, arrested for begging . . . . [All were] [t]aken before Judge Wandell and committed
. . . .”); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 138, at 41 (reporting
commitment of child for begging and noting that child’s “parents were Italians, strong, able-bodied persons, and were
evidently living almost wholly from his efforts, his receipts being many times two and three dollars per day”); THE NEW
YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 18, at 14-15 (reporting that parents of
arrested child beggar refused “to keep him home . . . as [the] boy was undoubtedly a source of large revenue to them”);
see also People v. Malone, 71 N.Y.S. 224, 224-25 (App. Div. 1901) (reversing parent’s conviction where the New York
society found his child begging, on the ground that there was no evidence “that the parent neglected or refused to use the
ordinary and proper means to restrain him from begging”).
136
See THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT 9
(New York, Styles & Cash 1880) (asserting that “[m]iserable little girls, compelled to sell flowers at the doors of places
of vile resort—their business often being a cover for shameful practices—no longer loiter there night after night”); THE
NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 141, at 6-7 (“[T]he practice [of child
cruelty] is carried to the extremes of educating children to beg, to peddle, to steal, and even to immorality, simply to put
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understood a child in commercial life to be per se evidence of a parent’s “cruelty.” Its eye focused
most sharply on those children whose labor was visible to a general audience,138 and it was quick to
spot commerce in the street activities of poor children, easily concluding that the purportedly free
performances that many of these children offered, for instance, were only veiled forms of
solicitation.139 It successfully lobbied for the passage of a series of statutes that codified its views into
law. As early as 1876, a parent was guilty of a criminal offense and liable to lose permanent custody
of his child whenever the child participated in “the vocation, occupation, service, or purpose of
singing, playing on musical instruments, rope, or wire walking, dancing, begging, or peddling, or
[performed] as a gymnast, contortionist, rider or acrobat, in any place whatsoever.”140 With less
fervor (and less legislative success), the New York society also opposed child labor in factories.141
money in the pockets of their parents, and without the slightest thought as to the consequences to the children or to
society . . . .”).
137
See In re Stevens, 24 N.Y.S. 780, 780-81 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (upholding conviction for publicly exhibiting a
child in a theatrical performance, in case in which defendant was arrested “at the instance of the New York Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Children”); People v. Meade, 10 N.Y.S. 943, 943-44 (Ct. General Sessions 1890) (recording
jury instructions in successful prosecution that New York society brought for employing children in a theatrical
performance); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 23, at 39 (reporting arrest of seven-year old boy “called ‘Prince Leo’” who performed on a tight rope); THE NEW
YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 136, at 66 (reporting commitment of
“Frederick Klinket, aged eleven years, known as ‘Young Barbadoes,’ [who was working] as a contortionist”).
138
Indeed, the society commonly described children who earned money in public as an infliction on the
respectable adults who encountered them. See, e.g., THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO
CHILDREN, NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 8 (“[T]he streets of this great city are no longer filled with
very small children, begging, peddling and pilfering, to the annoyance of all decent people.”); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY
FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 18, at 14 (reporting arrest of “Frank Haller, aged ten years, a
crippled beggar boy—one of the worst sights with which our city was inflicted. He was so badly deformed that he could
not walk erect, but slid along the pavement, upon his hands and feet, through the snow and ice.”); THE NEW YORK
SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 41 (New York, Styles & Cash 1877)
(reporting arrest of “Francesco Verize, a cripple boy, aged fifteen years” for begging and noting that “if persons from
whom he solicited alms did not comply with his request, he would insult them”).
139
Statutes enacted in this era often similarly treated adult street performances as prohibited forms of begging.
The Massachusetts criminal code of 1860, for instance, punished “persons who use any juggling or unlawful games or
plays, common pipers and fiddlers,” along with explicit beggars. See MASS. GEN. STAT. ch. 165, § 28 (1860). For an
excellent description of the street culture of poor people in nineteenth-century New York, see STANSELL, supra note 82,
at 50-51, 56-57, 203-05.
140
An Act to prevent and punish wrongs to children, ch. 122, §§ 1, 3, 1876 N.Y. Laws 95, 95-96. The statute
contained exceptions for singing or playing a musical instrument in church or school and for playing an instrument with
“the written consent of the mayor of the city or president of the board of trustees of the village where such concert or
entertainment shall take place.” Id. § 1. An earlier New York statute, enacted on April 3, 1874 just before Bergh and
Gerry began organizing the New York society, subjected parents to the possibility of a fine and/or imprisonment if they
sold, apprenticed, gave away, let out, or disposed of a child to someone who used the child for begging, peddling, or
street performing. See An Act in relation to mendicant and vagrant children, ch. 116, § 1, 1874 N.Y. Laws 132, 132.
This 1874 statute, however, was significantly less far-reaching than the 1876 act. Most notably, the earlier law did not
authorize the deprivation of custody. See id.
For more examples of statutes passed after the New York society’s founding that reflected its influence, see An
Act for the protection of children, and to prevent and punish certain wrongs to children, ch. 428, §§ 2-3, 1877 N.Y. Laws
486, 486 (providing that a parent who failed to restrain his “child from begging, whether actually begging or under the
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This definition of cruelty conditioned legal respect for parental prerogatives on the ability to
achieve the family-market ordering idealized in the literature of domesticity, operating on the
assumption that a child’s contribution to his family’s maintenance was a mark of parental failure,
indolence, and wilful exploitation. On the society’s account, huge portions of the children begging
on the streets were not “driven to it by actual want and suffering,” but instead had been “sent out
merely to support parents in a life of vice and drunkenness.”142 In fact, the society was also certain
pretext of peddling” was guilty of a criminal offense and subject to losing custody of his child); An Act to amend chapter
four hundred and twenty-eight of the laws of eighteen hundred and seventy-seven, entitled ‘An act for the protection of
children and to prevent and punish certain wrongs to children,’ and to repeal chapter forty-eight of the laws of eighteen
hundred and fifty-nine, ch. 496, § 2, 1881 N.Y. Laws 669, 669 (providing criminal penalties for a parent who
“permit[ted] or neglect[ed] to restrain [his] child from begging, gathering, picking or sorting of rags, or from collecting
cigar stumps, bones or refuse from markets”); An Act to amend the Penal Code, ch. 31, § 5, 1886 N.Y. Laws 39, 40-41
(providing criminal penalties for a parent whose child was, inter alia, performing circus tricks, “begging or receiving or
soliciting alms,” “gathering or picking rags, or collecting cigar stumps, bones or refuse from markets,” or “peddling,
singing or playing upon a musical instrument, or in a theatrical exhibition, or in any wandering occupation”); An Act to
amend section two hundred and ninety-two of the Penal Code relative to the licensing of children in theatrical exhibitions,
ch. 309, § 1, 1892 N.Y. Laws 632, 632 (similar).
Within a decade after the New York society’s establishment, the most influential reform lawyer in New York,
David Dudley Field, was urging the institutionalization of children who lived with their parents but spent their days,
“ragged and dirty, . . . pick[ing] up rags, cigar stumps, and other refuse of the streets, or . . . pilfer[ing] or beg[ging].”
David Dudley Field, The Child and the State, 1 FORUM 105, 106 (1886).
141
The society did not begin to lobby for a child labor law for children in manufacturing until 1882. See
Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1882, at 4, 4; MARY STEVENSON CALLCOTT, CHILD LABOR LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK 9
(1931); FRED ROGERS FAIRCHILD, THE FACTORY LEGISLATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 39 (American Economic
Association Publication No. 4, 1905); JEREMY P. FELT, HOSTAGES OF FORTUNE: CHILD LABOR REFORM IN NEW YORK
STATE 8-9 (1965); Jeremy Pollard Felt, The Regulation of Child Labor in New York State, 1886-1942, at 19-21 (1959)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University) (on file with author). The state legislature did not enact its first law
in that area until four years later. See An Act to regulate the employment of women and children in manufacturing
establishments, and to provide for the appointment of inspectors to enforce the same, ch. 409, 1886 N.Y. Laws 629. The
society’s annual reports would occasionally note “that no child should toil in the factory.” THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR
THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 14; see also THE NEW
YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 7 (New York, no publisher
1886) (“[This society] joins hands with the workingmen, who have at last aroused to the fact that their children are being
ruined in factories, in their efforts to secure proper legislation . . . .”). But they did not dwell on the issue. See Gerry’s
Odd Actions, supra note 12, at 31 (“The care with which Mr. Gerry refrains from interfering with the thousands of
miserable children who are allowed to work in factories and crowded stores in New York is quite as expressive as the
vigor with which he exercises his authoritative powers on the children of the stage.”).
142
THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 23, at 26; see also Gerry, supra note 12, at 128 (“Only those who are degraded far below the level of the brute
creation . . . by a shameless submission to degrading passions, compel such little children by their pitiful condition to
extract alms from the compassionate for their support, or for the procurement of the means of vicious indulgence.”).
Even before the advent of the New York society, a wave of nineteenth-century states passed harsh new laws
criminalizing begging and vagrancy by adult men. See generally STANLEY, supra note 56, at 99-100, 108-11. These
laws were similarly justified on the ground that legal coercion was needed to protect the foundation of the social order
from men who were deliberately choosing to avoid work and responsibility. See id. at 103 (“Most beggars were said to
be ‘idle from choice,’ not ‘necessity’ . . . . Supposedly, the beggar only pretended to seek work, ‘coining his unblushing
falsehoods as fast as he can talk’ . . . .”) (citations omitted); id. at 107 (“[‘[C]harity reformers’] attributed the dependence
of an able-bodied man on alms to his depravity, disinclination, and skill in avoiding the ‘discipline of hunger and cold.’
Regarding wage labor as the obverse of dependency, they postulated that beggars simply lacked compulsion to work.”)
(citation omitted).
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that the prevalence of families without a father who kept his dependents from market labor reflected,
more particularly, the racial degeneracy of foreign-born populations ill-suited for self-government,
whether in the household or outside it.143 Child labor had deep roots in the American tradition,144
and it remained quite common in the nineteenth century,145 despite the growing opposition of
middle-class reformers.146 But the New York society systematically characterized the practice as an
“anti-American” import, nonetheless.147 “The foreign theory,” the society explained in a phrase
equating child cruelty with the burgeoning immigrant population, “is that children are the property
of their parents, to be utilized as the latter see fit.”148 “The American theory is, that it is rather the
duty of the parents to support the child.”149
Deferring to the decision making and authority of these parents would, the society was
convinced, have dire and inevitable consequences, for the children at issue and the nation as a
whole. If left unscrutinized, unregulated, and with custody of their offspring, these failed and
patently immoral parents would contaminate their children’s innocence to the point of threatening
the foundations of the social order. The society predicted that boys subjected to parents who
cravenly forced them to labor in the market would grow up to “swell the ranks of the ‘dangerous
classes’ which imperil the public peace and security,”150 explaining that “[t]hose who grow up in an
atmosphere of vice mature into criminals as a matter of course.”151 The girls, for their part, would be
143

See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
See JOHN DEMOS, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY 140 (1970) (reporting
that “[s]ix to eight seems to have been the most common age” at which children in the Plymouth Colony were apprenticed
to work); EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY: RELIGION & DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
NEW ENGLAND 66 (rev. ed. 1966) (“Probably most children were set to some kind of useful work before they reached
seven. Certainly Puritan spokesmen emphasized the dangers of idleness more than the permissibility of play.”); ZELIZER,
supra note 66, at 59-60.
145
See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
146
See supra text accompanying notes 62-69.
147
THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 141, at 6; see also
Arthur Hornblow, The Children of the Stage, MUNSEY’S MAG., Oct. 1894, at 32, 35-36 (“‘What is so abominable, so
infamous, as to see healthy parents, perfectly able to earn their own living, forcing their children to support then? It is
wrong; it is anti American; it is disgraceful.’” (quoting Gerry)).
148
THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 17, at 14.
149
Id.; see also THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 141, at 5,
8 (“[The] foreign theory [is] that children are merely the property of their parents, and to be utilized as they see fit for
their pecuniary profit and benefit. . . . The proof of this appears in the nationality of the offenders. The statistics show a
very small percentage of Americans as cruellists.”); Elbridge T. Gerry, Children of the Stage, 151 N. AM. REV. 14, 18
(1890) (“The law compels parents to support their children during their tender years, and nowhere sanctions the reverse
of this rule. If parents are unable to provide for their children, the law provides institutions for that purpose.”).
150
THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 138, at 6.
151
THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 5
(New York, no publisher 1895) (celebrating “[t]wenty years of earnest, hard work in this great city involving the custody
of over 230,000 little outcasts most of whom but for the interference of the Society would to-day be mature criminals”);
see also THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra
144
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similarly corrupted, although their degradation and the blight they imposed on the public would take
a different form. On the society’s account, market labor in a girl’s youth led quickly and inexorably
to participation in a yet more immoral and inappropriate form of commerce, namely prostitution.152
“‘[I]t therefore follow[ed],’” the society explained, “‘that not only [was] removal best for the[se]
children,’” it was “‘best for the country at large, as a preventative for the increase of crime and
pauperism.’”153
Drawing on deep cultural impulses, the society effectively summarized and defended its
operating principles in a rhetoric of domesticity, explaining that the children it targeted lived with
their parents but had no real households that the law could recognize or respect. From the society’s
first statement of purpose, it made clear that it intended to rescue “little unfortunates” “from the
dens and slums of the City.”154 This description contained explicit expectations about the class
composition of the population that the society was seeking to regulate; the word “slum” could hardly
encompass a wealthy or middling neighborhood. But the term “dens and slums” spoke about class in
an idiom that the society took to be particularly apt. From the outset, the society consistently refused
to employ the language of home and domesticity to describe the families it was monitoring,
managing, and separating. Instead, the society reported that it was removing children from the
“‘miscalled homes of the inebriate,’”155 or the dwellings of those “unfamiliar with the meaning of that

note 17, at 5 (“A career in crime is usually based upon early vicious surroundings, the absence of proper religious training
in the young, evil associations and frequent contact with vice. . . . [U]nless prompt measures are taken with the growing
children, there can be but little diminution of the number of criminals as the population of this great country steadily
increases.”).
152
See THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 138, at 6
(reporting that child cruelty left girls “lost—body and soul—often before they are women in age and maturity”). The
society was especially concerned about girls who performed in public for pay. See THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 136, at 10 (noting that “the recorded instances of female ruin and
criminal acts, originating in the miscellaneous companies and evil associations connected with these performances, more
than sustain the wisdom of the action of this Society”); id. at 78, 80 (reporting that “‘[m]any of the girls [performing in
theatrical exhibitions] become prostitutes at an early age, and finally end in low dance houses and concert salons,’” while
the boys “‘ultimately end by being thieves or tramps’” (quoting “President Gerry’s letter to the Secretary of the Cleveland
Humane Society, in response to an inquiry made as to what the New York Society’s views were in regard to allowing
children of tender age to appear in public”)); Gerry, supra note 149, at 18 (explaining that girls in public performances
“soon lose all modesty and become bold, forward, and impudent. When they arrive at the limit-age of the law, they have
usually entered on the downward path and end in low dance-houses, concert-saloons, and the early grave which is the
inevitable conclusion of a life of debauchery.”); see also In re Donohue, 52 How. Pr. 251, 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876)
(conflating the employment of children in circus productions with holding “female children . . . for purposes of
prostitution”).
153
THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 17, at 19 (quoting “an able thinker and writer upon this subject”).
154
Protection for Children, supra note 7, at 3 (reporting remarks of Elbridge Gerry); see also CONSTITUTION
AND BY-LAWS OF THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 23, at 5 (same).
155
THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (New
York, Styles & Cash 1879) (quoting the American Female Guardian Society) (emphasis added).
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word [‘home’] in its American sense.”156 Indeed, the society could not have presented the contrast in
domesticity more starkly. On its account, children raised in “surroundings of vice and ignorance” by
their parents actually reached true “homes” when they were institutionalized at the society’s
behest.157 These child care institutions were, obviously, not the precise sort of homes that the
literature on domesticity envisioned. But they did keep their charges out of the public marketplace
and place them under constant supervision.158 The society took this to be a sufficient approximation
of the requirements of ideal domesticity—one it promised was far better than what parents who
“regard[ed] their children as simple puppets to be utilized in making money for them” had
accomplished.159
156

THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 17, at 6. For additional examples, see THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO
CHILDREN, supra note 18, at 5 (“the most degraded and vicious surroundings”); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 5 (“the slums and dens of the
city”); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT 8 (New York,
Styles & Cash 1883) [hereinafter THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, EIGHTH
ANNUAL REPORT] (“the slums and gutters of the city”); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO
CHILDREN, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (New York, no publisher 1884) (“dens of wretchedness and physical suffering”);
THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 8
(“vicious surroundings”); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 141, at 5
(“surroundings of vice and ignorance”); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN,
THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 11 (New York, no publisher 1888) (“the cesspool of vice, and crime, and suffering”); THE
NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at
19 (“low, vicious surroundings”); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, TWENTYFOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 7 (“atmospheres of poverty and crime”).
The New York society used this language of failed domesticity so consistently that outsiders soon described the
society’s work in the very same terms. Reformer Jacob Riis, for instance, characterized the society’s clients as “little
savages . . . hauled forth from their dens of misery.” JACOB A. RIIS, THE CHILDREN OF THE POOR 143 (New York,
Charles Scribner’s Sons 1892). Justice Martin of the New York Court of Appeals similarly reported that “[t]he class of
children which the [society] seeks to benefit is found in the slums and dens of a metropolitan community.” People ex rel.
State Bd. of Charities v. New York Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 55 N.E. 1063, 1074 (N.Y. 1900)
(Martin, J., dissenting).
157
THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 141, at 5; see also THE
NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 18, at 7 (“Societies having the care of
children in our city and through the country have forwarded their reports, thus placing us in a position to find homes for
the little ones coming under our charge . . . .”); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO
CHILDREN, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 156, at 8 (praising the institutions where it placed children “for their
efforts to provide homes for the little waifs after they are rescued from the slums and gutters of the city”); THE NEW
YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT 11 (New York, no
publisher 1900) (reporting that the society had placed “over 80,000 [children] in comfortable homes under moral
influences,” meaning child care institutions in the overwhelming number of cases).
158
See THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 11, at 5 (explaining that the society’s “officers go into the slums and dens of the city, remove helpless and
wronged children by the strong arm of the law, and place them, by the aid of the Courts, in the Institutions who receive
children, reform their vicious habits, [and] give them moral and intellectual training”); THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 156, at 6 (“What now constitutes the value of an Institution is not the
number of children it receives and for the support of which it is paid either by private individuals or by the State or City,
but the proportion of those children which it can point to, as finally saved.”).
159
THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT,
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2.

The Child Cruelty Movement

The New York society’s approach proved remarkably successful, in the state legislature and
nationwide. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children spread like wildfire across the United States, with the heaviest concentration in the MidAtlantic states and the Midwest. By the end of 1879, there were four other cruelty societies in New
York State,160 and sixteen more outside New York.161 By the end of 1884, fifty-six cruelty societies
had been formed in the United States in addition to the one in New York City.162 These societies
were independently organized and run, but there was a broad overlap in goals and commitments.
Like the New York society, the sister organizations were founded on the premise that it would be
inappropriate and unsafe for the law to continue to defer to parents who had not achieved the familymarket ordering celebrated in the ideology of domesticity. Throughout the country, cruelty societies
demanded, obtained, and enforced new bodies of law that scrutinized, regulated, and reshaped
families without a father able to adequately provide for his wife and children and protect them from
market labor.163
Consider the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, founded in
Boston in 1878.164 The Massachusetts society, nationally influential in its own right, did not follow
New York’s lead in all respects. The New York society’s first instinct was to prosecute parents and
commit children. The Massachusetts society thought it more effective to give parents some
opportunity to reform their home lives under supervision,165 although it ultimately removed large

supra note 17, at 6. David Dudley Field similarly described the institutionalization of children who lived with their
parents but spent significant time earning money in the streets. “This,” he wrote in 1886, “is to transfer the child from an
unclean home to one that is clean, from indecency to decency, from foul air to pure, from unhealthy food to that which is
healthy, from evil ways to good.” Field, supra note 140, at 108 (emphasis added).
160
The New York legislature helped encourage this development. The incorporation statute for the New York
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children provided that any five or more people could join together to incorporate
a local cruelty society within New York State. See An Act for the incorporation of societies for the prevention of cruelty
to children, ch. 130, §§ 1-2, 1875 N.Y. Laws 114, 114.
161
See THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 136, at 9.
162
See THE NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 23, at 9; see also FOLKS, supra note 24, at 177 (“In only one state [Indiana] have governmental bodies been
created to perform the duties elsewhere assumed by these societies [for the prevention of cruelty to children].”).
163
In 1924, William J. Shultz tabulated each state’s position, as of 1922, on a variety of offenses against
children. He found that 24 states and the District of Columbia criminalized the exhibition of children on the stage, 23
states and the District of Columbia criminalized child begging, and 8 states criminalized child peddling. See WILLIAM J.
SHULTZ, THE HUMANE MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1910-1922 app. II at 275-77 (1924).
164
See MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 5
(Boston, Wright & Potter Printing Co. 1882) (Massachusetts society’s charter).
165
See id. at 22 (“When the home life is not degraded, or can be essentially improved, it is better not to separate
parent and child.”).
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numbers of children from their parents.166 The Massachusetts society also preferred to place children
in foster care instead of the institutions that the New York society favored.167
But the Massachusetts officers agreed with New York on the nature of the problem that they
were confronting. Here, as in New York, the child cruelty society was much less concerned with
physical abuse, and much more interested in holding parents criminally liable when their children
occupied public space for commercial purposes. As early as 1883, the Massachusetts society reported
that its caseload reflected “a lessening of the number of cases of extreme cruelty by blows and other
methods of physical torture.”168 In its eyes, the problem of child labor loomed larger and more
dangerous, especially when that labor took place in public arenas. Like the New York society, the
Massachusetts organization understood a child’s peddling, begging, or performing to be conclusive
evidence of parental cruelty, certain that the money these children earned went “often to gratify the
appetite of a drunken father or mother, or both.”169
As New York had before it, the Massachusetts society convinced state legislators to create
new forms of positive law that strictly limited the control that these particular parents exercised over
their children. At the urging of the Massachusetts society, the Massachusetts legislature agreed in
1882, for instance, to subject a parent to criminal punishment if he permitted the employment or
exhibition of his “child under fifteen years of age, in dancing, playing on musical instruments, singing,
walking on a wire or rope, or riding or performing as a gymnast, contortionist, or acrobat, in any
circus or theatrical exhibition, or in any public place whatsoever.”170 In 1884, the legislature

166

Linda Gordon, who reviewed a sample of the confidential case records kept by the Massachusetts society,
found that “[b]etween 1880 and 1920, seventy-four percent of the neglected children of single mothers were taken from
those mothers by the MSPCC.” Linda Gordon, Single Mothers and Child Neglect, 1880-1920, 37 AM. Q. 173, 191
(1985).
167
See MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 164, at 22
(“[I]nstitution life is not the natural life for children, and does not fit them for the best manhood and womanhood.”);
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1889, at 13
(Boston, Wright & Potter Printing Co. 1890) (“While we are obliged to send many children to institutions by order of
court, we know their final destination should be a good family.”).
168
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1882, at 13
(Boston, Wright & Potter Printing Co. 1883).
169
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT FOR
1884, at 22-23 (Boston, Wright & Potter Printing Co. 1885) (campaigning for stringent criminal regulation of child
peddling); see also MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT
FOR 1883, at 21 (Boston, Wright & Potter Printing Co. 1884) (supporting criminal penalties for parents who place their
children in public performances on ground that “[t]he children are deprived of needed education, are kept from their beds
till 11 P.M., are exposed to a life of excitement and wandering, as members of variety troupes, or at cheap shows”); id.
(objecting to exhibitions “of deformed and mal-formed children”).
170
Of The Employment of Children, and Regulations Respecting Them, MASS. PUB. STAT. ch. 48, § 8 (1882).
The statute recognized some exceptions for performances in church, school, or “on the special written permission of the
mayor and aldermen of a city or of the selectmen of a town.” Id.; see also MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY FOR THE
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra note 168, at 22-24 (arguing that the statute did not go far enough).

43

prohibited any public exhibition of deformed children.171 Three years later, the state also agreed to
subject the parents of child peddlers and child beggars to strict criminal regulation.172
This conviction that child cruelty, and the need for legal intervention to limit parental
authority, turned primarily on failed family-market orderings was widespread in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century.173 Illinois provides another illustrative example. As early as 1877, the state
legislature enacted an anti-cruelty statute providing that parents could be imprisoned and lose
See An Act to prohibit the exhibition of deformities for hire, ch. 99, § 1, 1884 Mass. Acts 78, 78.
See An Act to prevent illegal peddling and begging by certain minors, ch. 422, 1887 Mass. Acts 1087, 108788 (“Any parent . . . who [requires or permits his child] under the age of fifteen years, [to engage] in peddling without a
license, when a license is required by law, or in begging, . . . shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding six months.”).
173
The Brooklyn Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, for instance, also operated on this view. As
it noted after only three years in operation, its attention was increasingly “directed to little street beggars,” along with the
children who swept the streets, or “peddle[d] some small wares, which is only a cloak for begging.” The Brooklyn
society, much like its counterparts in Manhattan and Boston, took such commercial activities to be certain proof that the
child laborers had “brutal and often drunken parents” who had “forced” their children to earn money out of greed and
indolence. THE BROOKLYN SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 4
(Brooklyn, Union Book and Job Printing Establishment 1883).
The Queen City Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, based in Buffalo, New York, similarly
reported that it had prevented “[m]any children . . . from begging, thereby saving them from that training school to
pauperism and crime.” THE QUEEN CITY SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, ANNUAL REPORT,
1882, at 4 (Buffalo, no publisher 1882). Indeed, the society successfully lobbied in 1882 for a Buffalo city ordinance
subjecting children and their parents to fines if the children were “‘allowed to loiter, peddle, or be engaged in any
vocation on any of the streets of the city’” after nine on summer evenings or eight on winter nights, “‘unless accompanied
by or under the charge of some person of full age.’” Id. at 4, 10 (quoting Buffalo city ordinance enacted on Sept. 11,
1882). The Queen City society applauded the Buffalo police for their “hearty coöperation” in enforcing this ordinance.
Id. at 4. “In most instances,” it elaborated, “the families of which these children were members were not in actual want.”
Id.
Along the same lines, the Toledo Humane Society, founded in 1884 to prevent cruelty against both children and
animals, reported in its first year of operation that “the grossest cruelty” to children resulted not “from indiscriminate
corporal punishment,” but instead “from the fact that hundreds of [children] were being nursed in veritable hot beds of
iniquity, and thus being prepared for lives of crime.” FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TOLEDO HUMANE SOCIETY, FOR THE
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS AND CHILDREN ORGANIZED, 1884, at 12 (Toledo, Comly & Francisco 1885?).
“Forcing children to beg” was, it explained, a “form of cruelty which prevail[ed] to an alarming extent” among parents
who thought that “the world owed [them] a living, and [that their] children should go out and get it.” Id. at 7 (original
emphasis omitted). The society warned that “[t]he result of this crime against society [was], generally, a house full of
vagrants, thieves and vagabonds, who finally find their way into our infirmaries, refuges and jails.” Id.
The California Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, founded in San Francisco in 1876, was
likewise devoted to “suppress[ing] the demoralizing practice of employing children, and especially young girls, to vend
flowers and other articles of sale upon the public streets and in those places of business to which they can gain access—a
practice that oftentimes involves results most painfully offensive to morality and paves the way to an inevitable life of
shame.” THE CALIFORNIA SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT FOR
THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1889, at 3-6 (San Francisco, Geo. Spaulding & Co. 1890). The California society’s
campaign was greatly facilitated by two overlapping state statutes enacted in 1878 that subjected parents to criminal
penalties and the loss of custody if their children participated in “the vocation, occupation, service, or purpose of singing,
playing on musical instruments, rope or wire walking, dancing, begging, or peddling, or [performed] as a gymnast,
acrobat, contortionist, or rider, in any place whatsoever” or (similarly) were found “begging, whether actually begging, or
under the pretext of peddling.” An Act relating to children, ch. 521, §§ 1, 3, 1878 Cal. Stat. 813, 813-14; An Act for the
protection of children, and to prevent and punish certain wrongs to children, ch. 520, §§ 2-3, 1878 Cal. Stat. 812, 812-13.
171
172
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permanent custody of their children if they allowed their children to participate in “the vocation or
occupation, service, or purpose of singing, playing on musical instruments, rope or wire walking,
dancing, begging or peddling, or as a gymnast, contortionist, rider or acrobat.”174 Prompted in part by
this law, the Illinois Humane Society, originally dedicated solely to the protection of animals,
unofficially investigated its first case of child cruelty in 1877.175
Within a few years, reformist concern in Illinois began to focus even more intently on
children, particularly girls, who spent significant portions of their time on the streets, acquiring
money in one way or another. Louise Rockwood Wardner, for instance, offered quite typical
warnings as an Illinois delegate to the Annual Conference of Charities held in 1879, predicting that
these children were destined to become “vagrants and outcasts at seven years of age, thieves at ten,
ruffians at twelve, and inmates of penal institutions or houses of prostitution at fifteen or earlier.”176
She concluded that child laborers had to be either orphans or children trapped with “vile,
unprincipled, debauched, drunken parents, who [were] rearing them by teaching and example to a
familiarity with vice.”177 Like many nineteenth-century Americans, Wardner found the prospect of
girls’ moral ruin particularly troubling. She advocated their institutionalization, arguing that
commitment would rescue girls from their unscrupulous and unloving parents, and introduce them to
the domestic arts.178
The Illinois legislature responded to this growing reform impulse that same year, facilitating
dramatic intervention into families without a father able to shield his dependents from commercial
pursuits. Much like the 1877 statute, the Illinois legislature’s 1879 law provided that a girl could be
removed from her parent’s custody because she “frequent[ed] any street, alley or other place, for the
purpose of begging or receiving alms” or “for other cause [was] a wanderer through streets and alleys,
and in other public places.”179 The 1879 statute, however, also provided for the incorporation of
An Act to prevent and punish wrongs to Children, §§ 1, 3, 5, 1877 Ill. Laws 90, 90-91.
The society was then known as the Illinois Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. See Oscar L.
Dudley, Sixteen Years’ Work Among the Dependent Youth of Chicago, in HISTORY OF CHILD SAVING IN THE UNITED
STATES AT THE TWENTIETH NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION IN CHICAGO, JUNE, 1893, at 99, 10203 (Committee on the History of Child-Saving Work ed., Boston, Geo. H. Ellis 1893).
176
Louise Rockwood Wardner, Girls in Reformatories, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF
CHARITIES, HELD AT CHICAGO, JUNE, 1879, at 178, 179 (F.B. Sanborn ed., Boston, A. Williams & Co. 1879).
177
Id. at 179-80.
178
As Wardner elaborated:
174
175

Shall we not, in taking the large number of young girls who are filling our city streets and alleys, our
almshouses, and worse places, miscalled homes,—shall we not, in protecting and sheltering them from
temptation, guiding, controlling, and training them to become useful, good, independent women, and
virtuous wives and mothers,—reach the very fountain from which flow the evils we desire to arrest?
Id. at 181.
179

An Act to aid industrial schools for girls, § 3, 1879 Ill. Laws 309, 309-10; see also An Act to amend sections
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state-supervised Industrial Schools for Girls “to provide a home” for these children.180 The only
evidence the statute offered to explain why the Industrial Schools would provide an adequate home,
where the girls’ parents had not, was that the Industrial Schools would teach the girls to substitute
housework—a proper female “avocation[],” done in private, and therefore not real labor at all—for
commercial activity in the street. By statute, the schools were charged with instructing the girls in
the “domestic avocations, such as sewing, knitting, and housekeeping in all its departments.”181
The Illinois legislature was slower to create a parallel institutional structure for boys, but here
agents of the Illinois Humane Society took the lead. The Illinois society officially included children
in its jurisdiction in 1881, recognizing that child cruelty had already come to constitute two-thirds of
the group’s caseload.182 By 1887, this transformed society had helped secure the equivalent statutory
authorization for boys’ institutions and the incorporation of the Illinois School of Agriculture and
Manual Training for Boys.183
With the assistance of court-appointed counsel, a girl committed under the statute for female
children challenged the law’s constitutionality, on the theory that she had been imprisoned without
the due process required for criminal confinement.184 But the Illinois Supreme Court accepted the
state’s argument that the Industrial Schools had properly appropriated the prerogatives of failed
parents. The Industrial Schools, the court held, could exercise “the same power of needful restraint
in the child’s care and education as belonged to the parent” because the Schools were providing “for
three (3), five (5) and nine (9) of an act entitled “An act to aid industrial schools for girls,” approved May 28, 1879, in
force July 1, 1879, § 1, 1885 Ill. Laws 243, 243 (virtually identical language).
180
An Act to aid industrial schools for girls §§ 1-2, 14.
181
Id. § 10.
182
The society also officially renamed itself the Illinois Humane Society in 1881. See Dudley, supra note 175,
at 104. By 1922, there were 307 humane societies in the United States that combined child and animal protection. See
SHULTZ, supra note 163, at 14.
183
See An Act to provide for and aid training schools for boys, § 3, 1883 Ill. Laws 168, 168-69; An Act to
amend sections three (3), five (5) and nine (9) of “An act to provide for and aid training schools for boys,” approved June
18, 1883, in force July 1, 1883, and to further amend said act by adding thereto a section to be numbered fourteen (14), §
1, 1885 Ill. Laws 238, 238-39; A Brief History, 16 HUMANE J. 39, 39 (1888); Dudley, supra note 175, at 107, 111-13;
The Illinois Industrial Training School for Boys, 15 HUMANE J. 114, 114 (1887); Oscar L. Dudley, 17 HUMANE J. 25, 25
(1889). For a later Illinois statute that applied to both girls and boys, see An Act to regulate the treatment and control of
dependent, neglected and delinquent children, § 1, 1899 Ill. Laws 83, 83 (defining “neglected child” to include any child
“who habitually begs or receives alms” and “any child under the age of 8 years who is found peddling or selling any
article or singing or playing any musical instrument upon the street or giving any public entertainment”).
184
See In Re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 369-71 (1882). Counsel for the girl relied on People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280
(1870), which struck down a statute providing for the commitment of a child who “‘is destitute of proper parental care, or
is growing up in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness or vice,’” id. at 282 (quoting statute). The Turner court, writing before
the advent of the child cruelty movement, had found that definition of parental failure radically under specified. See id. at
283-84 (“What is proper parental care? The best and kindest parents would differ, in the attempt to solve the
question. . . . [T]he conclusion is forced upon us, that there is not a child in the land who could not be proved . . . to be in
this sad condition.”). The statute at issue in Turner also provided far fewer procedural protections than the 1879
Industrial Schools statute. See In Re Ferrier, 103 Ill. at 370-71 (reviewing augmented protections under Industrial
Schools statute).
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the needed control and care of female infants,” where the children’s parents had not.185 With the
path cleared, the Illinois Humane Society systematically took children into custody for begging on
the streets and arrested their parents.186
C.

Mothers’ Pensions

In the first third of the twentieth century, this bifurcation of the law’s treatment of
parenthood began to take what would become its more prominent contemporary form. The second
legal turning point examined in this part concerns the mothers’ pension laws that were enacted in
twenty state legislatures between 1911 and 1913,187 forty of the forty-eight states by 1920,188 and
every state but Georgia and South Carolina by 1935.189
185

See In Re Ferrier, 103 Ill. at 372; see also County of McLean v. Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378, 383-84 (1882)
(“[The act only imposes restraints that] are essential to the comfort and the well-being of the unfortunate class of persons
who are brought within its provisions. All governmental and parental care necessarily imposes more or less wholesome
restraint, and we see nothing in the act which looks beyond this.”) (emphasis added). The Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld a similar statute that provided for the commitment of children found “‘in any public street or place for the purpose
of begging,’” or “‘found wandering in streets, alleys or public places, and belonging to that class of children called
‘ragpickers.’” Milwaukee Indus. Sch. v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wis 328, 334 (1876) (quoting An Act
authorizing industrial schools, ch. 325, § 5, 1875 Wis. Laws 632, 633). The court reasoned that the parents of these
children had, by definition, “wholly failed to perform” their responsibilities, leaving the state “to assume parental
authority.” Id. at 338.
186
The president of the Illinois Humane Society noted in 1896, for instance, that
there is no one here who is not more or less cognizant of the difficulties attending the treatment by this
Society of child begging upon our public streets. It is a difficult matter to control. The youngsters
know our officers so well that, when they appear in sight, these little vagrants will scuttle away, like so
many rats, into hiding places and escape. They are all perfectly well aware they are doing that which
is contrary to law. We are also made conscious of the difficulty of convicting these little children
before our magistrates, who temper justice with mercy—sometimes, as we think, too much mercy—in
the little ones’ behalf; but we have been successful in several cases in bringing the parents, who are
really responsible for this species of cruelty, to book.
TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS HUMANE SOCIETY 8 (Chicago, Illinois Humane Society 1896); see
also id. at 8-9 (recording the arrest of eight parents whose children the Illinois Humane Society caught begging in the
streets).
187
Missouri passed the first mothers’ pension law in 1911, but the statute was limited to one county. See An Act
to provide for the partial support of poor women, whose husbands are dead or convicts, when such women are mothers of
children under the age of fourteen (14) years and reside in counties now or hereafter having not less than two hundred
and fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants and not more than five hundred thousand (500,000) inhabitants, and now or
hereafter having or holding a juvenile court, with an emergency clause, 1911 Mo. Laws 120. That same year, Illinois
passed the first state-wide statute. See An Act to amend an Act entitled, “An Act relating to children who are now or may
hereafter become dependent, neglected or delinquent, to define these terms, and to provide for the treatment, control,
maintenance, adoption and guardianship of the person of such children,” 1911 Ill. Laws 126. It was followed in 1913 by
California, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. See THEDA SKOCPOL,
PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 446 tbl.9
(1992); Mark H. Leff, Consensus for Reform: The Mothers’-Pension Movement in the Progressive Era, 47 SOC. SERV.
REV. 397, 401 tbl.1 (1973).
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The mothers’ pension laws, which authorized local governments to provide direct financial
support to poor mothers,190 differed from the child cruelty societies in two important institutional
respects that would also come to typify later legal regulation. First, these statutes established
completely governmental programs, which were not dependent on enforcement by private reformers
imbued with public powers. Second, and more crucially, these laws primarily accomplished their
aims through the provision and refusal of much-needed financial aid, building on a growing
consensus among reformers of the period that this strategy was both more effective,191 and more costefficient,192 than removing children from their parents’ custody. The legal regimes that eventually
188

By the end of 1920, only Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, and South Carolina had not enacted a mothers’ pension law. See SKOCPOL, supra note 187, at 447 tbl.9; Leff,
supra note 187, at 401 tbl.1.
189
See SKOCPOL, supra note 187, at 447 tbl.9; Leff, supra note 187, at 401 tbl.1. For discussions of the activist
coalition that helped spur the rapid passage of the mothers’ pension laws, see LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED:
SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890-1935, at 38 (1994); SKOCPOL, supra note 187, at 464-65; Leff,
supra note 187, at 405-13.
190
It is important to note that nearly all of the mothers’ pension statutes permitted, rather than required, local
governmental authorities to distribute aid. Jane M. Hoey, the director of the federal Bureau of Public Assistance, later
estimated that “about 75 per cent of all the children receiving [mothers’] aid in 1934 lived in nine states. By 1935,
probably less than one-half the counties with legal authority to grant mothers’ aid were actually providing it.” Jane M.
Hoey, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 202 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 74, 74 (1939). In 1921 and
1922, a reported 45,825 families were receiving mothers’ pension grants. By 1931, the number had reached 93,620
families. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PUB. NO. 220, MOTHERS’ AID, 1931, at 8 tbl.1 (1933).
191
By the turn of the century, many reformers had growing suspicions about the efficacy of childcare
institutions. See, e.g., MARY CONYNGTON, HOW TO HELP: A MANUAL OF PRACTICAL CHARITY 186 (1909) (“If the
mother is a fit person to have the custody of her children, poverty is not a valid reason for [separation] . . . . An
institution, no matter how good, is a poor place for a child. Even a very poor home offers a better chance for its
development . . . .”); Charles H. Baker, Arguments in Favor of Public Outdoor Relief, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION AT THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL SESSION HELD IN INDIANAPOLIS, IND., MAY
13-20, 1891, at 31, 32 (Isabel C. Barrows ed., Boston, Geo. H. Ellis 1891) (“The feeling of kinship begotten in a home,
however lowly, if it be a home of virtue, has an influence to lift us in the scale of being, which feeling and influence are
not known, and cannot be known, in a normal sense, under the public roof.”); E.E. Porterfield, How the Widow’s
Allowance Operates, 7 CHILD-WELFARE MAG. 208, 208 (1913) (“A good mother can rear her children better than the best
institution. A mediocre home is better than any institution. A child reared in any institution is more or less a human
machine. The best citizens come from the home in which the influence of the mother is felt.”).
192
See, e.g., Address by Rabbi Emil G. Hirsch, D.D., LL.D., PH.D., President National Conference of Jewish
Charities, of Chicago, Ill., Delivered at the Conference Held in Washington, January 25 and 26, Called on Request of
the President, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE CARE OF DEPENDENT CHILDREN HELD AT WASHINGTON,
D.C. JANUARY 25, 26, 1909, S. DOC. NO. 60-721, at 85, 90 (1909) (“In the long run, pensioning mothers is cheaper than
building almshouses and jails and reformatories.”); Remarks of Mr. Max Mitchell, of Boston, Mass., Superintendent
Federated Jewish Charities, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE CARE OF DEPENDENT CHILDREN HELD AT
WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 25, 26, 1909, supra, at 49, 49-50 (“Instead of breaking up a home and paying for the board
of her children in a private family, . . . let the amount involved be paid to the mother in the exercise of her own trade,
which she already knows—a mother’s trade—the bringing up of her children . . . .”); Ada J. Davis, The Evolution of the
Institution of Mothers’ Pensions in the United States, 35 AM. J. SOC. 573, 582 (1930) (explaining that mothers’ pensions
were supposed to function “without any increased burden on the taxpayer,” the idea being that they would “cost
considerably less than the institutional care of the child” and also “make it possible for the child to have the protective
care and attention of the mother in the home”); Helen Todd Says Support Mothers, WOMAN’S J., Jan. 9, 1915, at 14, 14
(“‘It needs a woman’s sense to see the cruelty and folly of breaking up widowed homes. It costs more in the first place,
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superseded the mothers’ pension laws would make the same choice, and operate largely through the
grant and denial of aid or benefits, rather than the grant and denial of custody.
A number of scholars, focusing on these structural innovations, have described the mothers’
pension laws as a groundbreaking change in the legal regulation of the poor.193 And, indeed, the
advocates of mothers’ pension laws did express a commitment to honoring and rewarding the labor
and contributions of needy mothers that was nowhere near as visible in the work of the child cruelty
societies.194 Yet the fundamental norms and presumptions that governed the actual operation of the
mothers’ pension programs carried over from the nineteenth century. The mothers’ pension
programs, like the cruelty societies before them, ran on the guiding principle that a father’s failure to
fully provide for his wife and children was grounds for subjecting both the failed father and the
woman and children who were or should have been attached to him to legal rules wholly unlike those
conventionally associated with family law.
Family law, as it was authoritatively defined in the early twentieth century, continued to be
committed to the staunch protection of parental judgment and autonomy. The common law
doctrine guarding a parent’s right of correction, for instance, did not change noticeably from the late
nineteenth to the early twentieth century.195 Indeed, the early twentieth century was marked by two
and in the second, it kills child life and normal human development. It is good economy to help the mother to keep her
home together . . . .’” (quoting Helen Todd)).
193
See 2 GRACE ABBOTT, THE CHILD AND THE STATE 229 (1938) (“[The mothers’ pension laws] represented a
revolt against the current policy of separating children from their mothers on the ground of poverty alone and caring for
them at greater cost in institutions and foster-homes.”); GORDON, supra note 189, at 38 (“The inadequacy of mothers’ aid
should not mask its historical significance as a welfare accomplishment. Breaking with laissez-faire and Social Darwinist
assumptions, it not only asserted a public responsibility for the poor but also sought to remove relief from the stigma of
pauperism and the poorhouse.”); id. at 38-39 (“[Mothers’ aid] offered, moreover, a feminist version of those principles,
honoring the quintessential female labor, mothering. . . . Mothers’ aid was a kind of child custody reform for the poor.”);
MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 124 (1986) (“By
the early 1890s, child-saving strategies had changed radically. . . . [M]ost reformers . . . rejected the notion that children
should be taken from their families simply on account of poverty. . . . This emphasis on family preservation reflected a
major shift in reform thought. . . . Once family breakup was rejected, . . . mothers’ pensions had to follow.”).
194
See, e.g., Helen Todd Says Support Mothers, supra note 192, at 14 (“‘[I]t is preposterous that we should be
willing to pension veterans for having blown the lives out of people and not pension women for putting life into people.’”
(quoting Helen Todd)); Our Christmas Wish for Women: That Every Decent Mother in America Could Have Her Babies
With Her, DELINEATOR, Dec. 1912, at 413, 413 (“Set the children free! Let them go back to their mothers! And let the
mothers earn their living from the State by doing the most useful thing they could possibly do—bring up their children!”);
Mary Wood, The Legal Side of Industrial Betterment, in THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF WOMEN’S CLUBS ELEVENTH
BIENNIAL CONVENTION JUNE 25 TO JULY 5, 1912, SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. OFFICIAL REPORT 183, 185 (Mrs. George O.
Welch ed., 1912) (“[W]idows [with ‘small children’] should receive from the state, a pension sufficient to enable each to
look after children and home. . . . The woman who produces citizens and soldiers should be placed in a class with the
disabled soldier, during the period she is unable to earn for herself and children.”).
195
See 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW 627 (John M. Zane & Carl Zollmann eds., 9th ed.
1923) (“[I]f [a parent] acts in good faith, prompted by true parental love, without passion, and inflicts no permanent
injury on the child, he should not be punished merely because a jury reviewing the case dissents from his judgment
therein.”); JAMES SCHOULER, LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 240 n.1 (1905) (“The law reluctantly interferes
criminally in such cases unless the parental chastisement produces permanent injury or was maliciously inflicted.”).
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celebrated Supreme Court cases, Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)196 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925),197
that importantly constitutionalized common law principles of deference to parental control and
decision making. Meyer struck down a state statute that prohibited schools from teaching foreign
languages to young children, holding that it unreasonably infringed upon a parent’s right under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to “establish a home and bring up children.”198
Pierce similarly held that a state law requiring parents to send their children to public, rather than
private, schools was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause because it “unreasonably
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control.”199 Both decisions were grounded in the judgment that “[t]he child is
not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”200 In many
arenas in the early twentieth century, in other words, the norms and presumptions conventionally
associated with family law were endorsed, perpetuated, and sometimes even given constitutional
backing. The application of common law principles of deference to parental judgment and autonomy
was understood to be both appropriate and constitutionally required, for instance, where parents able
to afford private schooling for their children were at issue. The mothers’ pension programs, like their
nineteenth-century predecessors, operated on the conviction that new and different bodies of law,
shaped by much more interventionist, instrumental, and suspicious principles, needed to govern
families in which the father, if alive, was unsuccessful in the wage labor economy, and his dependents
required economic support from the public.
First, and perhaps more than anything else, the laws governing the mothers’ pension programs
were driven by an intense suspicion of fathers who were not supporting their families on their own.
Much like the cruelty societies, the authors of the mothers’ pension laws were certain that a family’s
poverty generally reflected a father’s sloth or moral degeneracy, and they were determined to create
no incentive towards either type of vice. The statutes absolutely excluded needy families who had a
healthy father living with them, on the ground that these fathers were totally responsible for their
family’s own maintenance and had no legitimate reason for their failure.201 The mothers’ pension
programs also all but excluded families of color, understood to be particularly prone to indolent
reliance on the public.202 The only thorough study of the racial distribution of mothers’ pensions
196

262 U.S. 390 (1923).
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
198
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397, 399-400.
199
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530-31, 534-35.
200
Id. at 535.
201
See infra text accompanying notes 206-211.
202
See FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 1927197
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found that ninety-six percent of the families receiving them in 1931 were white, as compared to just
three percent who were African-American, and one percent who “belonged to other races.”203
Discrimination was most intense in the South,204 but approximately half of all the black families
identified as collecting mothers’ pensions in 1931 lived in just two states: either Ohio or
Pennsylvania.205
Even when a (white) father was absent or incapacitated, the mothers’ pension laws still
evaluated women and children in terms of judgments about the men who should have been
supporting them but were not. Indeed, women’s claims to pensions turned to a remarkable extent on
assessments of men who were no longer there. Gendered norms about the way in which domesticity
was supposed to be organized were so inscribed in the mothers’ pension laws that mothers with
precisely the same need for aid were treated very differently based on their relationships with men,
notwithstanding the fact that most of the women eligible for mothers’ pensions were not in those
relationships any more.
28, at 55 (1929) (“From its experience the Outdoor Relief [Department of the Los Angeles County Charities] believes
that the feudal background of the Mexican makes it difficult, if not well nigh impossible, for him to understand and not
abuse the principle of a regular grant of money from the state.”); Mary Odem, Single Mothers, Delinquent Daughters,
and the Juvenile Court in Early 20th Century Los Angeles, 25 J. SOC. HIST. 27, 29 (1991) (“In addition to the formal
eligibility requirements established by the state, the Los Angeles County Outdoor Relief Department, which was
responsible for processing county applications for aid, adopted a policy of refusing mothers’ pensions to Mexican
widows. County officials claimed that Mexican immigrants had a dangerous propensity for ‘leaning’ on the state.”).
203
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 190, at 13.
204
See id. at 26-27. Almost all the mothers’ pension statutes were facially neutral on questions of race. See
WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILD HEALTH AND PROTECTION, DEPENDENT AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN: REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON SOCIALLY HANDICAPPED —DEPENDENCY AND NEGLECT 301 (1933) (“The only statute relating to
mothers’ aid mentioning race or color as a factor conditioning the grant is found in Alaska.”). But the South, the area of
the country where the overwhelming majority of African-Americans lived in this period, was also the region to most
aggressively pursue two different practical strategies for keeping black families off the mothers’ pension rolls. First,
some southern states simply delayed enacting mothers’ pension laws, and then funded mothers’ pension programs in only
a limited number of counties. See id. at 301-02; supra notes 187-189 and accompanying text. Second, the mothers’
pension programs that did exist in the South gave local administrators enormous authority, which they exercised by
systematically excluding applicants who were not white. Between 1924 and 1926, for instance, approximately 29% of
the population of North Carolina was African-American, but African-Americans received only 4 (1.63%) of the 246
mothers’ pensions that the state provided. See WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILD HEALTH AND PROTECTION, supra, at
302. Similarly, only two African-American families were known to have ever received a mothers’ pension in Florida.
See id.
205
See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 190, at 13; see also Joanne L. Goodwin, An American Experiment in
Paid Motherhood: The Implementation of Mothers’ Pensions in Early Twentieth-Century Chicago, 4 GENDER & HIST.
323, 336 tbl.1 (1992) (reporting that African-Americans constituted two percent of the Chicago population in 1911 and
six percent of the poor relief rolls, but they received no mothers’ pensions; in 1920, African-Americans constituted four
percent of the Chicago population and eight percent of the poor relief rolls, and received three percent of the mothers’
pensions); CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PUB. NO. 109, PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE ON MOTHERS’
PENSIONS 2, 4 (1922) (“[Q]uestionnaires were sent in February to 125 mothers’ allowance and other public agencies
throughout the country, and we have received 45 well-considered replies. . . . Eleven [of these 45] agencies made
deviations from the [budget] schedule on account of nationality. One agency had a Mexican problem which affected the
use of the schedule. Another agency figured a low estimate for food and clothing for foreign families. A third agency
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Within (white) families with only a mother present, the mothers’ pension laws (which were
sometimes called widows’ pension laws) favored the widowed over the deserted, the deserted over the
divorced, and the divorced over the never married. Marital status served as a proxy for the mother’s
sexual morality, with widowhood at the virtuous end of the spectrum and unmarried motherhood at
the other. But it was also used to identify those few families who might have an acceptable
explanation for being without a father’s steady financial support. In a program without an
understanding of the structural sources of poverty, widows had the best excuse for their financial
need. As the New York State Commission on Relief for Widowed Mothers explained, “the
misfortune that follows upon the decease of the poorer laborer is not caused in any way by those who
must suffer.”206 Moreover, providing relief to widows could not “in any way increase the number of
worthy families in distress,” while “[t]o pension desertion or illegitimacy would, undoubtedly, have
the effect of a premium upon these crimes against society.”207 Where every mothers’ pension statute
included widows, just three states by 1931 explicitly covered mothers who had never married and just
ten more states covered them implicitly.208 Deserted mothers, in turn, were eligible in 35 out of 45
states and divorced mothers in 21.209 Local administrators, moreover, privileged widows more
intently than even the statutory provisions suggest. Nationwide in 1931, 82% of the mothers
receiving mothers’ pensions were widows.210 Mothers who had never married were explicitly eligible
for aid in Michigan, but only 25 (1.25%) of the 2000 mothers’ pension recipients in a 1933-1934
study actually fell into that category, as compared to 1226 (61.30%) widows, 325 (16.25%) deserted
wives, 175 (8.75%) divorced wives, 151 (7.55%) wives with a physically or mentally incapacitated
husband, and 98 (4.90%) wives with a husband in prison.211

granted lower allowances for Italian and Czechoslovakian families.”).
206
STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON RELIEF FOR WIDOWED MOTHERS
21 (1914).
207
Id.
208
See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 190, at 3. Michigan, Nebraska, and Tennessee were the three states that
explicitly included mothers who had never been married. See id. at 3 n.11.
209
Twenty-five states specifically included deserted mothers, and eleven states specifically included divorced
mothers. Ten additional states implicitly included both categories. See id. at 3. Thirty-seven states (27 explicit) included
mothers whose husbands were imprisoned. Forty-three states (33 explicit) included mothers whose husbands were
physically or mentally incapacitated, although five of those states required that the husband be living in an institution.
See id.
210
See id. at 11 (also noting that 5% of the mothers had been deserted, 4% were married to a man who was
physically disabled, 3% were married to a man who was mentally disabled, another 3% were married to a man who was
imprisoned, and 2% were divorced).
211
See MICHIGAN STATE WELFARE DEP’T, MOTHERS’ AID IN MICHIGAN: A REPORT OF STATE-WIDE STUDY 3-5
(Lansing, Michigan State Welfare Department 1934); see also id. at 4 (“In 21 counties certain types of cases were refused
aid by the Judges of Probate although the law does not grant him such power. For example—in 17 counties the children
of divorced or unmarried mothers are not allowed Mothers’ Aid.”).
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The mothers’ pension laws reflected a consuming dissatisfaction with fathers who had failed
to support their wives and children, and a willingness to express this antipathy by penalizing the
women and children associated with the unsuccessful family men. In addition, however, the
mothers’ pension laws directed almost as much suspicion at the mothers who needed public aid
because they had no husband able to support their family. The statutes took the fact that these
women had turned to the state for economic assistance as grounds for questioning their fitness for
motherhood, scrutinizing their behavior, and regulating their relationships with their children.
Virtually every mothers’ pension law included a provision limiting the program to mothers who were
“physically, mentally and morally fit.”212 The exact characteristics needed to satisfy those criteria
were usually left unspecified to maximize the discretion of the local administrators who determined
eligibility and conducted home visits to monitor continued compliance.213 But the concern with
fitness reflected the fact that this population of mothers was considered a potential threat to both
See, e.g., Aid to Mothers and Children—Act of 1913 Amended, § 11(4), 1915 Ill. Laws 243, 244 (“[S]uch
mother must, in the judgment of the court, be a proper person, physically, mentally and morally fit, to have the care and
custody of her children.”). By the start of 1929, only Arizona, California, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Texas did not
include substantially similar language in their mothers’ pension statutes. Connecticut and Texas, however, explicitly
limited their mothers’ pension programs to widows, and New Jersey included only widows and women raising orphans.
See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CHART NO. 3, A TABULAR SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS RELATING TO
PUBLIC AID TO CHILDREN IN THEIR OWN HOMES IN EFFECT JANUARY 1, 1929 AND THE TEXT OF THE LAWS OF CERTAIN
STATES 4-25 (3d ed. 1929).
213
Recipients of mothers’ pensions in Illinois, for instance, were “subject to the friendly visitation of a probation
officer.” An Act to amend an Act entitled, “An Act relating to children who are now or may hereafter become dependent,
neglected or delinquent, to define these terms, and to provide for the treatment, control, maintenance, adoption and
guardianship of the person of such children,” § 1, 1911 Ill. Laws 126, 126. In the first 11 months of the Illinois program,
17 out of 306 families lost their grants for such reasons “as the death of the mother, or her conceded unfitness from
causes and conditions arising subsequent to the order for relief.” Merritt W. Pinckney, Public Pensions to Widows, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION AT THE THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL SESSION
HELD IN CLEVELAND, OHIO JUNE 12-19, 1912, at 473, 476 (Alexander Johnson ed., 1912). For examples of other
mothers’ pension statutes requiring home visits, see An Act To provide home care for dependent children in the District
of Columbia, ch. 647, § 5, 44 Stat. pt. 2, at 758, 759 (1926) (requiring a mothers’ pension administrator to visit “every
home for which an allowance is made” as often as “necessary to observe the conditions which obtain in the home, the care
which the child is receiving, and to offer such friendly counsel and advice as may be helpful to the mother and the
child”); An Act to provide for suitably aiding mothers with dependent children, ch. 763, § 3, 1913 Mass. Acts 726, 72728 (requiring mothers’ pension administrators to visit the home of each recipient family “at least once in every three
months,” in order to report on “the condition of the home and family” and decide whether to continue aid).
During home visits, administrators commonly looked for signs of extramarital sexuality, alcoholic beverages, or
sloppy housekeeping. See MARY F. BOGUE, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PUB. NO. 184,
ADMINISTRATION OF MOTHERS’ AID IN TEN LOCALITIES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO HEALTH, HOUSING, EDUCATION,
AND RECREATION 29, 40 (1928) (reporting that mothers’ pension administrators in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania
conducted home visits “at least once a month” to make sure, inter alia, that recipients were not keeping any “men
boarders or lodgers other than [a] brother or father”); THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF CHILD WELFARE OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, JANUARY 1, 1918 TO DECEMBER 31, 1918, at 18 (1919) (explaining that the board would not grant
or continue a mothers’ pension if the mother was “mentally, morally [or] physically” unfit; if she had “a record of
intemperance, wastefulness, or of misconduct;” if “the presence and behavior of lodgers are such as to bring the widow
into disrepute;” or if “the home and the children are not kept clean and orderly, or are otherwise neglected, or where the
children are unnecessarily kept from school or from work”).
212
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individual children and, yet more frightening, the nation at large. Influential Americans in this era,
as in the late nineteenth century, increasingly believed that the fate of the United States depended
on the eugenic composition of the country’s population and understood vast numbers of their fellow
citizens to be irredeemably inferior. A majority of states in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, for instance, passed laws prohibiting the marriage of the “feebleminded,”214 a condition
that was variously defined but taken to be inheritable.215 The mothers who applied for mothers’
pensions were frequently foreign-born, reflecting immigrants’ disproportionate share of poverty.216 By
the dominant logic of the day, that alone identified them as predisposed to “inborn socially
inadequate qualities” that threatened the nation’s survival.217 But poverty itself was also generally
taken to be excellent evidence of eugenic unfitness and feeblemindedness.218 So was female sexual
immorality, a charge to which women living without a husband would always be more vulnerable.219
214

See Matthew J. Lindsay, Reproducing a Fit Citizenry: Dependency, Eugenics, and the Law of Marriage in
the United States, 1860-1920, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 541, 542 (1998) (“The Connecticut legislature led the way in 1895,
prohibiting ‘feebleminded, imbecilic, and epileptic men and women under 45 years of age’ from marrying. Similar
legislation was then adopted throughout the nation. By 1929, 29 states barred ‘imbeciles,’ ‘idiots,’ ‘lunatics,’ the
‘feebleminded,’ and those of ‘unsound mind’ from marriage.”) (citations omitted).
215
See CHARLES BENEDICT DAVENPORT, HEREDITY IN RELATION TO EUGENICS 67 (1911) (“In view of the
certainty that all of the children of two feeble-minded parents will be defective how great is the folly, yes, the crime, of
letting two such persons marry.”); THURMAN B. RICE, RACIAL HYGIENE: A PRACTICAL DISCUSSION OF EUGENICS AND
RACE CULTURE 133 (1929) (“Its inheritance is well understood. Feeble-mindedness is a recessive condition, a condition
due to the lack of some normal determiner. It is for this reason that practically all of the children of two hereditarily
feeble-minded parents are feeble-minded. . . . Under no circumstances should a feeble-minded person be permitted to
bear children.”).
216
For instance, German immigrants in Chicago constituted seven percent of the city population in 1911, and
eleven percent of the poor relief rolls. They received twenty percent of the mothers’ pensions. Irish immigrants
constituted three percent of the population, accounted for ten percent of the relief rolls, and received twenty-two percent
of the pensions. Italian immigrants constituted two percent of the population, accounted for eight percent of the relief
rolls, and received eight percent of the pensions. Polish immigrants constituted six percent of the population, accounted
for nineteen percent of the relief rolls, and received fourteen percent of the pensions. See Goodwin, supra note 205, at
336 tbl.1.
217
Analysis of America’s Modern Melting Pot: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Immigration and
Naturalization, 67th Cong. 755 (1923) (statement of Harry H. Laughlin) (“The outstanding conclusion is that, making all
logical allowances for environmental conditions, which may be unfavorable to the immigrant, the recent immigrants, as a
whole, present a higher percentage of inborn socially inadequate qualities than do the older stocks.”); see also
DAVENPORT, supra note 215, at 219 (“[U]nless conditions change . . . , the population of the United States will, on
account of the great influx of blood from South-eastern Europe, rapidly become darker in pigmentation, smaller in
stature, more mercurial, more attached to music and art, more given to crimes of larceny, kidnapping, assault, murder,
rape and sex-immorality . . . .”); J.B. Peabody, Putting It Up to Philanthropy, 29 SURVEY 98, 99 (1912) (“Instead of
decreasing our own unfit classes, we go on adding to them by admitting every year thousands of unfit immigrants.”).
218
See DAVENPORT, supra note 215, at 80 (“Barring a few highly exceptional conditions poverty means relative
inefficiency and this in turn usually means mental inferiority.”); VICTORIA C. WOODHULL MARTIN, THE RAPID
MULTIPLICATION OF THE UNFIT 38 (New York, no publisher 1891) (“The best minds of to-day have accepted the fact that
if superior people are desired, they must be bred; and if imbeciles, criminals, paupers, and [the] otherwise unfit are
undesirable citizens they must not be bred.”); RICE, supra note 215, at 138-39 (“The term ‘pauper’ is often misused. In
this place it is used to designate an individual who does not wish or try to earn his living,—one who is perfectly content
to accept charity indefinitely. Feeble-minded persons are often of this type . . . .”).
219
See 15 S. DOC. NO. 61-645, at 67 (1911) (“There is a growing recognition of the fact that there are many
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Even if a mother managed to prove her basic fitness despite the presumptions against her, the
mothers’ pension laws still sought to closely control her interactions with her children. Indeed,
where the common law and its codifications systematically deferred to a parent’s judgment and
authority, the suspicion of mothers receiving mothers’ pensions was so intense that the programs
operated to defeat their own stated goals, and often placed women in near impossible situations. For
example, mothers’ pension statutes and local administrators routinely required mothers to spend the
vast majority of their time at home with their children, without providing them with adequate funds
to do so. The policies demanding a mother’s presence reflected the conviction that children needed
constant supervision of a sort that recipients of mothers’ pensions could not be trusted to provide if
the issue was left to their own judgment. Sophonisba Breckinridge, a prominent supporter of
mothers’ pensions, explained the need for a mother’s constant presence at home in language that
echoed dozens of cruelty society reports, reasoning that this sort of vigilance was necessary to keep
children away from “that life of the street which is at once so alluring and demoralizing.”220 But, at
the same time, mothers’ pension grants tended to be paltry, because the programs were chronically
underfunded and states were desperately afraid of encouraging fathers to abandon their families or
wives to leave their husbands.221 In fact, the grants were so small that mothers’ pension statutes and
regulations explicitly contemplated that mothers, and often even their older children as well, would
earn additional money elsewhere. The mothers’ pension law that Illinois enacted in 1915, for
instance, included detailed guidelines covering the wage work of mothers’ pension recipients.222
women and girls who are too defective mentally to be safe in the outside world, and who, if left unrestrained, will
inevitably become mothers of illegitimate children.”); STUART ALFRED QUEEN & DELBERT MARTIN MANN, SOCIAL
PATHOLOGY 163-64 (1925) (“Feeblemindedness and mental imbalance doubtless greatly increase the probability of an
irregular sex life, involving, as they do, lack of foresight, weakened powers of inhibition and tendency to yield to the
impulse of the moment.”); RICE, supra note 215, at 291 (“The problem of prostitution is to a very large extent the
problem of the defective girl . . . . In the light of the Binet test findings, the woman of scarlet is usually found to be a
foolish child who needs the care and the protection of the more fortunate members of society.”); Many Favor School for
Feeble-Minded, PROVIDENCE DAILY J., Feb. 22, 1907, at 10, 10 (“‘Feeble-minded women who are loose in the
community are often notoriously loose in another sense. It is as one would expect since there is always a marked
impairment and sometimes a complete atrophy of the moral sense in feeble-minded persons.’” (quoting Dr. G.A.
Blumer)).
220
Sophonisba Preston Breckinridge, Neglected Widowhood in the Juvenile Court, 16 AM. J. SOC. 53, 60
(1910).
221
The maximum monthly pension varied between states. For instance, New Jersey’s maximum allowance in
1914 was “$9 a month for one child, $14 for two children, and $4 for each additional child.” Illinois offered up to “$15
for one child and $10 for each additional child . . . (not to exceed in all $50 for any one family).” CHILDREN’S BUREAU,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PUB. NO. 7, LAWS RELATING TO “MOTHERS’ PENSIONS” IN THE UNITED STATES, DENMARK AND
NEW ZEALAND 10 (1914). Northern industrial states tended to be more generous than southern and western agricultural
states. In June 1931, the average monthly grant per family varied from $69.31 in Massachusetts and $55.09 in Rhode
Island, to $7.29 in Oklahoma and $4.33 in Arkansas. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 190, at 17; see also supra text
accompanying notes 206-207.
222
See Aid to Mothers and Children—Act of 1913 Amended, § 11(3), 1915 Ill. Laws 243, 244. A 1923 study of
942 mothers’ pension recipients living in nine locations found that 52% were earning money, with the proportions ranging
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Mothers’ pension administrators in Chicago, moreover, held that any healthy child in a recipient
family who was “legally old enough to work” because at least fourteen years old had to “be counted a
wage earner” and also “contribute his share to the family income.”223 As a result of these crosscutting impulses, each driven by distrust for mothers who had called on the state for economic aid,
mothers’ pension laws and administrators pushed mothers into jobs like home laundry or piecework,
among the most time-consuming and least lucrative forms of labor.224
III.

THE MODERN DIVIDE IN THE LEGAL REGULATION OF PARENTHOOD
The bifurcation in the legal treatment of parenthood has persisted since the era of the

mothers’ pensions. The law of parenthood, as it is authoritatively understood, remains deferential to
“from 21 per cent in Boston and Haverhill [Massachusetts] to 67 and 69 per cent in Denver [Colorado] and Westchester
County [New York].” FLORENCE NESBITT, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PUB. NO. 118, STANDARDS OF
PUBLIC AID TO CHILDREN IN THEIR OWN HOMES 2, 17 (1923); see also RESEARCH SECTION, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
RELIEF ADMINISTRATION, RESEARCH BULL. NO. D-6, AN ANALYSIS OF THE “UNEMPLOYABLE” FAMILIES AND NONFAMILY PERSONS ON URBAN RELIEF ROLLS, DECEMBER 1934, at 2 (1935) (“That most of the female heads now on
[mothers’ pension] relief still consider themselves in the labor market is evidenced by the fact that about 60 percent of
them reported that they were working or seeking work.”).
223
“A normally strong child in a pensioned family in Chicago [was] allowed to remain in school after he [was]
14 only on condition that the amount he would contribute to the family income [was] forthcoming from some other
source.” EDITH ABBOTT & SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PUB. NO. 82,
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE AID-TO-MOTHERS LAW IN ILLINOIS 157 (1921); see also THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
BOARD OF CHILD WELFARE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, JANUARY 1, 1918 TO DECEMBER 31, 1918, supra note 213, at 1819 (providing that mothers’ pensions would “not be granted or continued” “[t]o families where, without valid excuse, the
children of working age fail to contribute adequately towards the support of the home”).
224
Illinois, for instance, stated that its mothers’ pension program was designed to keep a mother from “work[ing]
regularly away from her home and children.” Aid to Mothers and Children—Act of 1913 Amended § 11(3). If a
recipient wanted to work outside the home, the state required her to secure a court order approving her work schedule and
confirming that “such work [could] be done by her without the sacrifice of health or the neglect of home and children.”
Id. The director of the Rhode Island Mothers’ Aid Bureau similarly reported in 1925 that every mothers’ pension
applicant who was found to be “away from her home all day at work in a mill or factory” was “advised to give up this
work and return to the job of caring for and training her own children. Other work of a less confining nature such as
jewelry work at home, sewing, cleaning by the hour, and part-time work in lunch-rooms was secured for these mothers.”
BUREAU OF MOTHERS’ AID, STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
STATE PUBLIC WELFARE COMMISSION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS JANUARY SESSION, 1925, at 6 (1925); see also
REBA F. HARRIS, MICHIGAN STATE WELFARE DEP’T, MOTHERS’ AID IN MICHIGAN: A REPORT OF STATE-WIDE STUDY 14
(Lansing, Michigan State Welfare Department 1934) (“[Mothers’ pension recipients in Michigan have] the impression
that if [they go] outside of the home to work even for a short time the grants will be discontinued. . . . Our records show
that in most counties this fear is based on actual facts . . . .”). Denver, Colorado, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and some
counties in Pennsylvania limited mothers receiving pensions to three days a week of work outside the home. See
NESBITT, supra note 222, at 2, 19. In 1917 and 1918, Mary F. Bogue, the acting supervisor of the Mothers’ Assistance
Fund in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, visited 166 mothers’ pension recipients in twelve rural Pennsylvania counties. See
Mary F. Bogue, Problems in the Administration of Mothers’ Aid, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
SOCIAL WORK AT THE FORTY-FIFTH ANNUAL SESSION HELD IN KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI MAY 15-22, 1918, at 349, 352-53
(1919). She found that three-fourths of the women were earning wages, but “over one-half of those earning were doing
day’s work or washing in their own homes or both.” Id. at 354.
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parental judgment and strongly predisposed against intervention. But it continues to be the case that
the law takes the provision of financial support through certain governmental programs associated
with failed fatherhood and dependency as grounds for subjecting entire families to rules and norms
that are interventionist, instrumental, and wholly at odds with those conventionally identified with
the law of parental relations.
To some extent, this divide in the legal regulation of parenthood has escaped critical analysis
precisely because family law is still generally and officially defined to encompass only those rules and
presumptions that apply to families regarded as economically self-reliant. But more fundamentally,
the near impossibility under current constitutional law of raising a successful legal challenge to the
bifurcation has led to the collapse of substantive political and popular debate about whether
particular transfers of economic assistance should be cause for a complete reversal of the legal rules
governing parent and child.
The present constitutional framework upholds the bifurcation in the law’s treatment of
parental relations as a matter of law and accepts it as a matter of common sense. In reasoning about
the divide in the law of parenthood, this jurisprudence has simply adopted the perspective of the
bifurcation’s creators. The dual regime is understood to raise few questions and require little
examination, even though many of the reasons historically offered to explain and defend the
bifurcation would be rejected by large numbers of modern Americans as unconvincing and
illegitimate. It is long past time for sustained reflection about whether and why the law should
continue to perpetuate the divide in the regulation of parenthood.
A.

The Enduring Bifurcation

The divide in the legal treatment of parenthood, already structurally clear by the time of the
mothers’ pensions, was only solidified with the advent of the New Deal. The mothers’ pension laws
themselves were soon superseded by other programs that provided financial support to poor mothers.
As part of the Social Security Act of 1935, the federal government established Aid to Dependent
Children (ADC)—renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1962—which
appropriated federal matching funds to state programs that satisfied federal conditions.225 In 1996,
Congress replaced AFDC with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), also funded
jointly by the federal government and the states.226

See Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (1935). On the name change, see Public
Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 104, 76 Stat. 172, 185.
226
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §
103(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2112 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-619 (West Supp. 1999)).
225
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ADC was enacted quickly and relatively uncontroversially. It was generally understood to be
simply an extension of the mothers’ pension programs that the vast majority of states had already
authorized.227 As a result, it attracted remarkably little attention from either critics or supporters of
the New Deal, although Southern congressmen did make sure that state and local ADC agencies
were free to employ a wide variety of strategies to exclude African-Americans from the rolls.228 The
enactment of TANF, in contrast, was highly contested, characterized by advocates and opponents
alike as a revolutionary change in welfare law.229 Yet both of these successor regimes, the relatively
peaceful transition and the supposed revolution, were governed to a tremendous extent by the same
227

As Linda Gordon has explained:

While Old-Age Insurance and Unemployment Compensation—Titles II and III of Social
Security—were extremely controversial, ADC (Title IV) and the other public assistance programs . . .
were uncontested. Everyone agreed that ADC would be drafted by the Children’s Bureau. No one
from the various technical and advisory committees that [Edwin] Witte [who directed the design of the
Social Security Act] established had anything to suggest about ADC. Nothing illustrates so profoundly
the maleness of the social insurance perspective as does the total silence about single mothers and
children in their deliberations about this bill. Witte accepted as given, from the moment he first heard
the Children’s Bureau plan, that there should be federal contributions to the state and local mothers’ aid
programs and left the design to the bureau.
So ADC was quickly drafted by Grace Abbott, Katharine Lenroot, and Martha Eliot. Their
speed reflects the fact that they anticipated no controversy and that ADC was not even the Children’s
Bureau’s highest priority.
GORDON, supra note 189, at 256, 147.
228
See id. at 265-80, 284. Between 1937 and 1940, only fourteen to seventeen percent of ADC recipients were
African-American, greater participation than had been allowed under the mothers’ pension program but still much less
than the proportion of need. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY 359 (1944). In seven Southern states, moreover, African-Americans were under-represented even
compared to their proportion of the state population. African-Americans in Georgia, for instance, constituted just eleven
to twelve percent of the ADC caseload between 1937 and 1940, but thirty-eight percent of the state’s population under
age fifteen. See id. One field supervisor explained these exclusionary practices this way in the late 1930s:
“The number of Negro cases are few due to the unanimous feeling on the part of staff and board that
there are more work opportunities for Negro women and to their intense desire not to interfere with
local labor conditions. The attitude that ‘they have always gotten along’ and that ‘all they’ll do is have
more children’ is definite. . . . There is a hesitancy on the part of the lay boards to advance too rapidly
over the thinking of their own communities which see no reason why the employable Negro mother
should not continue her usually sketchy seasonal labor or indefinite domestic service rather than
receive a public-assistance grant.”
Mary S. Labaree, Unmarried Parenthood Under the Social Security Act, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK SELECTED PAPERS SIXTY-SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE BUFFALO, NEW YORK JUNE 18-24,
1939, at 446, 454 (1939).
229
See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 8496 (1995) (statement of Rep. Shaw) (“[The Personal Responsibility Act, which
replaces AFDC with TANF,] is nothing short of a revolution in social policy that replaces the current failed welfare
system with one that will better meet the needs of the poor and get millions into work and off welfare.”); GWENDOLYN
MINK, WELFARE’S END 133 (1998) (“The Personal Responsibility Act removes poor single mothers from the welfare state
to a police state.”).
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fundamental norms, presumptions, and modes of operation that the mothers’ pension programs had
adopted. Each used the provision and denial of much-needed financial aid (but not, usually, the
provision and denial of custody) to regulate families in which there was no father able to support his
dependents, and the mother had called on the state for economic assistance. Each functioned on the
guiding principle that where either parent in these families was concerned, the law needed to be
suspicious of parental judgment, eager to scrutinize parental conduct, and anxious to limit parental
autonomy and reshape parental relations. Meanwhile, entirely different norms and rules continued
to be thought wholly appropriate for families not seen as dependent or tainted by failed fatherhood
and continued to be enforced in what was officially defined as family law.
A few examples will suffice to illustrate the governing norms that shaped the programs
following in the path of the mothers’ pensions. Let’s begin with ADC. From the start, this program
was grounded in a suspicion of fathers who had failed to support their families, on the assumption
that there was almost no acceptable reason for that state of affairs. Initially, ADC absolutely
excluded families with two healthy parents present, and it only gave the states the option of including
them in 1961.230 The language of the federal statutory scheme may have been gender-neutral (a
linguistic change from many of the mothers’ pension laws),231 but the underlying reasoning and the
results were starkly sex-specific. As its creators understood from the beginning,232 ADC, like the
230

See An Act To amend title IV of the Social Security Act to authorize Federal financial participation in aid to
dependent children of unemployed parents, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 1, 75 Stat. 75, 75-76 (1961).
231
With one exception, the federal statutes governing the ADC program were formally gender-neutral from the
start, part of a trend towards using gender-neutral language in laws with a disproportionate impact on women that began
even before the advent of the modern equal protection doctrine on sex discrimination. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest
and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1502-03 (2000). The definition of a “‘dependent
child’” in the Social Security Act of 1935, for instance, included any
child under the age of sixteen who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the
death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is
living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother,
stepbrother, stepsister, uncle or aunt.
Social Security Act, ch. 531, § 406(a), 49 Stat. 620, 629 (1935). In 1968, Congress added a sex-specific provision to the
statutes governing ADC, giving states the option of providing benefits to families whose dependent children had been
deprived of parental support because of their father’s unemployment, but not extending the same benefits when a mother
was unemployed. See Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 203, 81 Stat. 821, 882-84 (1968). In
1979, the Supreme Court, which now applied heightened scrutiny to questions of sex discrimination, held that the explicit
sex-based classification in this statute violated the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979).
232
The legislators and policymakers who devised ADC in 1935 routinely discussed the program in sex-specific
terms, operating on the explicit assumption that it would serve poor mothers and their children. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO.
74-615, at 10 (1935) (“One clearly distinguishable group of children . . . for whom better provision should be made, are
those in families lacking a father’s support. Nearly 10 percent of all families on relief are without a potential breadwinner
other than a mother whose time might best be devoted to the care of her young children.”); 79 CONG. REC. 5862 (1935)
(statement of Rep. Fuller) (“[In visualizing ‘the great good and happiness’ that ADC will bring,] I can see the careworn,
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mothers’ pension programs before it, would serve a population that included very few fathers and
instead consisted overwhelmingly of poor mothers and their children.233
Even when a father was not present, moreover, the states and localities that administered
ADC still evaluated women and children in terms of the men who should have been providing for
them but were not. Although the Social Security Act officially opened the ADC program to children
with either a dead, absent, or incapacitated parent,234 ADC administrators initially followed the
pattern of the mothers’ pension programs in strongly favoring widows and their children, whose
husbands and fathers had the best excuse for their failure to support their dependents.235 A federal
survey in 1936 and 1937, for instance, found that a full sixty-one percent of the mothers receiving
ADC were widowed, compared to twenty-five percent who were deserted, divorced, or separated.236
In addition, only two percent of the children receiving ADC were living with mothers who had never
been married, and no such cases were noted in five of the thirty states reporting.237 This strategy of
devoting such a large proportion of ADC benefits to widows and their children eventually became
practically implausible. The 1939 amendments to the Social Security Act, for instance, removed
many widows and their children from the ADC program by making them eligible for the far more
generous benefits provided under the Social Security Act’s old-age and survivors insurance

dejected widow shout with joy upon returning from the neighbor’s washtub after having received assurance of financial
aid for her children.”); see also supra note 227 and accompanying text.
233
The precise statistical evidence collected about the ADC/AFDC program varied over time, but all the
available evidence confirms that the overwhelming number of adult recipients of ADC/AFDC were female. In 1961, for
instance, 793,753 (89.7%) out of 884,441 surveyed families receiving ADC had a mother in the home, compared to
225,787 (25.5%) with a father in the home. See DIVISION OF PROGRAM STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES RECEIVING AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT
CHILDREN, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1961, at tbls.12, 23 (1963). In 1971, 2,345,700 (92.9%) out of 2,523,900 surveyed
families receiving AFDC had a mother in the home, as compared to 472,900 (18.7%) families with a father in the home.
See NATIONAL CENTER FOR SOCIAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, FINDINGS OF THE
1971 AFDC STUDY: PART I. DEMOGRAPHIC AND PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS tbls.16, 21 (1971). In 1981, 3,412,670
surveyed families receiving AFDC had a mother in the home (3,076,928 of these mothers were receiving AFDC),
compared to 342,130 families with a father in the home (283,924 of these fathers were receiving AFDC). See OFFICE OF
POLICY & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FINDINGS OF THE MAY 1981-MAY 1982 AID TO
FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN STUDY 6 tbl.15 (1982). In 1990, there were 3,437,784 adult female recipients of
AFDC in surveyed families, and 374,187 adult male recipients. See OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF AFDC RECIPIENTS, FY 1990, at
42 tbl.20, 46 tbl.24 (1990). In 1996, the last full year for which AFDC statistics are available, there were 3,431,682 adult
female recipients in surveyed families, and 501,119 adult male recipients. See OFFICE OF PLANNING, RESEARCH AND
EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF
AFDC RECIPIENTS, FY 1996, at 28 tbl.22, 31 tbl.25 (1996).
234
See Social Security Act § 406(a).
235
See Hoey, supra note 190, at 76 (director of the federal Bureau of Public Assistance reporting in 1939 “that
some states have been relatively slow in bringing into their new programs families who, though not eligible under their
old mothers’ aid laws, might legally be aided under the more inclusive provisions now in effect”).
236
See id. at 76 & n.2.
237
See id. at 78.
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program,238 discussed in more detail below.239 But the normative commitments underlying ADC
remained intact. In fact, the suspicion that ADC directed at families associated with failed fathers
only intensified when the program began to include few widowed families.
Indeed, state ADC programs were so certain that a family’s poverty generally reflected a
father’s moral or character failings, and were so anxious to avoid creating any incentives in that
direction, that they eventually went to the extreme of seeking responsibility from men with only
tenuous connections to dependent families. Here again, the practical consequences of this wideranging suspicion of failed fathers fell heavily on children and on mothers, who found their conduct
monitored and harshly controlled. By 1968, nineteen states and the District of Columbia had
adopted “substitute parent” or “man-in-the-house” rules.240 Whether these state statutes and
regulations were written in gender-neutral terms or sex-specific language,241 they functionally and
predictably operated by denying a family eligibility for ADC if the mother had a sexual relationship
with a man, on the categorical assumption that the family had now found a private means of
support.242 This “substitute father” did not necessarily have any biological or legal connection to the
238

As originally enacted in 1935, the Social Security Act provided old-age insurance benefits only to workers.
See Social Security Act §§ 202(a), 210. In 1939, however, Congress amended the program before it went into effect.
See id. § 202(a) (providing that old-age insurance payments would not be made until January 1, 1942). These 1939
amendments entitled wives, widows, and dependent minor children to collect old-age or survivors insurance benefits
based on the employment history of a husband or father. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 201,
53 Stat. 1360, 1362-65. For an excellent account of the enactment of the 1939 amendments, see Alice Kessler-Harris,
Designing Women and Old Fools: The Construction of the Social Security Amendments of 1939, in U.S. HISTORY AS
WOMEN’S HISTORY 87, 91-92 (Linda K. Kerber et al. eds., 1995) (arguing that “Congress added dependent wives and
aged widows in order to shore up the legitimacy of a system in trouble. It did this by making the benefits of alreadycovered (mostly white) males more adequate by granting extra benefits to those who had aged wives to support and extra
insurance to those with young children who survived them.”).
239
See infra text accompanying notes 270-279.
240
See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 337-38 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). The nineteen states were:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. See id.
241
Unlike the federal ADC statutes, see supra note 231 and accompanying text, many state laws and regulations
governing the ADC program in the 1950s and 1960s (before the Supreme Court applied heightened scrutiny to questions
of sex discrimination) were written in sex-specific language. For instance, the Alabama regulation at issue in King v.
Smith (1968) provided that “an ‘able-bodied man, married or single, [would be] considered a substitute father of all the
children of the applicant . . . mother’ in three different situations.” 392 U.S. at 313-14 (original emphasis omitted)
(quoting Alabama Manual for Administration of Public Assistance, pt. I, c. II, § VI). For other examples of state laws
and regulations that were written in sex-specific language, see sources cited infra notes 242, 248.
242
Regulations issued in South Carolina in 1956, for example, stated that ADC benefits would be terminated if a
man “visit[ed] frequently for the purpose of living with the [mother],” even if the man had no legal or biological
relationship to the family and had made no commitment to it. 4 SOUTH CAROLINA DEP’T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES IN PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 40 (Oct. 1956) (on file with author; South Carolina Department of Archives and
History). “Where there [was] a pattern of the mother having a series of relationships, resulting in children or not, this
[was] considered the same as if she ha[d] a continuous common-law relationship with the same man.” Id. Mississippi’s
regulations for 1954 similarly provided that a child’s assistance payments would be discontinued if the child’s mother
lived with a man or gave birth to an illegitimate child. See DEP’T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, HANDBOOK
62 (July 1, 1954) (on file with author; Mississippi Department of Archives and History). For an example of a substitute
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mother or her children.243 But the ADC programs insisted that these men should take responsibility
nonetheless and did not want to encourage them otherwise, a strategy that the programs actually
pursued by refusing aid to women and their children. The Supreme Court eventually held in 1968
that the Social Security Act prohibited states from considering a man to be a child’s parent for
purposes of ADC eligibility, when the man was not supporting the child and had no legal obligation
to do so.244 Yet the basic premise that there was virtually no excuse for a father’s failure to support
his family, if he was in fact the family’s father, remained firmly in place.245
The ADC program also took the fact that a mother had no husband able to provide for her
family, and needed financial assistance, as grounds to doubt her competence as a parent, strictly
regulate her behavior, and closely inspect her conduct. Even the Congress that enacted ADC into
being assumed that any mother eligible for the new program could legitimately be suspected of
unfitness, and it indicated in the committee reports accompanying the Social Security Act that states
were authorized to condition ADC eligibility on an applicant’s “moral character.”246 By 1941, thirtyone of the forty-five states with operational ADC programs had promulgated what were known as
“suitable home” rules,247 which regulated mothers by threatening to withdraw the financial assistance

father rule in operation, see Rios v. Hackney, 294 F. Supp. 885, 886 (N.D. Tex. 1967) (turning on the question of
whether the plaintiff “was or had been cohabiting with a man who was not the legal father of the minor plaintiffs, her
children, which fact, if established, would have required that public welfare funds be withheld from plaintiffs under the
‘substitute father’ regulation adopted by the defendant Board of Public Welfare”).
243
See sources cited supra note 242.
244
See King, 392 U.S. at 329-30. In the wake of the Supreme Court ruling, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) issued a regulation, upheld in 1970, which established that states could also not assume
that the child had access to the man’s income. See Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 554, 559-60 (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 203.1
(1969).
245
The King opinion, for instance, reported with approval that Congress had made “[e]very effort . . . to locate
and secure support payments from persons legally obligated to support a deserted child.” King, 392 U.S. at 332.
246
S. REP. NO. 74-628, at 36 (1935); H.R. REP. NO. 74-615, supra note 232, at 24; see also 79 CONG. REC.
5679 (1935) (statement of Rep. Jenkins) (“I think every child is entitled to the care of its mother if she is at all worthy.”).
The federal Bureau of Public Assistance endorsed suitable home policies in 1940. See Bureau of Public Assistance,
Federal Security Agency, Bureau Circular No. 9 § 209, at 1 (May 1, 1940), quoted in WINIFRED BELL, AID TO
DEPENDENT CHILDREN 35-36 (1965). However, it retracted its endorsement in 1945 (without prohibiting the policies) on
the ground that:
The “suitable home” provision . . . may be in part an expression of the community’s concern for the
protection of the welfare of the children in that sector of the population in which families suffer more
than average hazards. This provision, if it is used as an eligibility requirement, will not, however,
protect children. It simply precludes them from receiving aid to dependent children.
Jane M. Hoey, Bureau of Public Assistance, Federal Security Agency, State Letter No. 46 to State Agencies
Administering Approved Public Assistance Plans: “Suitable Home” Provisions of State Plans for Aid to Dependent
Children 3 (Mar. 5, 1945) (on file with author; Library of the Office of Family Assistance). For a similar passage in a
published summary of State Letter No. 46, see “Suitable Home” Provisions of State Plans for Aid to Dependent Children,
SOC. SECURITY BULL., Apr. 1945, at 19.
247
See BELL, supra note 246, at 30.
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on which they and their children depended.248 Florida’s suitable home law of 1959, for instance,
provided that a home would be considered unsuitable for purposes of ADC eligibility if the parent
living with the child (virtually always the mother) failed “to provide a stable moral environment for
the child, by engaging in promiscuous conduct either in or outside the home, or by having an
illegitimate child after receiving an assistance payment from the department, or by otherwise failing
to demonstrate an intent to establish a stable home.”249
States frequently used surprise home visits, or required scheduled inspections, to monitor
compliance with their suitable home (and substitute father) rules. These visits, often conducted in
the middle of the night or the early morning if the object was to take the family by surprise, operated
on the premise that mothers receiving economic assistance because of failed fatherhood required and
deserved a form and level of scrutiny that would have appeared absolutely unnecessary and
inappropriate if directed at more financially successful families.250
248

Like the mothers’ pension laws before them, state ADC programs primarily relied on the provision and denial
of financial aid, rather than the removal of children from their parents’ custody. Only approximately 0.5% of the children
affected by Florida’s 1959 suitable home law, for example, were actually removed from their homes by court order. See
ROLAND J. CHILTON, CONSEQUENCES OF A STATE SUITABLE HOME LAW FOR ADC FAMILIES IN FLORIDA 202 (1968). In
1960, the Louisiana legislature enacted a suitable home law that disqualified a family if the mother had ever given birth to
an illegitimate child while receiving ADC payments, unless the family could convince their local welfare administrators
“that the mother ha[d] ceased illicit relationships and [was] maintaining a suitable home for the child or children.” Act
No. 251, § 1, 1960 La. Acts 525, 527. Under this policy, over twenty-three thousand children were dropped from the
ADC rolls in the summer of 1960, but left at home. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REVIEW OF PRACTICE UNDER THE SUITABILITY OF HOME POLICY IN AID TO DEPENDENT
CHILDREN IN LOUISIANA, JUNE-OCTOBER 1960, at 10 (1960).
249
House Bill No. 312, § 2, 1959 Fla. Laws ch. 59-202; see also supra note 248 (describing Louisiana suitable
home statute).
250
Given the poor’s chronic lack of access to counsel before the mid-1960s, see infra notes 285-286 and
accompanying text, authoritative legal sources generally considered and reported the surprise visits that government
investigators made to the homes of ADC recipients only in the context of government prosecutions based on evidence
obtained this way. For examples of these accounts, see People v. Shirley, 360 P.2d 33, 34 (Cal. 1961) (in bank) (“The
social worker visited defendant at her home . . . and found a Mr. Shirley there, fully clothed but wearing bedroom
slippers. Two days later, . . . investigators from the district attorney’s office called at defendant’s home about 2:30 a.m.
and found Shirley in bed in her bedroom.”); People v. Rozell, 28 Cal. Rptr. 478, 480 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (“An
investigator of the district attorney’s office visited Mrs. Rozell’s residence in October 1961 about 10:45 one evening.
Wilson Colvin was in the home and articles of men’s clothing were discovered . . . . A social worker stated that on
January 15, 1962, she visited Mrs. Rozell. . . . [W]hen Mrs. Rozell opened the door [the social worker] walked to the
kitchen in time to see a man running out the back door.”); People v. Phipps, 12 Cal. Rptr. 681, 683 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961)
(“Between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. on January 28, 1959, investigators went to the Phipps home to investigate the truth of
reports that Mr. Phipps was frequenting the home of Mrs. Phipps.”); Blackmone v. United States, 151 A.2d 191, 194
(D.C. 1959) (“[T]hree investigators of the Department of Public Welfare went to the house occupied by Mrs. Blackmone.
Two of them went to the rear of the premises, and after a short wait, they observed a man running from the rear door in
his bare feet and shirt sleeves.”). Most legal academics writing before the mid-1960s followed the courts in paying little,
if any, attention to the practice of surprise visits. In 1963, Charles Reich wrote one of the first academic articles to ever
consider the subject, relying in part on the accounts of surprise visits revealed during prosecutions. See Charles A. Reich,
Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347, 1352-53 (1963).
By the late 1960s, federal regulations required state ADC agencies to refrain, in “taking applications and
determining eligibility for assistance,” from “practices that violate[d] the individual’s privacy or personal dignity, or
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As in the mothers’ pension programs, women (and children) applying for or receiving ADC
were measured and governed through a set of judgments about the men to whom they were or should
have been attached. Women associated with failed male providers found their reproductive work
automatically devalued, their skill as mothers openly questioned, and their morality (especially in
sexual matters) immediately in doubt and rigidly regulated. Indeed, states with suitable home
policies took it upon themselves to assume a place among the single mothers receiving ADC akin to
that of a jealous and suspicious husband, distrustfully scrutinizing a woman’s behavior for signs of
laxity or licentiousness and refusing to tolerate sexual conduct outside of marriage. Children’s claims
to ADC, in turn, revolved around the state’s exacting assessment of their mothers’ conduct. The
suitable home rules, remember, functioned by denying aid to needy children as well as to their
mothers.
Congress, for its part, placed some limits on the harshness of suitable home rules in 1962,
requiring states that excluded “unsuitable” families from ADC to provide those families with
“adequate care and assistance” from general relief rolls that typically provided less aid.251 But with
that caveat in place, suitable home rules and their governing logic of suspicion remained a part of the
ADC program throughout its life.252

harass[ed] him, or violate[d] his constitutional rights.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK
OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION § 2300(a) (1969). These regulations advised states to
especially guard[] against violations of legal rights and common decencies in such areas as entering a
home by force, or without permission, or under false pretenses; making home visits outside of working
hours, and particularly making such visits during sleeping hours; and searching in the home, for
example, in rooms, closets, drawers, or papers, to seek clues to possible deception.
Id. Many states, however, continued to require ADC recipients to submit to home visits as a condition of aid, and the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this practice in 1971. See infra text accompanying notes 288-310.
251
Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 107(b), 76 Stat. 172, 189. A year before this
statute was enacted, Arthur Flemming, then in his final days as Secretary of HEW, had issued what became known as the
“Flemming Ruling.” See Bureau of Public Assistance, Dep’t of Health, Education, and Welfare, State Letter No. 452
(Jan. 17, 1961), reprinted in Appendix at 278-80 (plaintiffs’ exhibit 1), King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (No. 949).
This ruling had not prohibited states from employing suitable home policies. Indeed, it endorsed the use of such policies,
explaining that “[w]henever there is a question of the suitability of the home for the child’s upbringing, steps should be
taken to correct the situation or, in the alternative, to arrange for other appropriate care of the child.” Id. at 279. But the
Flemming Ruling had barred state ADC programs from disqualifying a family based on the unsuitability of its home,
when the state left the children in that home. See id. (“[E]ffective July 1, 1961: A State plan for aid to dependent children
may not impose an eligibility condition that would deny assistance with respect to a needy child on the basis that the
home conditions in which the child lives are unsuitable, while the child continues to reside in the home.”). Congress’s
1962 statute represented a weakening of this standard.
252
See 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(b)(1) (1999) (“A child may not be denied AFDC either initially or subsequently
‘because of the conditions of the home in which the child resides’, or because the home is considered ‘unsuitable’, unless
‘provision is otherwise made pursuant to a State statute for adequate care and assistance with respect to such child’.”
(quoting Social Security Act § 404(b))).
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The TANF program, which replaced ADC, operates on similar principles. TANF was
enacted as part of the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996,253 a law most prominently defended and
explained in the Contract with America that served as a unifying campaign document for House
Republicans in the 1994 election.254 The Contract, like the ADC program before it, identified fathers
as the family members preeminently responsible for the financial maintenance of their offspring.255 It
acknowledged, moreover, essentially no legitimate reason why a father might not be able to provide
for his children, explaining that the fathers of children receiving ADC had responded strategically to
the perverse incentives towards irresponsibility supposedly created by the ADC program itself.256 But
the Contract also took a mother’s economic need, and the fact that her children had no father
financially supporting them, as grounds for suspecting her judgment as a parent, discounting the
value of her reproductive labor, and constraining her autonomy. Like the ADC program, the
Contract judged and regulated women linked to failed fathers on the basis of their association with
these unsuccessful family men. In fact, the Contract assumed from the start that the principles it
endorsed and the restrictions it proposed would operate most directly on women and their

See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §
103(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2112 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-619 (West Supp. 1999)).
254
See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE
HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 6 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
255
In important respects, the Contract’s TANF proposal operated on the premise that healthy family life
depended on economic support by a male breadwinner. Indeed, the proposal was importantly structured on the
assumption that forcing men to take financial responsibility for their children was a key solution to poverty and
dependency. As the Contract repeatedly stressed, its TANF program required mothers to “identify the fathers [of their
children] as a condition for receiving AFDC payments [as well as food stamps and public housing], except in cases of
rape and incest.” Once identified, most fathers of children receiving TANF would be subject to a child support suit by
the state. Id. at 66; see also id. at 69, 71. In addition, a number of other provisions structured the provision of aid under
TANF in order to increase both a mother and a father’s incentives to marry. For example, “mothers age eighteen who
[gave] birth to illegitimate children [had to] live at home in order to receive aid—unless the mother marrie[d] the
biological father or marrie[d] an individual who legally adopt[ed] the child.” Id. at 70-71.
256
See id. at 65 (“Isn’t it time for the government to encourage work rather than rewarding dependency? The
Great Society has had the unintended consequence of snaring millions of Americans into the welfare trap. Government
programs designed to give a helping hand to the neediest of Americans have instead bred illegitimacy, crime, illiteracy,
and more poverty.”); id. at 75 (“Republicans understand one important thing ignored by most Democrats—incentives
affect behavior. . . . It’s time to change the incentives and make responsible parenthood the norm and not the exception.”).
253
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children,257 who would constitute the overwhelming majority of TANF recipients even though the
program’s statutory scheme would be formally gender-neutral.258
In particular, the Contract was explicitly determined to use the government’s power to
provide or deny financial support to women receiving TANF as a means of affecting their
reproductive decisions in the direction of constraining childbearing. On the Contract’s account,
women who were rearing children by themselves while receiving ADC were not performing “work.”

257

In advocating the adoption of TANF, the Contract routinely and systematically assumed that the adults who
would receive TANF and be subject to its conditions would be mothers. See, e.g., id. at 66 (“Mothers under the age of
eighteen may no longer receive AFDC payments for children born out of wedlock and mothers who are ages eighteen,
nineteen, and twenty can be prohibited by the states from receiving AFDC payments and housing benefits.”); id. at 68
(“Although almost half of the mothers who enter AFDC can be expected to leave within two years, most return. Longterm users often are young, never married, and high school dropouts; and most AFDC families begin with a birth to a
teenager.”); id. at 70 (“The savings generated from this provision to deny AFDC to minor mothers (and to mothers age
eighteen to twenty if the state elects that option) is returned to the states in the form of block grants to provide services—
but not cash payments—to help these young mothers with illegitimate children.”).
258
The Personal Responsibility Act requires every state TANF program to provide the federal government with
a wide variety of demographic information about the people receiving TANF. Interestingly enough, this statute, which
requires data about age, marital status, race, educational status, and citizenship, does not specifically instruct the states to
compile information about the sex of TANF recipients. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 411 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 611 (West Supp. 1999)).
After the Personal Responsibility Act was enacted, the federal administrative office with jurisdiction over
TANF, the Administration for Children and Families in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, proposed
rules to require state TANF programs to collect sex-based statistics. See Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
Program (TANF), 62 Fed. Reg. 62,124, 62,172, 62,180 (proposed Nov. 20, 1997) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 27075). But the federal regulators did not immediately require states to collect such information. See OFFICE OF PLANNING,
RESEARCH, AND EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, TRANSMITTAL NO. TANF-ACF-PI-97-6,
TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES PROGRAM: PROGRAM INSTRUCTION (1997) (Emergency TANF Data
Report).
Accordingly, the federal government does not have any sex-based statistics for TANF from the start of the
program through the end of fiscal year 1999. See TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) PROGRAM,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF TANF RECIPIENTS,
FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 1-7 (1999); TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF TANF RECIPIENTS, FISCAL YEAR
1998, at 1-5 (1998); TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF TANF RECIPIENTS, JULY-SEPTEMBER 1997, at
1-4 (1997).
However, the federal government’s final rules for data collection, issued in April 1999, require state TANF
programs to submit information about the sex of the people receiving TANF. See Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families Program (TANF), 64 Fed. Reg. 17,720, 17,907, 17,910, 17,912, 17,922, 17,925, 17,927 (Apr. 12, 1999) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 260-65). The first such statistical information, for fiscal year 2000, is scheduled to be
published in the summer of 2001. See E-mail from Sean D. Hurley, Administrator, Office of Planning, Research, and
Evaluation, Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, to Jill Hasday (Nov. 22,
2000) (on file with author).
Although the exact statistics are not yet available, there is no reason to think that the sexual composition of the
TANF population differs markedly from the sexual composition of the ADC population, in which adult women vastly
outnumbered adult men. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. Indeed, this is perhaps one reason why the Personal
Responsibility Act overlooked the need for sex-based statistics. The sexual composition of the TANF population was so
predictable that it might have been taken to be a matter of common knowledge not requiring more rigorous analysis.
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Their caretaking did not count as “a productive job” worth recognizing or rewarding.259 The Contract
promised that its proposed legislative reform would reduce the number of children that TANF
recipients bore by making raising children under TANF extremely arduous.260
The Personal Responsibility Act that Congress enacted included dramatic manifestations of
this commitment. Perhaps most strikingly, it permits states to freeze a family’s benefit levels if the
mother bears an additional child while receiving TANF,261 and offers a substantial annual bonus to
the five states that reduce their illegitimate births by the greatest amount.262 By October 1997,
twenty-two state TANF programs had so-called “family cap” or “child exclusion” policies in place.
Seventeen of these states provided no additional TANF benefits for a child conceived and born while
her mother was receiving TANF, and the rest provided for reduced or restricted increases in aid.263
259

CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 254, at 65 (“To ensure that welfare offers a helping hand rather than a
handout, we require that welfare beneficiaries work so they can develop the pride and self-sufficiency that comes from
holding a productive job.”); see also id. at 67 (“More than twenty-five years later, Johnson’s War on Poverty has been an
unqualified failure. Despite spending trillions of dollars, it has had the unintended consequence of making welfare more
attractive than work to many families . . . .”); id. at 69 (noting that the Contract’s TANF proposal “requires 50 percent of
AFDC recipients to work by 1996”).
260
See, e.g., id. at 65 (“To reverse skyrocketing out-of-wedlock births that are ripping apart our nation’s social
fabric, we provide no welfare to teenage parents and we require that paternity and responsibility be established in all
illegitimate births where welfare is sought.”); id. at 70 (“The Personal Responsibility Act is designed to diminish the
number of teenage pregnancies and illegitimate births.”).
261
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 103(a) (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(7)(A)(iii) (West Supp. 1999)). The Contract with America had advocated making the family cap a
mandatory part of the TANF program. See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 254, at 70-71 (“The bill also includes
a number of other provisions to reduce illegitimacy. . . . Mothers already receiving AFDC will not receive an increase in
benefits if additional children are born out of wedlock.”).
262
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 103(a) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 603(a)(2) (West Supp. 1999)). This provision was amended in 1997 so that the annual bonus
is awarded to the five states that reduce their proportion of illegitimate births by the greatest amount, rather than the five
states that reduce their absolute number of illegitimate births by the greatest amount. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 5502(b), 111 Stat. 251, 607. The 1997 amendment did not alter the requirement that a state is only
entitled to a bonus if its abortion rate for the year in question is less than the state’s abortion rate from 1995. See Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 103(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §
603(a)(2)(C)(i)(I)(bb) (West Supp. 1999)).
263
See L. JEROME GALLAGHER ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, ONE YEAR AFTER FEDERAL WELFARE REFORM: A
DESCRIPTION OF STATE TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) DECISIONS AS OF OCTOBER 1997, at VI-8
(1998). By February 1999, twenty-three states had some form of family cap policy in place. See SHELLEY STARK &
JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, EXCLUDED CHILDREN: FAMILY CAP IN A NEW ERA 3
(1999).
So far, the evidence on the effect that family cap provisions have on birth rates is still sketchy and inconclusive.
As of 1999, only two of the first fourteen states to enact family cap policies, Arkansas and New Jersey, had completed
studies comparing the behavior of welfare recipients who were subject to a family cap to similar recipients who were not.
See id. at 6 & 18 n.24 (noting that Arizona’s evaluation period will end in June 2002). Arkansas’s study, begun in 1994
and completed in 1997, found that the state’s family cap policy had no statistically significant effect on birth rates. See
CAROLYN TURTURRO ET AL., THE UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS AT LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK, ARKANSAS
WELFARE WAIVER DEMONSTRATION PROJECT: FINAL REPORT, JULY, 1994 THROUGH JUNE, 1997, at 1-2 (1997). Capped
families experienced an average of 0.16 births during the waiver period, as compared to an average of 0.14 births among
the control group. See id. at 80 (calculating a level of significance of 0.679). New Jersey’s study, begun in 1993 and
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ADC and TANF have continued the law’s tradition of interventionist and instrumental
regulation directed at poor families without a father able to support them. But although these
programs regulate the rights, responsibilities, and relationships of family members, they (like their
predecessors) are not considered part of, or even relevant to, what is authoritatively defined as family
law. Family law as it is officially understood—the family law that governs more economically
successful families—continues to support and enforce the same basic principles of deference to
parental prerogatives that characterized the common law. Government programs regulating families
considered financially self-sufficient, moreover, track these “official” presumptions and norms, even
when distributing financial aid.
The state of the law in the 1950s and 1960s provides a good initial vantage point for
considering this continued, and unexamined, bifurcation. These were decades that saw the ADC
program at perhaps its most aggressive,264 but the authoritative accounts of family law in this era
betrayed no sign of that. Instead, they articulated slight variations on the positions that common law
courts had endorsed over a century before, and affirmed the law’s consistent commitment to
protecting parental authority. William Prosser, author of the most influential torts treatise in the
middle of the twentieth century and reporter for the second restatement of torts,265 made the
historical continuity with common law principles explicit in discussing a parent’s right of correction.
“A husband or father, as the head of the household, was recognized by the early law as having
authority to discipline the members of his family,” Prosser explained.266 “As to children, the privilege
remains, despite any modern theories that to spare the rod is not to spoil the child. A parent, or one
who stands in the place of a parent, may use reasonable force, including corporal punishment, for
discipline and control.”267 The Model Penal Code, in turn, reported that family law, properly
understood, was even more deferential to parental prerogatives. The code’s drafters stated, for
instance, that requiring a parent to use only reasonable force was “too extreme” a curb on parental
authority.268 As they elaborated, “so long as the person exercising parental authority acts for the
completed in 1996, reported a significant effect on birth rates, but also a rise in abortion rates. See MICHAEL J. CAMASSO
ET AL., A FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF NEW JERSEY’S FAMILY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, at v (1998). Among
ongoing welfare cases, families subject to the state’s family cap experienced a birth rate that was approximately nine
percent lower than the birth rate for families in the control group. See id. Among new welfare cases, families subject to
the family cap experienced a birth rate that was twelve percent lower than the birth rate for families in the control group.
However, the abortion rate among the families new to welfare was fourteen percent higher in the group subject to the
family cap. See id.
264
See supra text accompanying notes 230-252.
265
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, at iii (1965).
266
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 139 (3d ed. 1964).
267
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 265, § 147(1) (“A parent is privileged to apply
such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement upon his child as he reasonably believes to be necessary
for its proper control, training, or education.”).
268
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 cmt. 1, at 71 (Tentative Draft No. 8 1958).
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purpose of safeguarding or promoting the child’s welfare (including the specific purpose of preventing
or punishing misconduct), we think he should be privileged in penal law unless he culpably creates
substantial risk of . . . excessive injuries.”269
These official accounts of family law ignored, and were at odds with, the norms and
presumptions that governed the ADC program, which was driven by suspicion of parental judgment,
and an eagerness to scrutinize parental conduct and constrain parental behavior. Yet the norms
endorsed in the twentieth-century’s authoritative accounts of family law did shape many modern
governmental programs that regulated family relationships and determined the legal rights and
responsibilities of family members, but were not popularly associated with failed fatherhood. Two
examples nicely illustrate this pattern: the first involves a program promulgated alongside ADC, and
the second focuses on some of the proposed bills introduced at the same time as TANF.
The 1935 Social Security Act that created ADC also established a program of old-age and
survivors insurance,270 which is today commonly referred to simply as “Social Security.” In addition
to entitling workers to old-age benefits based on their history of paid employment,271 this program
provides financial support to the spouses,272 dependent minor children,273 and dependent parents of
these workers.274 Like ADC or TANF, the Social Security program is a form of family law,
structuring the legal rights and responsibilities that family members have based on their family status.
In many ways, it is also a redistributive scheme designed to respond to economic need among
families in which the male breadwinner has stopped working or died. Large numbers of Social
Security recipients collect much more money from the program than they or their family members
ever paid in Social Security taxes.275 But receiving Social Security is not culturally taken to be a
mark of economic dependency or failed fatherhood.

Instead, Social Security is popularly

characterized as a benefit that husbands and fathers (and, significantly less frequently, wives and
mothers)276 have earned for themselves and their families through their employment.277 Accordingly,
Id. The Model Penal Code defined “excessive injuries” as “death, serious bodily harm, disfigurement,
extreme pain or mental distress or gross degradation.” Id. § 3.08(1)(b), at 69.
270
See Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 1-210, 49 Stat. 620, 620-25 (1935). For a discussion of the crucial 1939
amendments to the Social Security Act that entitled wives, widows, and dependent minor children to receive old-age or
survivors insurance benefits based on the record of employment that a husband or father had established, see supra note
238 and accompanying text.
271
See 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1994) (old-age insurance benefits).
272
See id. § 402(b) (wife’s insurance benefits); id. § 402(c) (husband’s insurance benefits); id. § 402(e) (widow’s
insurance benefits); id. § 402(f) (widower’s insurance benefits).
273
See id. § 402(d) (child’s insurance benefits).
274
See id. § 402(g) (mother’s and father’s insurance benefits); id. § 402(h) (parent’s insurance benefits).
275
See Michael J. Boskin et al., Social Security: A Financial Appraisal Across and Within Generations, 40
NAT’L TAX J. 19, 22 (1987); Michael D. Hurd & John B. Shoven, The Distributional Impact of Social Security, in
PENSIONS, LABOR, AND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 193, 193 (David A. Wise ed., 1985).
276
Most female recipients of social security collect spousal benefits, rather than benefits based on their own
269
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the authors of Social Security, operating on principles implicitly understood but never fully explained,
have seen no reason to deviate from the norms conventionally associated with family law.
In the Social Security program, as in ADC or TANF, the legal treatment that women and
children receive importantly turns on judgments about the men who head or should head their
households. The husbands and fathers who are the primary beneficiaries under the Social Security
program are considered successful and self-reliant family men, and they, along with their wives and
children, are therefore subject to deference and respect rather than scrutiny and suspicion. The
Social Security program protects family autonomy and self-government in ways that contrast starkly
with the presumptions guiding a legal regime like ADC or TANF. The latter programs, regulating
women and children associated with failed fathers, discount both paternal and maternal judgment,
closely monitor parents, and control their behavior.278 In contrast, the payments that the Social
Security program distributes to family members are entitlements that recipients enjoy solely because
of their family status. The Social Security program does not investigate whether recipients are fit
parents, or children, or wives, or husbands; no morals or sexual relationships are examined, no
households inspected. When a man entitled to Social Security dies or retires, his wife and his
dependent minor children are automatically entitled to receive Social Security benefits.279 When a
man is absent or incapacitated in a family applying for ADC or TANF, the requirements, regulations,
and restrictions governing benefits to that mother and her children whirl into activity.
The Contract with America that introduced TANF was similarly committed to protecting
familial autonomy and parental judgment, where families not tainted with failed fatherhood were
concerned. The same Contract that endorsed the Personal Responsibility Act also proposed a
number of bills designed to increase other parents’ rights of control and privacy, and to provide these
supposedly self-sufficient parents with considerable financial support. The “Family Reinforcement
work histories. In 1998, for example, only 37.3% of the women aged 62 or older who were receiving social security
collected benefits based on their own work records. In contrast, 35.7% of the female recipients collected spousal benefits
because their employment histories did not qualify them for worker benefits at all. The other 27.0% could have collected
benefits based on their own work histories, but instead collected spousal benefits because they entitled the women to
higher payments. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY
BULLETIN, 1999, at 199 tbl.5.A14, 370-71 (2000).
277
For accounts of how this cultural understanding of the Social Security program was created, see JERRY R.
CATES, INSURING INEQUALITY: ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERSHIP IN SOCIAL SECURITY, 1935-54, at 104 (1983) (“The phrase
social security as used in the 1935 Act meant public assistance as well as conservative social insurance. Over the years,
the phrase has come to mean, for most people, only the social insurance system. This is symbolic of and, in part,
attributable to the SSB’s [Social Security Board’s] drive to segregate social insurance from public assistance and to
identify the agency with the more desirable of the two systems.”); Fraser & Gordon, supra note 56, at 322 (“Equally
deliberate was the construction of the differential in legitimacy between the two tracks of the welfare system. The Social
Security Board propagandized for Social Security Old Age Insurance . . . precisely because, at first, it did not seem more
earned or more dignified than public assistance.”).
278
See supra text accompanying notes 230-263.
279
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Act,” for instance, would have given parents the right to prevent their children from participating in
any federally-funded survey or analysis that would question children about their family’s political,
medical, sexual, financial, or religious characteristics.280 It also included a tax credit of up to $5000
for families adopting a child, and a $500 tax credit for families with a dependent elderly parent or
grandparent at home.281 The Contract explained that this bill reflected a determination to support
parents on the conviction that “parents know what’s best for their children—not the government.”282
The Contract similarly championed another bill, which would have reduced taxes, on the ground
that it would enable women in two-parent, “middle-class families” to stay at home and personally
supervise their children.283 TANF, of course, hardly operated on such principles of deference and
respect, or evinced such concern about the value of mothers’ reproductive labor.284 But the Contract
took it as a matter of (unstated) fact that its TANF proposal, and the future TANF recipients, were
somehow outside the confines of family law.
B.

The Evasion of Critical Scrutiny

The bifurcation in the legal regulation of parenthood has endured for more than a century,
but never been fully acknowledged, explained, or justified. The Contract with America, for instance,
never actually indicates why opposing norms should govern the Personal Responsibility Act and the
other bills to regulate families that the Contract endorses. The Social Security program has never
explicitly addressed why the rules and presumptions it operates under should be so different from
those shaping ADC or TANF. Authoritative accounts of family law, in turn, make no reference to
the tradition of legal regulation that extends from the child cruelty societies to the Personal
Responsibility Act.
In part, the divide in the law’s treatment of parental relations has evaded critical scrutiny in
political and popular discourse precisely because family law is still officially and commonly defined to
include only those rules that govern families deemed financially self-reliant. The legal regimes that
have emerged to regulate families tainted by failed fatherhood and economic dependency are not
conventionally counted as being part of family law. Although they regulate the rights, obligations,
and relationships of family members, they are typically considered to fall within the sole jurisdiction
of the law of poverty or welfare, rather than being recognized as forms of welfare that are also and at
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the same time forms of family law. This way of classifying and envisioning the law helps obscure the
division in the legal regulation of parental relations, by safely placing opposing regimes into different
legal categories. Phrased another way, the assumption that examples of social welfare regulation or
poverty law cannot also be instances of family law helps preserve the illusion that the law of
parenthood has remained pastoral and largely unchanged over time, by defining this body of law to
include only those forms of regulating family life that still reflect the common law tradition.
More importantly, however, the protection that our existing constitutional framework
accords to the bifurcation in the law of parenthood has collapsed sustained normative debate about
whether particular transfers of money should be the occasion for a complete reversal in the norms
and presumptions that the law employs to govern parents.

Contemporary constitutional

jurisprudence makes it virtually impossible to mount a successful legal challenge against government
programs that condition the provision of crucial financial support to poor families on their surrender
of legal and constitutional rights to autonomy and privacy that they would otherwise possess. Indeed,
modern courts considering the bifurcation in the law’s treatment of parenthood have reasoned from
within the same structure that produced the bifurcation in the first place, adopting the perspective of
the divide’s creators without questioning or rigorously examining any of their premises. With few
opportunities in constitutional law to discuss or remedy the bifurcated normative regime governing
the law of parenthood, the issue has not attracted much interest or analysis.
The poor’s chronic lack of access to counsel meant that courts were slow to hear any cases
that challenged the divide in the legal regulation of parenthood.285 But after the federal government
began funding legal assistance for the poor in the mid-1960s,286 a number of suits were brought
raising the issue.287 They quickly encountered almost insuperable obstacles. In particular, one case
that reached the Supreme Court proved especially pivotal.
As discussed above, state ADC programs routinely policed compliance with their policies by
inspecting the homes of families receiving support.288 New York, like at least fifteen other states,289
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had statutes and regulations that required ADC recipients to consent to these “home visits” as a
condition of aid.290 Barbara James, the plaintiff in Wyman v. James (1971), had been expelled from
New York’s ADC program because she refused to agree to such a visit, and she sued challenging the
constitutionality of New York’s rule.291 James based her claim on precedent establishing that
government agents have no constitutional right to search a person’s home without a warrant,292
relying on an emerging legal argument that commentators generally term the doctrine of
“unconstitutional conditions.”293
This argument was based on a number of Supreme Court cases decided in the years before
Wyman that appeared to endorse the proposition that governments cannot condition the receipt of
public benefits on the waiver of constitutional rights, unless the government has a legitimate interest,
unrelated to compromising constitutional rights, in imposing the condition. Many of the leading
cases in this line of jurisprudence had addressed, in particular, the terms on which a state
government could distribute financial support or public employment, although none had involved a
program as culturally stigmatized as ADC. In Speiser v. Randall (1958),294 for instance, a group of
veterans had sued challenging the constitutionality of a California law that conditioned eligibility for
a veterans’ property tax exemption on the veteran’s willingness to sign a loyalty oath.295 The
Supreme Court struck down the California law, reasoning that “[t]o deny an exemption to claimants
who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. . . . The appellees
are plainly mistaken in their argument that, because a tax exemption is a ‘privilege’ or ‘bounty,’ its
denial may not infringe speech.”296 Similarly, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967),297 the plaintiffs,
faculty members at a state university in New York, had been let go at the end of their employment
contracts or had been informed they would be dismissed for their refusal to sign certificates stating
that they were not presently Communists and had notified the president of the State University of
New York if they had ever been Communists in the past.298 The Supreme Court struck down this
289
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policy as well, explaining that “‘the theory that public employment which may be denied altogether
may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.’”299
“‘It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the
denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.’”300
Barbara James’s claim in Wyman could have easily fit into this line of reasoning. The New
York policy that she challenged conditioned her receipt of public benefits from the ADC program on
her agreement to waive constitutional rights she would otherwise possess, namely the Fourth
Amendment right to bar government agents from searching her home without a warrant. Moreover,
the facts of Wyman, perhaps even more dramatically than those of Speiser or Keyishian, amply
supported the key insight behind the notion that conditioning a public benefit on the waiver of
constitutional rights should raise a constitutional question. James was not forced to apply for or
collect ADC, but she had extremely compelling reasons to do so. After all, James was eligible to
receive ADC precisely because she and her infant son had no other financial resources available to
them.301 Conditioning the receipt of this benefit on the waiver of constitutional rights functionally
operated (here, as in Speiser or Keyishian) in a way that was similar to a penalty imposed on James for
asserting her Fourth Amendment rights, which of course would be subject to constitutional challenge
(and probable defeat). Indeed, because James was under such tremendous pressure to forfeit her
rights, because she had so few other realistic options, New York’s policy functionally resembled
(although of course it was not precisely the same as) a direct government order that simply denied
James protection against warrantless searches outright.
But the Supreme Court decided the Wyman case on wholly different terms, which would
make it all but impossible to mount a successful constitutional challenge against government
programs that condition the provision of aid to poor families on their surrender of privacy and
autonomy. The Wyman Court held that a mother’s agreement to allow a ADC caseworker to visit
her home was fully voluntary, so that the caseworker’s visit was not a search at all within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.302 As the Court explained, any mother receiving ADC who did
not want a state worker to visit her home could simply refuse to agree to the visit, without fear of
criminal prosecution: “If consent to the visitation is withheld, no visitation takes place.”303 To be
sure, such an act would result in the state terminating the aid on which the family relied for its
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support, but the Court held that this penalty did not change the fundamentally voluntary nature of
the transaction or raise a constitutional issue.304
This was not the conception of consent and coercion that appeared to be driving the Speiser
and Keyishian decisions, although it did have some deep historical roots in the jurisprudence of family
law. Common law courts and commentators had long defended the application of marital status
rules, which fixed marital rights and duties in the law and made them unchangeable by private
agreement, by explaining that married people had voluntarily subjected themselves to these rules
when they agreed to marry. This argument about voluntariness had dismissed as irrelevant any
economic or social pressure that may have pushed women, in particular, into marriage.305 It had not
been traditionally applied in the parent-child context, presumably because it would be difficult to
characterize a child as having voluntarily agreed to his birth to his biological parents. But the Court
drew on a similar conception of voluntariness in Wyman, where aid was at stake. States, on its
interpretation of the Constitution, were free to use the provision and denial of financial support to
subject families on ADC to non-negotiable requirements, even if the form the intervention took was
wholly at odds with the norms conventionally associated with the law of parent and child, and the
constitutional protection of the home.
Indeed, the Wyman opinion took the notion that different rules should apply to families
receiving ADC as a matter of common sense. After finding that the required home visits were not
searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the Court went on to note that even if the
required visits did “somehow” constitute involuntary searches (even if, in other words, they did
trigger constitutional scrutiny under something like an unconstitutional conditions theory), they
ultimately raised no constitutional objection under the Fourth Amendment because they were
reasonable.306 The Court based this latter judgment on two somewhat contradictory arguments. The
first contended that New York needed the right to require home visits in order to make sure that
mothers receiving ADC were not committing fraud, endangering their children, or otherwise
behaving improperly.307 The second asserted that mothers subjected to home visits by ADC
caseworkers only benefited from these visits and had nothing to fear, because the caseworker was
“not a sleuth but rather, we trust, . . . a friend to one in need,” dispensing helpful advice and
assistance.308 Despite their cross-cutting impulses, both arguments were ultimately grounded in the
assumption—never stated but adopted as a matter of course—that the fact that a mother was
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receiving ADC was grounds to suspect that she needed outside supervision and guidance to monitor
and improve her behavior.
After all, parents who receive other government benefits (like Social Security, to cite one
prominent example)309 have never been routinely subjected to home visits. Certainly, those programs
also raise the possibility that families will obtain government funds through fraud, or that the aid
provided through those programs will be used to support families in which children are subject to
dangerous or simply mediocre parenting. But a program like Social Security does not automatically
presume that every one of its recipients is liable to be fraudulent, or abusive, or incompetent at any
moment, even though the families it serves are facing the stresses created when a breadwinner stops
working or dies and are often very eager to receive the relatively generous financial benefits that the
Social Security program provides. Any concerns that the Social Security program does have about
preventing those problems, moreover, are tempered by a commitment to protecting the family lives of
recipients from unnecessary disturbance. Inspections of these families’ homes without a warrant
would be considered unnecessary and improper intrusions into familial autonomy and privacy. The
Wyman Court, in contrast, made no reference to the principles of respect and deference
conventionally associated with family law, obviously convinced they did not properly apply in this
case. On its view, it was reasonable for the New York ADC program to rely on warrantless searches,
without compiling any of the particularized evidence about a specific household that securing a
warrant would require. Any mother receiving ADC could reasonably be suspected and scrutinized,
automatically.
The argument that the Wyman Court put forth to defend home visits should be deeply
familiar, by this point. The authors of the mothers’ pension laws, remember, had harbored a very
similar suspicion of program recipients; they operated on the conviction that the mothers receiving
these pensions could not be trusted to provide adequate care for their children unless forced to stay
at home, but they were equally certain that recipients could not be trusted with adequate funds to
enable them to stay home.310 The Wyman decision also resembles the line of legal regulation
extending from the child cruelty societies to the TANF program in that its commitment to the
bifurcation in the legal regulation of parenthood—its certainty that poor families without a father
able to support them do not merit the deference otherwise accorded to a parent’s household
government—is more deeply felt, than fully explained. When the Wyman decision all but precluded
successful constitutional challenges to this bifurcated regime, it ensured that future cases, and the
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legal and political decision makers who follow them, would have little cause to consider the issue in
more depth.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has survived in a number of arenas since Wyman,
although none of these cases appear to raise pressing issues of class, race, or gender. Where the
property rights of landowners are at issue, for instance, the Supreme Court has held that a
government cannot condition approval of a building permit on the property owner’s agreement to
dedicate a portion of her land to flood control and traffic improvements,311 or on the owner’s
agreement to give the public an easement across her beachfront property.312 With the free speech
rights of the media at stake, the Court has ruled that a government cannot condition a tax
exemption for periodicals on the subject matter of the magazine,313 or condition funding to a
noncommercial educational broadcasting station on the station’s agreement not to engage in
editorializing.314 Public employees have also been successful with unconstitutional conditions
arguments, with the Court finding that a government cannot condition public employment on the
surrender of the due process right to notice and an opportunity to respond before termination,315 or
condition continued public employment on membership in a particular political party.316
But constitutional challenges since Wyman to the bifurcation in the law of parental relations
have been summarily rejected,317 on the ground—crucial to the Wyman decision as well—that the
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disputed policies affected only voluntary behavior and hence could not infringe upon any
constitutional rights at all. Consider how the Supreme Court quickly disposed of two challenges to
policies that conditioned some welfare benefits on the restructuring familial relations. In Lyng v.
Castillo (1986),318 the Supreme Court held that it raised no constitutional issues for the federal food
stamp program, which provided subsidized food vouchers to ADC recipients and other poor families,
to deny or reduce benefits to closely related families who lived together, but generally bought their
food and prepared their meals separately.319 Such a statutory scheme placed tremendous financial
full TANF benefits on an applicant’s one-year residence in the state, even if the state provided the applicant with the
amount of TANF benefits that she would have received had she remained in her prior state of residence, see id. at 492-93,
495-96, 507-08. Along the same basic lines, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), held that a state could not
condition eligibility for welfare benefits upon United States citizenship or require aliens to have spent a specified number
of years in the United States, see id. at 366, 376, 380.
In my opinion, however, none of these cases squarely implicate the divide in the law of parental relations.
Indeed, they do not seem particular to the welfare context at all. To be sure, the statutes challenged in Shapiro, and
perhaps those at issue in some of the other cases as well, placed financial pressure on parents receiving welfare to stay in
their current state of residence. But none of these statutes appear to have been motivated by a desire to subject families
associated with failed fatherhood to special forms of suspicion and interference not applied to the households of more
successful family men, which is the key normative hallmark of the legal tradition extending from the child cruelty
societies to the Personal Responsibility Act. Instead, states defended the statutes at issue in these cases with variations on
the same essential argument that they have employed to defend the lower tuition rates that public universities offer to
students who have resided in the state for a specified amount of time or that Alaska, in particular, has used to defend a
dividend distribution program according preferential treatment to established state residents: namely that a state has a
legitimate interest in favoring its own long-time residents in distributing limited resources and will best be able to offer
generous benefits to those residents if it can prevent newcomers from immediately claiming an equal share and raising the
state’s total costs in a way thought to be undesirable or unfair. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 497; Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S.
at 263; Graham, 403 U.S. at 372; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627-28. The Supreme Court almost always rejects this sort of
argument, in the welfare context and out. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 56, 65 (1982) (striking down
Alaskan statutory scheme that distributed income derived from the state’s natural resources to the adult citizens of the
state in varying amounts based on the length of each citizen’s residence in the state); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452
(1973) (holding that state university cannot deny a student in-state tuition rates on the basis of a permanent and
irrebutable presumption of nonresidence).
In addition, there is one case, United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), that
might be considered closer to a successful constitutional challenge to an aspect of the bifurcated law of parenthood.
Moreno considered the constitutionality of a federal statute that excluded from the food stamp program any household
containing an individual who was unrelated to any other member of the household. See id. at 529. The statute created
enormous incentives for households to restructure themselves. See id. at 537-38. In that sense, it was quite typical of the
interventionist norms that the law has repeatedly applied to families associated with dependency and failed fatherhood,
although, in fact, the statute’s legislature history indicates that the law was actually passed “to prevent so-called ‘hippies’
and ‘hippie communes’ from participating in the food stamp program.” Id. at 534.
In Moreno, the Court struck down this statute. See id. at 538. That result stands in important contrast to
Wyman, as well as to the cases discussed below. See infra notes 318-350 and accompanying text. At the same time, the
Moreno Court did not rely on a theory of unconstitutional conditions, or hold that any fundamental rights of privacy or
liberty were infringed upon by the challenged law. It simply ruled that the particular statutory classification at issue
failed the rational basis test applied to every law passed by Congress because there was no rational reason to believe that
the rule would serve the food stamp program’s purposes of improving nutrition among low-income households and
supporting the agricultural industry or that it would help to minimize fraud in the program. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 53338.
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pressure on poor people to reorder their family lives so that all closely related families residing in the
same house ate together. But the Court found, nonetheless, that the law did not “‘directly and
substantially’ interfere with family living arrangements and thereby burden a fundamental right”
because it did not actually “order or prevent any group of persons from dining together.”320 Along
the same lines, Bowen v. Gilliard (1987)321 held that the federal government could structure the ADC
program so that some families would have significantly greater financial resources available to them if
the mother sent one or more of her children to live in another household.322 The Court concluded
that such a statute presented no constitutional questions either, because a mother making such a
choice was acting freely: “That some families may decide to modify their living arrangements in order
to avoid the effect of” such a policy, the Court reasoned, “does not transform the [law] into an act
whose design and direct effect are to ‘intrud[e] on choices concerning family living arrangements.’”323
Having determined that no constitutional rights could be infringed upon by these two
statutory schemes, the Court felt the need to only briefly state why it was altogether reasonable for
Congress to regulate family relationships among recipients of welfare benefits in this way. As in
Wyman, the Court relied heavily on conclusory (but historically resonant) justifications steeped in
suspicion and worries about fraud, while simultaneously denying that the challenged policies would
have an adverse effect on the family life of the people affected. It explained in Castillo, for instance,
320
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that “the Legislature’s recognition of the potential for mistake and fraud and the cost-ineffectiveness
of case-by-case verification of claims that individuals ate as separate households unquestionably
warrant[ed]” Congress’s decision to reduce or deny benefits based on the categorical assumption that
closely related families living in the same house bought their food and prepared their meals
together.324 The Court saw no cause to elaborate on the reasons why concerns about fraud should
loom so large as a rationale for the law’s treatment of family relations among recipients of food
stamps, when such worries do not play nearly as large a role in other programs (like Social Security,
for example)325 that distribute benefits to family members but are not popularly associated with
economic dependency or failed fatherhood. That fact was taken as a given, here as in Wyman, as was
the proposition that it was unremarkable and untroubling for the government to use the provision
and denial of aid as a means of pushing families receiving stigmatized benefits like food stamps into
reordering the internal structures of their familial relationships. With no evident qualm or nod to
the norms of deference, respect, and noninterventionism generally understood to characterize the
law’s treatment of family life, the Court concluded in Castillo that it would be relatively easy and
unproblematic “for close relatives . . . to accommodate their living habits to a federal policy favoring
common meal preparation.”326
Since deciding Wyman, the Court has also employed the mode of argument used to dispose of
constitutional challenges to the bifurcated treatment of parental relations more broadly, in litigation
that more generally addresses the reproductive rights of poor women. An apt example can be found
among the Court’s decisions upholding laws that deny poor women access to abortions under
Medicaid, a joint federal-state program that provides medical care, including that associated with
childbirth, to recipients of ADC or TANF and to other indigent people. Maher v. Roe (1977),327 for
instance, rejected a constitutional challenge to a Connecticut regulation that refused to provide poor
women who received their medical care through the state Medicaid program with first trimester
abortions, unless the abortions were “‘medically necessary.’”328 The regulation was explicitly intended
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to push pregnant women receiving Medicaid into giving birth to a child,329 wielding a form of
pressure that could only be applied with such intensity to women who were eligible for statesupported health care precisely because they lacked the financial resources to pay for medical
procedures like abortions on their own. But the Maher Court held, nonetheless, that the regulation
did not impinge upon a woman’s constitutional right to have a first trimester abortion, or create a
problematic divide between poor women and privileged women, who would have much greater
practical access to abortion services.330 Instead, it explained, here as in Wyman and its progeny, that
the Connecticut regulation raised no such constitutional issues because any steps that a woman took
or decisions that she made in light of this law would be fully voluntary and not coerced or created in
any way by the state. “An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a
consequence of Connecticut’s decision to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent
on private sources for the service she desires,” the Maher Court reasoned.331 “The State,” the Court
continued, “may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman’s
decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there.”332
Harris v. McRae (1980)333 similarly upheld the constitutionality of a series of federal laws (popularly
known as the “Hyde Amendments”) that denied states reimbursement for the cost of certain
medically necessary abortions that they chose to provide under their Medicaid programs.334 Like the
Connecticut regulation upheld in Maher, the Hyde Amendments were explicitly designed to use the
provision and denial of aid to make it much more difficult for poor women enrolled in the Medicaid
program to obtain abortions.335 Yet the Court again held that the challenged laws did not infringe
upon an indigent woman’s constitutional right to abortion, concluding that the woman’s choice
remained free and unconstrained by the state: “Although Congress has opted to subsidize medically
necessary services generally, but not certain medically necessary abortions, the fact remains,” the
Court explained, “that the Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent woman with at least the same range
of choice in deciding whether to obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if
Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all.”336
329

See id. at 475, 478-80.
See id. at 474.
331
Id.
332
Id.
333
448 U.S. 297 (1980).
334
See id. at 300-03, 326.
335
See id. at 315.
336
Id. at 316-17; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (“Petitioners contend . . . that most Title X
clients are effectively precluded by indigency and poverty from seeing a health-care provider who will provide abortionrelated services [since federal law prohibits family planning clinics that receive federal funding under Title X from using
those federal funds to provide abortion-related services]. But once again, even these Title X clients are in no worse
position than if Congress had never enacted Title X.”); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1989)
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But the record of the recent litigation on the family cap provisions applied to welfare
recipients is perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the status, treatment, and interest that courts
currently bestow on constitutional cases that challenge the divide in the law of parental relations.
This case law has two very notable characteristics. Its first prominent feature is its sparseness. Even
before the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996 authorized states to enact family cap provisions in
their TANF programs, nineteen states had received waivers from the federal government enabling
them to make family caps part of their ADC programs.337 By October 1997, twenty-two states had
family cap policies in place.338 All of these provisions, however, have resulted in only two
(unsuccessful) legal challenges pursued to the point of a published court opinion, a sign that potential
plaintiffs recognize the difficulties that such suits confront.339 The second striking feature of this case

(“Missouri’s refusal to allow public employees to perform abortions in public hospitals leaves a pregnant woman with the
same choices as if the State had chosen not to operate any public hospitals at all.”).
The Court did note in Maher that “[i]f Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women who had
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, . . . strict scrutiny might be appropriate.” 432 U.S. at
474-75 n.8. It similarly remarked in Harris that “[a] substantial constitutional question would arise if Congress had
attempted to withhold all Medicaid benefits from an otherwise eligible candidate simply because that candidate had
exercised her constitutionally protected freedom to terminate her pregnancy by abortion.” 448 U.S. at 317 n.19. On the
Court’s view, either of these imagined regimes of exclusion might count as a “penalty” imposed for exercising a
constitutional right, rather than simply “a refusal to subsidize” the exercise of that right. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474-75 n.8;
Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19. It is not clear what underlies this judgment and proposed distinction. Certainly, the logic
of voluntariness that the Court deployed in Maher and Harris could be extended to uphold the Court’s imagined statutes.
The Court could reason in these future cases, as in Maher and Harris, that pregnant indigent women exercise a legally
free choice in deciding whether to have an abortion, because the state does not actually compel them to carry their fetuses
to term. To be sure, the indigent pregnant women who do chose to have an abortion will never again be eligible for
general welfare benefits and/or Medicaid. But the logic of Maher and Harris might indicate that this result should be
understood as leaving those women no worse off than if general welfare benefits and/or the Medicaid program had never
existed. All that said, however, the Court’s decision to raise constitutional questions about these imagined regulatory
regimes does suggest that the Court thinks that there has to be some limit to its arguments from voluntariness.
337
See GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 263, at VI-8 (“15 [states] had a family cap in place prior to the passage of
PRWORA [the Personal Responsibility Act] in August 1996. The other 7 states did not implement a family cap until
after PRWORA, however all but 3 states . . . had received permission for a family cap under waivers.”); OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SETTING THE
BASELINE: A REPORT ON STATE WELFARE WAIVERS 6 (1997).
338
See GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 263, at VI-8.
339
See C.K. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’g 883 F. Supp.
991 (D.N.J. 1995); N.B. v. Sybinski, 724 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). A New Jersey Superior Court judge also
recently issued an oral decision rejecting a challenge to the state’s family cap provisions that was brought under the New
Jersey constitution. The plaintiffs had contended that the family cap policy in New Jersey violated the state’s equal
protection guarantee and interfered with a woman’s fundamental right under the state constitution to decide whether to
have additional children. See Randall J. Peach, Judge Upholds N.J.’s Welfare Cap Linked to Birth of Added Children,
N.J.L.J., Sept. 4, 2000, at 8, 8 (reporting oral decision in Sojourner A. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Human Servs., No. ESX-L10171-97 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Aug. 30, 2000)); Appeal Likely on Welfare Cap, N.J. LAW., Sept. 4, 2000, at 2, 2
(reporting that plaintiffs expect to appeal). In addition, a small handful of suits challenging family cap provisions have
been filed and are awaiting judicial disposition. See, e.g., Gates v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, No. 99-J218 (Mass. App. Ct. May 3, 1999) (order denying preliminary injunction); Mason v. Nebraska, No. CI00-3389 (Neb.
Dist. Ct. filed Sept. 15, 2000).
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law, linked to the first, is how little attention it devotes to the normative premises underlying the
family cap policies in the absence of a live constitutional question as to their legal validity.
Consider, for instance, the opinion that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
issued in C.K. v. New Jersey Department of Health and Human Services (1996), which rejected a
challenge to New Jersey’s family cap policy.340 This policy, initiated under waiver in 1992,341 provided
that families entering the ADC program would receive (somewhat) more aid for each additional
child they contained, reflecting the added costs of raising more children. However, families would
not receive any more aid from the New Jersey ADC program to cover the costs of an additional child,
if that child was conceived and born while her mother was already receiving ADC.342 The policy
explicitly intended to use the state’s power over the financial support it granted and denied as a
means of influencing the reproductive decisions of women receiving ADC. Specifically, (and in this
way unlike the anti-abortion legislation upheld in Maher and Harris),343 it sought to give women
receiving ADC a stark incentive not to have more children. Indeed, in its application to the federal
government for a waiver to implement the family cap policy, the New Jersey Department of Health
and Human Services “explicitly described the choice to have a child while receiving public support as
‘irresponsible [and] not socially desirable.’”344 Plaintiffs, a class consisting of individuals in families
subject to the New Jersey family cap,345 challenged the policy on statutory, regulatory, and
constitutional grounds.346 Most of their arguments fell in the first two categories, however, an
acknowledgment of how difficult it is to raise a successful claim under the current constitutional
framework.347
The Court of Appeals, for its part, quickly disposed of the plaintiffs’ claims under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses, after also rejecting their statutory and regulatory contentions.
It explained, in a logic deeply reminiscent of the Wyman opinion and its Supreme Court progeny,
that New Jersey’s family cap placed no burden on reproductive choice and was, instead, “neutral with
respect to that choice.”348 This was the case, the court held, because the New Jersey policy that
denied additional aid to mothers who had another child while receiving ADC, also did not provide
340

See C.K., 92 F.3d at 177-78, 195.
See id. at 177.
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See id. at 179 (“The provision challenged in this action is section 3.5 of the chapter, an amendment to
then-existing state law that eliminates the standard AFDC grant increase (e.g., $102 for a second child and $64 for a third
child) for any child conceived by and born to an AFDC recipient.”).
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See supra text accompanying notes 327-336.
344
C.K., 92 F.3d at 180 (quoting App. at 183).
345
See id. at 177 n.1.
346
See id. at 177-78.
347
See id. at 181-94.
348
Id. at 195. In making this determination, the court did not see the need to actually cite any cases, except the
district court opinion in the case before it. See id. at 194-95.
341
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additional aid to mothers who had no more children while on ADC. Either way, whether a woman
had more children or not, she received no increase in financial support. A woman’s decision about
whether to have another child thus remained fully voluntary, free, and uncoerced as a matter of
constitutional law, despite the fact that mothers who did have more children while on ADC would
be left with less to support each child on than even the ADC program otherwise thought
appropriate.349 The constitutional question effortlessly (if bizarrely) answered, the court saw no need
to question or examine the normative validity of subjecting women receiving ADC (or now TANF)
to forms of interventionist and instrumental regulation wholly at odds with the norms governing the
rest of family law. It was simply a moot issue.350
C.

The Need for Normative Deliberation

The ease with which our current constitutional regime dismisses legal challenges to the
bifurcated regulation of parenthood has discouraged sustained normative debate on the subject. But
the lack of realistic constitutional possibilities should not preclude serious reflection about whether
the divide in the law of parenthood should persist as a matter of legislative and regulatory policy.
Indeed, such reflection is particularly needed in an arena that has been missing the forms of
deliberation that constitutional adjudication can sometimes supply.
The crucial unexplored question does not concern how much welfare the government should
provide, a much discussed subject in recent years.351 Instead, it asks why the provision of welfare
should be reason to completely alter the legal norms that govern a family’s relations. Why should it
be the case that a father’s failure to provide, together with a mother and child’s call for government
support through certain tainted programs, is still enough to subject every member of that family to
legal rules and presumptions that are interventionist, instrumental, and wholly opposed to those
349

See id. N.B. v. Sybinski, 724 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), rejected a constitutional challenge to
Indiana’s family cap policy on similar grounds, reasoning that the policy “does not deprive the Class of the right to have
children; rather, it merely chooses not to subsidize the increased costs of an additional child,” id. at 1110; see also id. at
1109 (“Indiana has done nothing to bar a TANF recipient from keeping a capped child in the home; rather, the State has
merely chosen not to subsidize the parents’ fundamental right by removing the automatic benefit increase associated with
an additional child under the AFDC program.”); id. (“The fact that some families may choose to remove a capped child
from their home in order to avoid the effects of the family cap does not give the rule coercive effect and make it
unconstitutional.”).
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See C.K., 92 F.3d at 195.
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For typical statements in this debate, see 141 CONG. REC. 15,450 (1995) (extended remarks of Rep.
Cunningham) (“‘The spending on welfare, food stamps, AFDC, and others must decrease. These programs have increased
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Really Means, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1995, at B7, B7 (“Child advocates wonder why some people are so outraged over
the 1.5% of the federal budget spent on AFDC, given the much larger waste on corporate subsidies, and the expenditure
of 20 times this amount on the elderly.”).
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conventionally associated with family law? Why should the law sustain two separate and very
different normative regimes for governing parenthood whose application turns on whether money is
transferred in this particular social modality?
Constitutional courts and legislative policymakers have hardly begun to frame this question,
much less formulate a normative response. In fact, courts have endorsed America’s record of dual
regimes for governing parenthood with little question. In considering the law’s bifurcated treatment
of parental relations, they have accepted and reasoned from within the very structure that created
the divide.
It may be that one could offer a convincing defense for the current structure of the legal
regulation of parenthood. To be honest, I am deeply skeptical that such a defense exists. If the
deference that the common law tradition accords to a parent’s household government does not
adequately recognize a child’s right to be protected from parental abuse and excess, the tradition of
legal regulation extending from the child cruelty societies to the Personal Responsibility Act evinces
an enthusiasm for disrupting parental prerogatives that turns on particular forms of economic failure
rather than, for instance, actual evidence of child abuse.
The more important point, however, is that so far we have not even begun to have a sustained
national conversation about whether and why the legal treatment of parenthood should be divided as
it is now. The bifurcation in America’s law of parental relations is widely taken to be a matter of
common sense that is beyond the need for rigorous explanation. Yet to the extent that these common
sense intuitions rest, as they fundamentally appear to, on the familiarity created by past practice, that
history can no longer be taken to provide an adequate justification. Many of the reasons historically
offered for the divide’s creation and maintenance would not convince large numbers of modern
Americans. Indeed, the impulses behind the creation and maintenance of the bifurcation in the law’s
treatment of parental relations have frequently reflected a vision of class, race, and gender that
portions of our contemporary legal and constitutional culture actively repudiate in other contexts.
We can no longer comfortably rely on the long record of past practice to explain and perpetuate the
bifurcation in the law of parenthood. The time for serious deliberation about the divide is long
overdue.
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